[Ayush Paul] posts about extracting data from Claude agents while it accesses web data to fulfill user requests. But it wasn’t that easy. [Ayush] discovered that Anthropic anticipated many of the attacks, and set up guardrails in an attempt to keep the agent from accessing arbitrary web sites. For Claude to access a website, the user has to specify it, it must be the results of a web search, or it must be referenced by a website previously specified by the user or returned in a search.
To convince the Claude agent to navigate a malicious site designed to extract data, Ayush formed a false warning that Cloudflare was blocking the agent for authentication purposes, and asked it to spell out the name of the agents owner by clicking a list of alphabetical links. Of course Claude trusts Cloudflare and wants to be helpful, so it cheerfully completed the task.
Once the agent is trapped in the false authentication loop, it can be interrogated for all sorts of information it knows about the owner: Ayush was able to convince it to disclose employer, and even data about the user that could be linked to security questions, like their home town.
Since Claude can be detected by the user agent (the field attached to web requests that tells the web server what sort of browser is requesting the page) custom information can be fed to the bot while users see a normal website; clicking a link looks completely normal, but asking an agent to summarize the site triggers fooling the bot into spilling the beans.
After reporting the issue, Ayush was told that Anthropic had already identified the issue internally, and eventually prevented the attack for now by preventing the agent from following links on external pages.
Grok sends entire codebases #
Cereblab discovered that the Grok coding agent uploaded the entire content of the codebase it’s working with – and all Git history – to xAI servers, almost immediately. Even when told to never upload a file, the agent would reply “OK”, and then begin up the code bundle anyway.
If up your code to a remote server isn’t bad enough, and this could be extremely bad in some situations involving sensitive company code, including the entire Git history means that previously deleted files, like accidentally committed secrets or authentication credentials and tokens, were also leaked. Attempting to opt out by disabling options to improve the model by up code had no effect. After gaining attention, Grok has added a privacy option to opt out of data retention. xAI has committed to deleting the retained uploaded code, but it is unclear if users will be told when their data has been removed. To actually prevent the agent from up local files to the xAI servers, even temporarily, a global flag “disable_codebase_upload” is required. Watch out, the privacy retention flags are only per-session!
Steam malware used to steal crypto #
Court filings in Washington state this month revealed an attempt to steal cryptocurrency using malware uploaded to the Steam gaming platform. Publicly identified and taken off the store in 2025, the filing alleges the same individuals were behind multiple games containing crypto stealing trojans: “Dashverse”, “Lunara”, “PirateFi”, “BlockBlasters”, and “Lampy”.
PC World covered the initial discovery of the malware on Steam. While Steam, overall, seems to do a good job preventing malware titles, 2025 had several high-profile cases. Prosecutors say the malware netted approximately $200,000 in stolen cryptocurrency wallets as well as other stolen credentials including Steam accounts.
OpenSSL DoS in 11 Bytes #
Okta posts about a denial of service in OpenSSL where a single pre-auth packet is able to cause an allocation of up to 16 megabytes of RAM.
The “11 bytes” headline is very catchy, but more important than the actual number of bytes is the general asymmetric behavior; an attacker can send a very small amount of data and achieve a disproportionately large result. The OpenSSL vulnerability only has local impacts, exhausting server memory rather than generating network traffic, but similar attacks in the network space can fuel denial of service storms when extremely small requests result in amplified results.
The bug is ultimately due to being insufficiently suspicious of remotely supplied content, in this case the pre-authentication fields in the connection message that define the length of the incoming client message. Since the memory is pre-allocated in the server, the client doesn’t need to actually transmit that much data – it simply needs to hold the connection open. Keeping the connection open isn’t even required for causing problems – repeatedly allocating large blocks of different sizes can lead to memory fragmentation where the memory allocator keeps grabbing larger and larger ranges of memory because there isn’t sufficient ram available in a contiguous chunk.924899
Fortunately this bug has already been addressed in OpenSSL 4.0.1 and backported to maintenance releases of previous versions.
Exposed Interfaces on Car Chargers #
Saiflow has a report on a range of exposures via the electric vehicle charging infrastructure. In CVE-2026-9039 Saiflow exposes the risks in some CCS2 EV charging stations. As part of the standard, communication is established between the charging station and the operator network, which is typically strongly secured via TLS and VPN use. A second connection, however, is established over the charging plug between the charging station and the vehicle; the vehicle is assigned an IPv6 address for communicating with the charger for various charging protocols.
The XCharge C6 charging station exposes SSH and basic telnet network services on all network interfaces, including the interface connected to the vehicle. To make it even worse, they allow root login, with password “root”, giving full admin access to the charging station.
Once inside the charging station, an attacker has access to the network connection from the charging station to the company network, as well as root control over the charging station itself, with the possibility of damaging the charger, changing the power output levels, or getting free charging. If a future vulnerability was found in the management interface of the vehicle, a compromised charger could be used to attack future connected vehicles.
The main lessons for vendors seem to be ones we’re familiar with already: never leave default credentials, especially not “root” and “root” in a product, and be aware of what networks you expose services on. Good lessons for all of us; let those who have never left a Raspberry Pi with default credentials on a network cast the first stone.
Hugging Face Breach #
In news that has likely been impossible to avoid, Axios reports on a compromise of the Hugging Face platform by an OpenAI model. The reports around the incident echo the frequently weird boastful statements from OpenAI, who state “We consider this to be an unprecedented cyber incident” and they “are responding accordingly”, despite being the originators of and cause of said incident.
Multiple vulnerabilities in the Hugging Face API were combined to accomplish the breach, including an unknown vulnerability in the package registry system. OpenAI says that safeguards on their model had been disabled for the test, which seems irresponsible given the outcome. Under almost any normal situation, conducting an unsolicited test of the security of a company because safeguards were ignored is considered illegal hacking, not fodder for a pre-IPO press release and humble-brag.
Linux Kernel Discloses 442 Vulnerabilities #
Possibly feeling that Microsoft has all the press for a record-breaking Patch Tuesday last week, the Linux kernel developers have announced 442 CVEs related to the kernel.
With this many vulnerabilities in one report, it’s nearly impossible to isolate at a glance which ones are truly impactful and which are simply incorrect behavior. While CVE entries have been created, none have been assigned severity scores yet.
It appears the majority of the vulnerabilities were found with Sashiko, an agent developed by the Linux Foundation and trained on the Linux kernel for finding vulnerabilities in new submissions.
LG to Ban Residential Proxy Apps #
After recent negative press (some of which we covered here) about the prevalence of residential proxy apps on the LG platform, Krebs on Security now reports that LG is banning the behavior from apps on the platform.
This comes after Spur reported that 42% of apps on the platform contained libraries to enable always-on residential proxies, which allow access to the network the television is connected to. Residential proxies can be used as a pivot point to attack companies and bypass geographic IP restrictions, commit ad fraud, or access the internal home networks of users.
Iran Attacking Industrial Logic Controllers #
CISA, the US cyber security agency, has issued a warning that Iranian based attackers are targeting industrial control systems made by Rockwell Automation, Schneider Electric, and Siemens.
These sort of controllers are found in manufacturing, waste processing, water treatment, and other industrial processes, and attackers have been able to upload custom control logic, overriding “safe operating parameters” according to the report. Most of us will never be responsible for these systems, but they impact our lives all the time.
Cisco Releases Open-Weight Vulnerability-Finding Models #
Finally, Cisco has released a set of open-weight models to aid in searching a codebase for known vulnerabilities. The Antares models are open-weight models designed to run fully locally and search a code base for vulnerabilities related to lists of known CVE issues. Cisco has published the models on Hugging Face.
Are you using AI tooling for security scans or research? How is it going?