# Your AI agent should not have unrestricted power > Source: > Published: 2026-07-16 07:52:47+00:00 Most people building AI agents wire the model straight to real actions. The model says run this. So it runs. That works right up until a fetched web page, a poisoned file, or one bad reasoning step tells your agent to delete a folder, send money, or overwrite production. There is nothing sitting between the model's words and the irreversible action. I run a few autonomous systems that touch real money and real files. So I built the layer I wanted in that gap. It is called `agent-gate` . Plain Python. No framework. No dependencies. MIT. Your agent still decides. But code decides whether it is allowed to act. The model's `APPROVED` is not authority. Authority only comes from a one time capability token that a deterministic gate issues after the request passes explicit code level checks. ``` php LLM output -> [ POLICY GATE ] -> real action | approves only if the request passes deterministic checks ``` | Guarantee | How | |---|---| | Reject before select | Dangerous goals are killed before they are ever chosen, not filtered after | | AI judgment is not authority | The model cannot act on reasoning alone. A deterministic gateway must issue a token first | | One time hash bound tokens | A token is bound to the exact request hash and is single use. Change the request or replay it and it is void | | Reversible by default | The sandbox backs up before every write, so a wrong or injected action can be rolled back | | Observed data is not a command | Text inside fetched pages, files, and tool output is treated as data, never as an authenticated instruction | | Tamper evident audit | Every step goes to an append only hash chained log. Edit one line and the chain breaks | | Human keeps the keys | High risk actions like delete, pay, and deploy require explicit human approval by design | Run `python demo.py` and you get two flows. **A legitimate action.** The agent wants to fix a wrong total in a file. It clears the sequential gates. The gateway issues a one time token. The sandbox backs the file up, writes it, blocks a replay of the same token, and rolls the change back. ``` [gateway] ISSUE_TOKEN (11/11 checks passed) [sandbox] executed=True backup=report.txt.bak [replay] executed=False (single-use token blocks reuse) [rollback] rolled_back=True (original restored) ``` **A prompt injection.** A fetched page contains this. ``` ``` A naive agent might follow it. Here the Rejector kills that goal before it is ever selected, so the gateway never even sees it. ``` php [rejector] G-INJ -> rejected - OBSERVED_DATA_TREATED_AS_HUMAN_INSTRUCTION - FORBIDDEN_LEVEL_L4 - IRREVERSIBLE - MATCHES_ABSOLUTE_PROHIBITION [result] the gateway never receives this goal -> 0 tokens, 0 execution ``` Then the audit chain is verified, and one line is tampered with to prove the chain catches it. The core is one file. The shape is always the same. Put the gate in front of the single function that actually touches the world. ``` python from agent_gate import Constitution, PolicyGateway, SandboxExecutor, AuditLogger k = Constitution("constitution.json") log = AuditLogger("audit_log.jsonl") gw = PolicyGateway(k, limits, log) # before ANY real action, ask the gate token, decision = gw.check_and_issue(action_request, evaluator_verdict, human_approval) # no valid token, no action if token: sandbox.execute(token, action_request, new_content) ``` The model can propose anything. Only requests that clear the gate become tokens. This is not an autonomous reasoning breakthrough. It is the boring part that actually keeps you safe. The evaluator and reasoning triggers in the repo are deliberately simple stubs. Swap in your own model where marked. I think the boring part is underrated. Repo and demo here: [https://github.com/wildeconforce/agent-gate](https://github.com/wildeconforce/agent-gate) If you are shipping agents in production I would love to hear how you handle this gap.