Universal XSS in uBlock Origin from website-driven element picker A security researcher disclosed a one-click universal XSS vulnerability in uBlock Origin's MV2 Firefox version, in which a malicious website could trick the extension's element picker into adding arbitrary trusted filters that inject JavaScript into any site; a similar but less severe issue affected the MV3 version, uBO Lite. The flaw, found largely by GPT-5.6 Sol and verified by the researcher, has been fixed, with details in GitHub advisory GHSA-cmqw-9r2w-6wv2. The attack worked by leaking the per-installation extension UUID through a hooked XHR inside uBO's default no-fetch-if filter rule, then embedding the element picker in an invisible iframe and driving it via postMessage to enable the Create button. Earlier this month I found a one-click universal XSS issue with uBlock Origin the MV2 Firefox version, although a similar but less problematic issue also affected the MV3 version, uBO Lite , where a malicious website could trick the extension into adding arbitrary trusted filters. Trusted filters can inject JavaScript code into pages, and so the malicious website could create a trusted filter on another website and run arbitrary JS in the context of any site. This issue is fixed now; you can read the GitHub advisory https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/security/advisories/GHSA-cmqw-9r2w-6wv2 for some more details. GPT-5.6 Sol did most of the hard work of finding the issue. I figured there might be some kind of UXSS from filter injection, so I asked it to take a look, and it found the issue. I then checked and verified the issue it proposed. I wrote all of the prose in this post myself; Claude wrote most of the code for the PoC. The issue uBlock Origin has an element picker that you can pull up by right-clicking on the page. You can use this to create a filter rule to block an element on the page without leaving the page. The element picker is implemented by injecting an iframe to a URL like moz-extension://76b2331a-894c-4d25-8b89-fcce37e79cc4/web accessible resources/epicker-ui.html . That page can talk to the extension background script and tell it to add filters. Basically the attack here is: 1. Figure out the element picker URL 2. Create our own invisible opacity 0 iframe that embeds it 3. Drive the picker to put the filter we want in it 4. Position the invisible iframe to trick the user into pressing the invisible “Create” button Figuring out the element picker URL On Firefox, the only information we needed to figure out was the extension internal UUID which is random per-installation. On the default setup uBO has a lootdest. +js no-fetch-if, adsbygoogle, war:googlesyndication adsbygoogle.js filter rule from uAssets , which hooks fetch . From inside the fetch hook, it makes an XHR request to moz-extension://