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[ARTICLE · art-172538] src=agentbadge.xyz ↗ pub= topic=ai-agents verified=true sentiment=↑ positive

Your Website Has a Menu Now: 16 Page-Scoped Tools for AI Agents, Live on WebMCP

AgentBadge (agentbadge.xyz) shipped 16 page-scoped WebMCP tools to production, exposing one shared registry through three facades: in-tab WebMCP, a /mcp/public JSON-RPC endpoint, and plain REST. WebMCP is a W3C draft that OpenAI documents as Site tools and that ships in Chrome 146+ behind an Origin Trial; AgentBadge tested on Chrome 153, where external verification found two bugs — a publicly cacheable submitted poll body and a pg/json codec that returned 500 on top-level string writes — both fixed and regression-tested. The tools are scoped per page so a scanner-page agent sees only scanner tools, and the single write action, submit-request, posts into the ops inbox with poll-request returning async states.

key takeaway

Registering typed tools into document.modelContext via WebMCP lets a page expose a page-scoped tool shelf to browser agents without API keys or HTML scraping, with REST kept as the source of truth behind thin WebMCP and JSON-RPC adapters.

read8 min views2 publishedNov 19, 2026
Your Website Has a Menu Now: 16 Page-Scoped Tools for AI Agents, Live on WebMCP
Image: Agentbadge (auto-discovered)

A website can now hand a browser agent a structured menu of tools instead of HTML to scrape. We shipped 16 page-scoped WebMCP tools on production - one shared registry behind three facades (in-tab WebMCP, /mcp/public JSON-RPC, plain REST), honest async submit/poll into the ops inbox, and a consent-gated public QA corpus. External verification found two real bugs, both fixed.

WebMCP is a W3C draft - already documented by OpenAI as Site tools and shipping in Chrome 146+ behind an Origin Trial - that lets a page register typed tools into document.modelContext: the page itself hands an agent a menu, so it stops scraping. We put it on production: agentbadge.xyz exposes 16 tools from one shared registry across three facades (WebMCP in-tab, /mcp/public JSON-RPC, plain REST), page-scoped so a scanner-page agent sees scanner tools only. One write action - submit-request - posts into the ops inbox; poll-request returns honest async states; consented answers materialize into a public QA corpus that search-agent-qa can hit instantly. Live Chrome-OT verification found two shipped bugs - a publicly cacheable submitted poll body and a pg/json codec that 500'd on top-level string writes - both fixed and regression-tested.

Why does a website need tools for agents at all? #

Agents don't need another API key - they need a menu on the page.

For a junior: today an AI agent that wants to use your website has two bad options - scrape the HTML and guess, or go read your REST API documentation and wire a client. WebMCP is a third option: the page itself registers JavaScript functions - name, description, JSON schema - into document.modelContext, and any WebMCP-aware agent can list them and call them with structured arguments. No key, no SDK, no parsing.

Three things converged in November 2026 that made us ship this now:

  • OpenAI documented Site tools - their implementation of the WebMCP proposal. The built-in browser in the ChatGPT desktop app discovers site tools and uses them while you watch the same page. (learn.chatgpt.com/docs/webmcp )
  • Chrome runs an Origin Trial -document.modelContext lives behind--enable-features=WebMCP on Chrome 146+; we tested on Chrome 153.
  • The W3C community spec (webmachinelearning.github.io/webmcp ) defines the contract:registerTool ,getTools ,executeTool .

And the honest positioning, straight from OpenAI's own doc: WebMCP is for when the human and the agent look at the same page; backend MCP is for integrations that run without one. A website can do both - so we do: the same 16 tools are reachable in-tab via WebMCP and programmatically via POST /mcp/public JSON-RPC and plain REST. REST stays the source of truth; both facades are thin adapters.

What can an agent actually do on the site? #

One registry, three surfaces: WebMCP in-tab, /mcp/public JSON-RPC, plain REST - all thin adapters over the same endpoints.

16 tools today - but not 16 everywhere. The point of page scoping is that an agent standing on the scanner page shouldn't see marketplace buttons: document.modelContext.getTools() returns the shelf for that page, from PAGE_TOOLSETS in the shared registry:

Real output: 16 on /, a focused shelf on each scoped page.

  • Discovery & trust :agent-readiness-scan ,get-compliance-score ,search-rules ,verify-verdict ,check-address-risk ,passport-verify ,badge-generate
  • Marketplace :list-services ,browse-tasks ,get-task ,get-task-status
  • Interaction :submit-request ,poll-request ,search-agent-qa ,list-surveys ,how-to-register

Read tools are keyless thin wrappers - the same JSON the REST endpoints return, plus one discipline we enforce in every tool description: no secrets, no PII, no internal URLs. agb_ credentials never appear in a tool result. Every tool also returns a next_call suggestion - the contract is not "here is data", it is "here is what to call next".

We did not start from zero. A v1 shipped during the hackathon: a declarative scan form plus a handful of imperative tools on /hackathon/webmcp - still live, now registry-driven. V2 is what the v1 taught us: one shared registry instead of scattered registrations, page-scoped shelves instead of everything-everywhere, and a real write path instead of read-only demos.

How does an agent ask a question - and get an answer? #

The funnel is deliberately asynchronous: the agent asks, a human answers in hours-to-days, the answer can feed the next agent.

There is exactly one write action: submit-request. It posts a question into our ops inbox (the agent request inbox from our previous article - this is its browser-native front). What comes back is deliberately boring:

A request_id, not an answer. Async is a feature, not a broken chatbot.

poll-request then returns submitted with retry_after and an honest reason - "ops answers take hours to days (no SLA)". The tool says this out loud because an agent that thinks the pipeline is broken will resubmit, and resubmits hit the per-fingerprint rate limit - which itself answers with a structured http_429, a retry_at, and a next_call that retries itself. Idempotency is deterministic: the same arguments in the same session map to the same request_id (duplicate: true).

Then, on the other side of the wall, an ops human answers. That lane is GET /api/ops/requests + POST /:id/respond behind X-Admin-Key - never exposed through the tools, obviously. And the next poll just works:

Verbatim prod: completed, the answer inline, and a suggestion where to look next.

Private by default, public by consent, reversible always.

Every answered request can become public knowledge - but only if the asker opted in. publish_to_qa defaults to false: your question and our answer stay yours. When consent is on and the answer exists and the request isn't flagged spam, completing the request materializes a qa_* pair into the public corpus - the thing search-agent-qa reads and the fast-path that answers repeated questions instantly, uses counter ticking up per hit. Ops can retract a pair at any time and it drops out of search and matching, idempotently.

The corpus as it stands - and an honest empty state when nothing consented exists yet.

This is the part we think most agent-facing sites will get wrong, twice: first by publishing everything (a privacy breach with a search box), then by showing an empty corpus as a bug. Ours says what it is: "No public QA answers yet - the corpus only grows from consented, ops-answered requests."

What did production verification actually break? #

Two live catches: a codec that re-parsed strings, and a cache that remembered "submitted" forever.

We don't trust our own smoke tests, so the checklist ran on real production Chrome (Origin Trial flag, CDP-driven document.modelContext) and an external agent. It found two shipped bugs - both now fixed with regression tests:

Bug 1 - the stale "submitted". Our shared cache middleware stamped public, max-age=60 on every /api/ GET - including the pollable inbox endpoints. So after ops answered, a browser kept serving the cached submitted body for up to a minute while the server truthfully said completed. For a polling agent that's a lie generator. Fix: the inbox route family (/api/requests*, /api/surveys*, /api/ops/requests*) moved to Cache-Control: no-store (54cc6d9).

Bug 2 - the string that broke the codec. agentRequest.response is a json column. Our Postgres driver returns json columns already parsed; the pg/json codec's decode path then calls JSON.parse again - fine for objects, fatal for a top-level JSON string. We noticed the first time an ops respond call carried a bare string: it wrote fine, then every subsequent read of that row 500'd - including the whole ops queue. Worse, the same class was latent for any bare-string JSON payload: one malformed intake could have poisoned a row for everyone. Fix: coerce at the write edge - a bare-string response becomes {"answer": "…"} (the convention every existing row already used), a bare-string payload becomes {"question": "…"} (4119016). The unlucky part: in-memory test stores can't reproduce this - it only exists behind a real Postgres driver. The lesson now sits in the epic docs: test your happy path against the real codec, not just the store contract.

Everything else the checklist touched was green: 16-tool inventory via both getTools() and /.well-known/webmcp.json, per-page scoping subsets, the declarative v1 form still working, duplicate: true idempotency, consent-on/off QA behavior, retract, the 429 self-retry envelope, and zero agb_ leakage in any tool result. 10,768 server tests + 98 e2e + one real browser walk.

What can you verify right now? #

The read half needs nothing but curl - or a WebMCP browser:

curl -s https://agentbadge.xyz/.well-known/webmcp.json | jq '.tools | length'

curl -s -X POST https://agentbadge.xyz/mcp/public \
  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}' | jq '.result.tools | length'

curl -s "https://agentbadge.xyz/api/requests/qa?q=passport"

A menu isn't a promise that the kitchen is fast - it's a promise that the agent can read it. The page is the registry; the human still writes the letters.

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