arXiv:2608.02665v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A benchmark score is a measurement instrument, yet most benchmarks read each item at a single canonical surface form. We ask whether that reading is faithful: when an item's intent is held fixed and only its meaning-preserving surface form varies, does the canonical-form score estimate model behavior well, and how much of any variation is decoding/judge noise rather than signal? We instantiate this in safety, a high-stakes setting with no gold label to average toward. To avoid prior confounds, we pre-author the reformulations (refusal-free, mostly non-LLM: machine back-translation and a Matrix-Language-Frame code-switch generator) so an identical surface form reaches every model, score all responses with one human-anchored, vendor-neutral judge (Claude, kappa = 0.86 vs. human on unsafe compliance, stable across languages, cross-checked by GPT-4o), and verify intent preservation. On 370 seeds x 5 surface forms x 5 models, no single transformation is uniformly most dangerous (6 of 20 per-transformation McNemar tests survive correction, most protective). Yet evaluating only the canonical prompt underestimates unsafe compliance: the union of unsafe outcomes across forms exceeds even the worst single form by 3.3-12.9 pp, with bootstrap 95% CIs excluding zero for all five models, and 5-13% of seeds safe on canonical are unsafe under some reformulation -- above a zero stochasticity floor (canonical resampled five times at temperature 0 gives 0/370 new exposures). The size of this gap is model-dependent (largest on Gemini 2.5 Pro). One form recovers only ~53% of a model's observed unsafe surface and about three reach 85% -- a redundancy characterization of this form set, not of a defined population. A benign control (XSTest) suggests the instability is bidirectional, though the benign and harmful pools are not item-matched. We release the dataset, code, and per-response labels.
Single Canonical Prompts Underestimate LLM Safety's Surface-Form Sensitivity
A new arXiv preprint (2608.02665v1) finds that evaluating large language models on a single canonical prompt surface underestimates unsafe compliance by 3.3 to 12.9 percentage points across five models, with 5-13% of safety seeds that are safe on the canonical form becoming unsafe under some reformulation. The study, which used 370 seeds, five surface forms, and five models, also shows that no single transformation is uniformly most dangerous, and that the gap is largest on Gemini 2.5 Pro. The authors release their dataset, code, and per-response labels.
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