Together AI Prompt Leak: AI Coding Agent Exposed a Hugging Face Credential Together AI disclosed on November 21, 2026 that an unauthorized party downloaded stored prompt samples after an AI coding agent committed a Hugging Face credential to the company's public xorl GitHub repository. The notice names MiniMax M3, GLM-5.2 and Kimi K2.6 serverless traffic on June 24, July 4, July 8 and July 14, 2026, and says the intruder tested five Dragos canary credentials embedded in those prompts. Together AI reverted the commit after automated scanning detected the credential, made zero data retention the default for new accounts, and told customers to enable ZDR and contact security@together.ai. Together AI disclosed on November 21, 2026 that an unauthorized party downloaded stored prompt samples after an AI coding agent exposed a Hugging Face credential in its public xorl GitHub repository. The official notice https://www.together.ai/blog/security-event-prompt-leakage-for-requests-in-june-and-july-of-2026?ref=explainx names MiniMax M3 , GLM-5.2 , and Kimi K2.6 serverless traffic on June 24, July 4, July 8, and July 14, 2026 , and says five Dragos canary credentials embedded in those prompts were tested by the intruder. TL;DR: what Together AI confirms | Item | Together AI's statement | |---|---| | Root cause | AI coding agent committed HF repo credential during xorl development | | Detection | Automated scanning found credential; commit reverted | | Intruder action | Downloaded stored prompt samples during exposure window | | Follow-on | Searched samples for other credentials; tested five Dragos canaries | | Data fate | Party understood to have deleted data; no further leak claimed | | Customer action | Enable ZDR; contact security@together.ai mailto:security@together.ai | | Scope review | Ongoing; direct notice if sensitive data found | This sits in the same week as Dragos canary research https://explainx.ai/blog/dragos-hd-moore-two-million-canary-prompts-three-provider-breaches-zdr-ignored-ai-routers-2026 and OpenRouter's MiniMax customer emails https://explainx.ai/blog/openrouter-minimax-prompts-may-have-been-read-customer-email-november-2026 . The mechanisms differ, but the lesson for builders is the same: prompts and dev credentials are attack surface . What is zero data retention on Together AI? Zero data retention ZDR is a Together AI account setting that tells the platform not to retain prompt and completion text for training or logging beyond what operations require. Together AI now says ZDR is the default for new accounts after this incident. ZDR governs production inference paths . It does not automatically cover engineering datasets copied into private Hugging Face repos for QA. If your compliance story depends on ZDR alone, map every copy of prompt text, including eval harnesses and customer support exports . Our OpenRouter ZDR explainer thread https://explainx.ai/blog/openrouter-minimax-prompts-may-have-been-read-customer-email-november-2026 shows how badges on a marketplace can disappear while investigators work. Together AI is making the opposite move, defaulting new tenants to stricter retention, but existing accounts must still toggle settings per the November 21 notice. Why Together AI stored prompts at all Together AI says the samples were collected as part of routine software testing and kept in a private Hugging Face repository . That is separate from live production routing, but it still held real user prompt text from serverless calls unless testing used synthetic data only. The company does not say how many distinct customers appear in the archive. Teams that run Together AI agent evals https://explainx.ai/blog/together-ai-agent-evals-97-percent-coding-agents-november-2026 already treat prompts as durable artifacts. This incident shows where those artifacts land matters as much as inference-time ZDR flags. The xorl repository and the AI coding agent Green key sealed inside a capsule beside a closed project folder xorl is Together AI's public GitHub project tied to its open inference stack. During development, an AI coding agent committed a credential that unlocked the private Hugging Face repo. Together AI's scanning caught the mistake and maintainers reverted the commit, but revert does not revoke a credential that was already copied . That pattern matches other 2026 supply-chain stories where agents write secrets into repos : - Microsoft Agent Framework PyPI typo stealer https://explainx.ai/blog/microsoft-agent-framework-pypi-1-26-credential-stealer-november-2026 showed how automated installs can pull malicious packages. Together AI's response includes PR credential scanning and scoped or short-lived credentials , which are table stakes for any org letting agents touch git. Dragos canaries in the downloaded prompts Vault door with a key hanging beside staged prompt credentials Together AI explicitly says the intruder tested five canary credentials associated with a Dragos security experiment . That aligns with Dragos CRO HD Moore's November 19 post on two million canary-laced prompts , which we summarized in the Dragos canary article https://explainx.ai/blog/dragos-hd-moore-two-million-canary-prompts-three-provider-breaches-zdr-ignored-ai-routers-2026 . Canary tokens are fake AWS keys or URLs that should never be used unless a system was compromised . When they fire, you know someone read prompt text or a provider logged it . Here, Together AI confirms post-download credential hunting , not just passive storage. Builders running coding agents should seed their own canaries in staging prompts and never paste production API keys into model chats, as Dragos recommends. Models and dates builders should check Together AI lists these serverless models in the stored sample set: | Model | Provider relationship | |---|---| | MiniMax M3 | Third-party model on Together serverless | | GLM-5.2 | Z.ai GLM family | | Kimi K2.6 | Moonshot Kimi line Together partners on natively https://explainx.ai/blog/together-ai-agent-evals-97-percent-coding-agents-november-2026 | Dates named in the notice: June 24, July 4, July 8, July 14, 2026 . If your team routed customer support logs, code, or credentials through those models on Together serverless on those days, assume the text could be in the downloaded archive until Together AI tells you otherwise. This is not the same incident as OpenRouter's MiniMax reseller forwarding warning, which covers July–October live traffic on a router marketplace. Read both notices if you use multiple hops . Investigation and customer notification Together AI says it engaged an external forensic firm and law enforcement . It reports no evidence of additional prompt leakage beyond this Hugging Face archive path, but content review is ongoing for personal or customer-sensitive data. If you need a direct answer for compliance, security@together.ai mailto:security@together.ai is the channel named in the post. Document which workspaces used serverless on the listed models in June–July 2026. Policy changes Together AI announced The notice lists four concrete controls: 1. Scoped or short-lived credentials , plus keyless access where supported. 2. Credential checks on all pull requests . 3. ZDR default for new accounts . 4. Updated development policies for AI coding agents . Default zero data retention helps forward-looking privacy, but it does not retroactively protect text already stored in a test Hugging Face dataset. Customers must opt in explicitly in settings for existing accounts, per the post. How to protect yourself API key beside an open pocket with leaked credential drops For inference customers - Turn on ZDR in Together AI settings before sending PII, source code, or secrets . - Rotate keys that ever appeared in prompts during the named window. - Prefer direct enterprise endpoints when contracts allow, as Near AI's TEE breach post https://explainx.ai/blog/near-ai-cloud-inference-breach-tee-november-2026 and Dragos both stress for sensitive workloads. - Compare your stack to Together prefix-cache guidance https://explainx.ai/blog/together-ai-ollama-prefix-cache-long-horizon-agents-2026 only after data-handling choices are settled. For teams using AI coding agents on public repos - Block commits that contain HF tokens, AWS keys, or inference API keys ; use pre-commit and CI secret scanners . - Never give agents production credentials ; use ephemeral tokens per session. - Split evaluation datasets into synthetic-only repos when possible. For agent-specific guardrails in CI, see Cognition's Corridor acquisition https://explainx.ai/blog/cognition-acquires-corridor-devin-security-ex-cisa-founders-stamos-agent-written-code-guardrails-2026 and AgentBeam's write-up of this incident https://agentbeam.com/blog/together-ai-prompt-leak-coding-agent-xorl-huggingface-november-2026?ref=explainx on stopping dangerous agent actions before they leak secrets. Context: why November 2026 feels like prompt-leak month Three threads converged in one week: | Date | Event | |---|---| | Nov 19 | Dragos publishes canary study; three unnamed provider breaches | | Nov 21 AM | OpenRouter emails customers about MiniMax routes | | Nov 21 PM | Together AI publishes xorl / Hugging Face notice | Congressional concern about AI-assisted patch cycles during outages appears in November outage reporting https://explainx.ai/blog/ai-vulnerability-patch-rush-outages-warner-congress-november-2026 . Prompt leaks are a different failure mode , but both show operational risk when AI touches production paths. Java4Shell https://explainx.ai/blog/java4shell-gpt-6-cyber-cve-2026-114938-oracle-patch-november-2026 demonstrated AI finding RCE ; this week demonstrates AI causing credential exposure . Security programs need both vulnerability review and agent governance . What Together AI does not claim The post does not say every Together customer was affected. It does not name the intruder. It does not publish counts of prompts or customers in the Hugging Face archive. It does not assert HIPAA or GDPR conclusions; review is ongoing . Treat "data deleted" as Together AI's understanding , not independently verified in the notice itself. Compliance checklist for security teams Security reviewers can work through this list without waiting for a personalized email: 1. Inventory which products called Together serverless not dedicated endpoints in June–July 2026 . 2. Filter logs for MiniMax M3 , GLM-5.2 , and Kimi K2.6 model strings on the four named dates. 3. Classify whether prompts could contain regulated data , source code , or live credentials . 4. Enable ZDR on active workspaces and document the toggle date. 5. Open a ticket with security@together.ai mailto:security@together.ai if regulated data might be in scope. 6. Rotate any API keys, OAuth tokens, or database passwords that ever appeared inside prompts. 7. Review xorl forks if your org contributed patches; ensure you never committed HF or cloud tokens . Pair this with internal canary-token drills modeled on Dragos's public methodology. You do not need two million prompts; a dozen unique canaries per environment is enough to catch unexpected log sinks . Why AI coding agents multiply secret risk Coding agents autocomplete environment files , CI configs , and integration tests . A single bad suggestion that lands on main can expose months of customer prompts stored elsewhere. Mitigations that match Together AI's post-incident list: | Control | What it blocks | |---|---| | Short-lived HF tokens | Stolen creds expire before archive download | | PR secret scanning | Agents cannot merge keys into xorl-like repos | | Separate synthetic eval data | HF test repos hold fake prompts only | | Human review on credential paths | Agents never touch secret stores unsupervised | If your workshop team is rolling out Claude Code or Codex broadly, pair tool training with secret hygiene , not just prompt craft. explainx.ai covers live formats in Claude workshop guidance https://explainx.ai/blog/what-is-claude-ai-workshop-formats-pricing-how-to-choose-2026 . Related reading Sources: Together AI security notice https://www.together.ai/blog/security-event-prompt-leakage-for-requests-in-june-and-july-of-2026?ref=explainx November 21, 2026 , Dragos canary post https://www.dragos.com/blog/ai-supply-chain-security-canary-tokens?ref=explainx November 19, 2026 .