{"slug": "upload2shell-cve-2026-125396", "title": "Upload2Shell · CVE-2026-125396", "summary": "Researchers at pwn.ai disclosed Upload2Shell, a use-after-free in Ghostscript's Type 1 font loader that lets a crafted document escape the `-dSAFER` sandbox and run attacker-chosen commands as the rendering process, tracked as CVE-2026-125396 and filed upstream as Artifex Bug 709684. The team confirmed remote code execution through Debian 13 CUPS (an anonymous IPP Print-Job to a shared network queue ran on the host as `uid=7(lp)`), plus ImageMagick delegates running as `www-data`, Roundcube thumbnails in Plesk Obsidian, WordPress upload plugins, MediaWiki's PdfHandler, and Google's document renderer. Artifex released a fix in Ghostscript 10.08.0, Debian published the fixed security build `10.05.1~dfsg-1+deb13u3`, and Ubuntu issued USN-8949-1.", "body_md": "#### Debian 13 CUPS\n\nGhostscript 10.05.1~dfsg-1+deb13u1\n\n- Access\n- Anonymous IPP Print-Job to a shared network queue\n- Observed\n- Command on the host as `uid=7(lp)`\n- Proof\n- One remote run; separate 20/20 local conversions\n\nA use-after-free in Ghostscript’s Type 1 font loader lets a crafted document cross Ghostscript’s `-dSAFER` sandbox, alter native path controls, and execute attacker-chosen commands as the rendering process.\n\nGhostscript sits beneath print, email, upload, and preview workflows. [Our ImageMagick research](https://pwn.ai/blog/imagemagick-from-arbitrary-file-read-to-rce-in-every-policy-zeroday) showed how files named `.png` or `.jpg` can still reach Ghostscript through image conversion. The index below records confirmed affected paths alongside additional applications whose renderer routes we traced.\n\nUpload2Shell / public record\n\nFrom the first escape to the downstream reports, fixes, and publication.\n\nWe found a Type 1 font-loader path out of Ghostscript's `-dSAFER` boundary. A crafted document gained native access inside the rendering process.\n\nA signed-out request for an attacker-hosted file reached Ghostscript in Google's document renderer. We sent the production proof to Google.\n\nCore's upload path exposed the renderer to Author+ users and any Contributor granted `upload_files`. Public upload fields in multiple plugins required no WordPress login. WordPress shipped its separate [CVE-2026-65640](https://github.com/WordPress/wordpress-develop/security/advisories/GHSA-8vr3-7mxf-gx8w) fix.\n\nWe filed the Type 1 loader flaw upstream as Artifex Bug 709684. Our broader audit also produced other independent Ghostscript findings.\n\nArtifex [released the fix](https://github.com/ArtifexSoftware/ghostpdl-downloads/releases/tag/gs10080) for the Type 1 loader flaw.\n\nWe confirmed a production document-processing finding in our broader Ghostscript research. Its individual root and proof belong to a separate case study.\n\nGhostscript 10.08.0 entered Debian unstable. The Debian 13 security update followed later.\n\nConfirmed unauthenticated remote command execution: an IPP job to a shared queue ran on the host as `lp`. We sent the network reproduction to Debian Security.\n\nConfirmed remote execution after an external sender's attachment was thumbnailed when its email was viewed. The tested ImageMagick delegate ran the proof as `www-data`.\n\nConfirmed command execution in the Roundcube thumbnail path shipped with Plesk Obsidian. We reported the result to WebPros.\n\nConfirmed unauthenticated remote command execution through a public registration widget with an upload field enabled. We reported the route to the plugin team.\n\nConfirmed unauthenticated remote command execution through a public PDF form configured to store files in the WordPress Media Library. We sent the report to the plugin team.\n\nConfirmed remote command execution when a configured document inbox imported and rendered an external email attachment. We sent the worker-chain report.\n\nConfirmed command execution through an open wiki's upload and resize path using its optional ImageMagick backend. We sent the report.\n\nConfirmed command execution through PdfHandler on a wiki configured for anonymous PDF uploads. We sent the MediaWiki reproduction to Wikimedia Security.\n\nConfirmed command execution in the preview worker through an authenticated upload or an upload-share capability.\n\nConfirmed a production route in our broader Ghostscript research. The individual access path, root, and proof will appear with its case study.\n\nDebian published its first stable-security Ghostscript update after our report. The current fixed security build followed in October.\n\nDebian published `10.05.1~dfsg-1+deb13u3`, the Debian 13 security build now marked fixed for Upload2Shell.\n\nRoundcube restricted unsafe attachment image types before ImageMagick conversion under `CVE-2026-114727`.\n\n[USN-8949-1](https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8949-1) included our Ghostscript font-loader finding and fixed package versions for seven Ubuntu releases, including Ubuntu Pro and Legacy branches.\n\nWe submitted assignment requests for the Type 1 loader flaw after the upstream fix and downstream reports.\n\nThe Ghostscript root received its public identifier. Individual case studies and PoCs will be linked from the product table as they appear.\n\nGoogle fixed the affected image and document processing path before our public case study.\n\nUpstream Ghostscript and tracked WordPress, Debian, and Ubuntu fixes are available. We will link the product-specific posts, proofs, and remaining vendor responses as each is published.\n\nAnother print filter, thumbnailer, or document preview may be the next route into the interpreter. New results will be added with their own trigger, evidence, and fix.\n\nThe times on 17–18 September mark when the vendor reports were sent. Technical evidence and access conditions are in the index and [writeup](https://pwn.ai/upload2shell/research.html). Dropbox and the redacted services belong to separate Ghostscript findings.\n\nEvidence index Updated 18 November 2026\n\nA single interpreter surfaced behind very different file-processing features. Each entry shows who can supply the file, where it goes, and what we observed or traced.\n\n01 / 02\n\n`uid=7(lp)`\nGhostscript 10.05.1\n\n`uid=33(www-data)`; no attachment click\nWordPress 7.0.2 · Ghostscript 10.05.1\n\nElementor 4.2.0 · WordPress 7.0.2 · Ghostscript 10.05.1\n\nOfficial image · Ghostscript 10.05.1\n\n`uid=1000` inside the application container\nAffected: 7.0.0–7.0.3, 6.9.0–6.9.6, and earlier branches in the advisory · Local renderer: 6.9.4 with Ghostscript 10.05.1\n\nProduct CVE-2026-65640 · Upload2Shell root CVE-2026-125396\n\n`upload_files` capability: Author+ by default, or a Contributor granted it; Imagick and Ghostscript required`uid=33`\nRoundcube 1.6.17 · Ghostscript 9.54.0\n\n`uid=995(roundcube_sysuser)` in 5/5 direct component trials\nPillow 13.0.0 · Ubuntu 24.04 · Ghostscript installed\n\n`gr.Image` app`.png` through Pillow`gs -dSAFER` started before the app function ran\nSource revision 5921fd6e\n\n`Image.open()` and `load()`\nSource revision 82a973c0 · Gradio 3.41.2 · Pillow 9.5.0\n\nSource revision 0263e488\n\nFrappe source revision 2bf593fd\n\nSource revision e87199c7 · image upload integration\n\nSource revision b976874b\n\n`Image.open().load()`\nSource revision bcfdfcaa · official image includes Ghostscript\n\nSource revision 42ab4a73\n\nThe first ten entries record Upload2Shell execution. Gradio records a live HTTP-to-Ghostscript handoff; the remaining entries map application code to image-processing sinks.\n\n02 / 02\n\nImage and document processing · Ghostscript 10.05.0\n\nPatch status\n\nGhostscript 10.08.0 fixes Upload2Shell. Debian backported the upstream change into its security package. [Ubuntu released fixed Ghostscript packages for seven supported releases on 21 October 2026](https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-8949-1); its notice described our font-loader finding before the CVE number was assigned. Application teams also closed routes into the renderer: WordPress fixed the Author+ upload path under `CVE-2026-65640`, and Roundcube restricted unsafe attachment image types before ImageMagick conversion under `CVE-2026-114727`. [The technical writeup lists distribution package versions.](https://pwn.ai/upload2shell/research.html#distribution-packages)\n\nWe found several other Ghostscript issues with lower or comparable impact and reported them upstream. Ghostscript sits beneath more file-processing features than most applications expose directly. We expect the security community to find additional software that reaches this vulnerability through uploads, thumbnails, print jobs, and document imports.", "url": "https://wpnews.pro/news/upload2shell-cve-2026-125396", "canonical_source": "https://pwn.ai/upload2shell", "published_at": "2026-11-21 18:29:29+00:00", "updated_at": "2026-11-21 18:43:30.193926+00:00", "lang": "en", "topics": ["ai-safety"], "entities": ["pwn.ai", "Ghostscript", "Artifex", "Debian", "CUPS", "ImageMagick", "Roundcube", "WordPress"], "also_reported_by": [], "takeaway": "A crafted Type 1 font escapes Ghostscript's `-dSAFER` sandbox via a use-after-free in the font loader (CVE-2026-125396), so any pipeline that renders untrusted files — CUPS IPP queues, ImageMagick delegates, email thumbnailing, wiki uploads — can execute commands as the renderer user until Ghostscri", "recommendation": {"advice": "Treat every document renderer as an execution surface: patch Ghostscript to 10.08.0 (or Debian 10.05.1~dfsg-1+deb13u3) and restrict unsafe attachment image types before ImageMagick conversion, as Roundcube did under CVE-2026-114727.", "playbook": "agent-security", "playbook_url": "https://wpnews.pro/playbooks/agent-security"}, "alternates": {"html": "https://wpnews.pro/news/upload2shell-cve-2026-125396", "markdown": "https://wpnews.pro/news/upload2shell-cve-2026-125396.md", "text": "https://wpnews.pro/news/upload2shell-cve-2026-125396.txt", "jsonld": "https://wpnews.pro/news/upload2shell-cve-2026-125396.jsonld"}}