The engineering around post-quantum cryptography is as important NEXUS-Q v4.1.2, an open-source post-quantum cryptographic engine written in Rust, was released on 2026-10-28 as an "Audit-Ready Release" with no production-readiness claim, no FIPS validation and an external audit still pending, according to the project's own release documentation. The release keeps RustCrypto as the default implementation path, with the native ML-KEM/ML-DSA backend remaining experimental and opt-in behind the `native-backend` feature, and requires Rust 1.88 or newer on `main`. The project states its assurance boundary covers security CI, fuzz targets and a documented threat model, and that registry availability is not proof of build provenance for every ecosystem package. | | NEXUS-Q is an open-source post-quantum cryptographic engine written in Rust | Protecting data, keys, and identities with standardized cryptography and an auditable security workflow. A plain-language tour of the project lives on the website: nexus-q.link https://nexus-q.link . Current project status checked 2026-10-28 : NEXUS-Q v4.1.2 is the current release. Audit-Ready Release. No production-readiness claim, no FIPS validation, external audit pending. Registry availability and release provenance are documented separately; the Go module retains independent v0.x versioning. The native ML-KEM/ML-DSA backend remains experimental and opt-in; RustCrypto remains the default path. v4.1.2 release status 2026-10-28 : Audit-Ready Release. No production-readiness claim, no FIPS validation, external audit pending. The release evidence and limitations are documented in docs/V4 RELEASE.md ; registry availability is not proof of build provenance for every ecosystem package. | Item | Current project position | |---|---| | Language | Rust, edition 2024 | | Current main toolchain | Rust 1.88 or newer; see the release-provenance note above before assuming published artifacts match main | | Cryptography | Standardized classical and post-quantum primitives; see Cryptography cryptography and docs/CRYPTOGRAPHY.md https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/blob/main/docs/CRYPTOGRAPHY.md | | Default implementation path | RustCrypto; the native backend is experimental and opt-in | | Interfaces | Rust library, CLI, server, C ABI and language SDKs; availability and packaging vary by ecosystem | | License | MIT OR Apache-2.0 | | Assurance boundary | Security CI, fuzz targets and documented threat model; no independent external audit or certification claimed | This is a quick orientation, not a substitute for the per-module documentation or release provenance. “Available” means the repository has an implemented path; it does not imply independent audit or certification. | Status | Capability | Qualification | |---|---|---| | Available | Rust core, CLI, server, vault/storage workflows, policy checks, audit logging and documented SDK bindings | Verify the specific package, target and release status in Installation installation and its binding guide. | | Available | Standardized cryptographic algorithms via the default RustCrypto path, including ML-KEM/ML-DSA capability in the project | Algorithm support at the library level does not mean every CLI command or SDK exposes every operation. | | Experimental / opt-in | Native ML-KEM/ML-DSA backend behind native-backend | Not enabled by default in core, CLI, server or SDKs; not independently audited. See native backend notes https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/blob/main/docs/performance/NATIVE BACKEND FEATURE.md . | | Integration-specific | HSM module and hardware-provider abstractions | Do not infer that a particular HSM, TPM, Secure Element or enclave is supported or provides hardware isolation without checking the relevant adapter and deployment docs. | | Planned / target-dependent | Hardware-backed isolation and platform-specific integrations | Treat roadmap entries as plans until an implementation, supported device matrix and CI evidence are linked. | | Question | Current documented position | Important limit | |---|---|---| | Which adversaries are considered? | Network attackers and local unprivileged attackers, with trust boundaries detailed in the threat model https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/blob/main/docs/THREAT MODEL.md . | A compromised endpoint, privileged attacker or malicious build/release infrastructure can defeat assumptions; consult the full threat model. | | What happens if vault files are stolen? | Vault data is encrypted at rest and key material is managed through the vault/key lifecycle. | Protection depends on password strength, correct deployment and the attacker not obtaining unlock secrets or process memory. | | What if the device is already compromised? | Zeroization, policy checks and audit controls provide defense-in-depth. | They do not guarantee protection from an attacker controlling the running process, OS or privileged account. | | What if a password is lost? | Follow the documented backup and recovery procedures for the configured vault. | Do not assume a password reset or recovery path can recover cryptographic secrets; keep verified backups and test recovery before production use. | | Has an external audit or certification been completed? | No independent external audit or FIPS 140-3 / Common Criteria certification is claimed. | Automated tests, fuzzing, CI, benchmarks and package publication are not substitutes for independent review. | | Are all dependency advisories resolved? | Dependency scanning is part of the security workflow. | RUSTSEC-2023-0071 for rsa remains a documented exception in audit configuration https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/blob/main/.cargo/audit.toml and deny.toml https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/blob/main/deny.toml ; review current CI and advisory status. | The repository separates the cryptographic core from interfaces, optional services, and language bindings. These names describe repository components, not a claim that every package has identical maturity, platform support, or release provenance. Use the installation table and each binding's own documentation to confirm the package and target you need. | Area | Main components | Purpose / boundary | |---|---|---| | Core and primitives | nexusq-core , nexusq-kernels , nexusq-ml-kem , nexusq-ml-dsa | Core security logic and algorithm-focused crates | | Application interfaces | nexusq , nexusq-cli , nexusq-server | Aggregate Rust API, command-line interface, authenticated HTTP service | | Native integration | nexusq-c , nexusq-cpp , nexusq-py | C/C++ integration and Python extension/binding | | Optional services | nexusq-admin , nexusq-enrollment , nexusq-ha , nexusq-hsm , nexusq-ocsp , nexusq-pki-cluster , nexusq-tsa , nexusq-x509 | Administration, enrollment, high availability, hardware integration and PKI-related modules; consult individual docs for operational scope | | Language bindings | bindings/ | Dart, .NET, Go, Java, Kotlin, PHP, Ruby, Swift and TypeScript/Node.js | | Performance evidence | arena/ , BENCHMARKS.md , docs/performance/ | Benchmark adapters, methodology, measured reports and historical engineering decisions | The repository already includes visual assets for the architecture flow, project overview and benchmark comparisons. Benchmark visuals are based on the documented measurements; consult the accompanying tables and run-specific notes rather than treating a graphic as a standalone performance guarantee. NEXUS-Q is a post-quantum cryptographic security engine designed to protect: | 🔒 Data | 🗝️ Keys | 🪪 Identities | |---|---|---| | Authenticated encryption of files and streams. | Full lifecycle management: generation, rotation, revocation, destruction. | Digital signatures and verifiable credentials. | It is intended as a cryptographic/security engine for applications and servers. The repository also defines hardware-provider abstraction points for future TPM, HSM, Secure Element, enclave and RISC-V integrations; the default software backend does not itself provide hardware isolation. Every operation goes through the same building blocks: a password unlocks an encrypted vault format F-01, atomic writes , keys are managed through their full lifecycle, data is protected with envelope encryption format F-02 , a deny-by-default policy engine gates actions, and security-relevant events go to an HMAC-authenticated audit log with rollback anchoring. 1. We do not invent cryptography. Only standardized algorithms and maintained cryptographic libraries; dependency audit status is documented explicitly. 2. Library-first. The core is a Rust library; the CLI, SDKs and server are layers on top. 3. Hardware-agnostic boundary. Hardware-provider interfaces are separated from the software backend; concrete hardware isolation is only claimed when a provider is implemented and tested. 4. Zeroization. Secrets are wiped from memory when no longer needed. 5. Auditability. Auditable security state changes and cryptographic actions are recorded in a tamper-evident, HMAC-authenticated log. 6. Security from the ground up. Threat model and cryptographic rules before code. | Component | What it is | |---|---| | crates/nexusq-core | The library. All cryptography, vault, key management, identity, policy, storage and hardware abstraction live here. | | crates/nexusq-cli | The nexusq binary. A thin wrapper over the library; no cryptography. | | crates/nexusq-server | The nexusq-server binary and authenticated HTTP service. | | crates/nexusq-c · crates/nexusq-py | The C SDK and the Python binding. | | bindings/ | Go, PHP and Ruby bindings. | | arena/ | The PQC Benchmark Arena: pinned external implementations and normalized JSONL output. | | fuzz/ · artifact-archive/ | Fuzz targets and the archived V1/V2/V3 evidence with SHA-256 manifests. | | docs/ · deploy/ · examples/ | Documentation, release packaging and C examples. | Current main build requirements: Rust 1.88 or newer edition 2024, matching the current Cargo.toml MSRV and Git. Published packages may have different source provenance and MSRV; check the specific package metadata when targeting an older toolchain. Additional SDK toolchains are only required when building a specific binding C/C++, Python, Go, Ruby . Target platforms: Linux x86 64, aarch64 ; Android / Termux aarch64 ; RISC-V riscv64gc-unknown-linux-gnu , build verified; macOS and Windows release builds are validated by the V2 CI/release gate. | Family | Purpose | Implemented | |---|---|---| | Randomness | Entropy for keys, nonces and salts | OS CSPRNG, TRNG support with health checks and mixing | | Hashing | Digests and commitments | SHA-2, SHA-3 | | KDF | Passwords and key material to keys | Argon2id, HKDF | | AEAD | Symmetric authenticated encryption | AES-256-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305 | | KEM | Post-quantum key encapsulation | ML-KEM-768 and ML-KEM-1024, hybrid with X25519 | | Signatures | Authenticity | Ed25519, ML-DSA-65, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f | The reference document is docs/CRYPTOGRAPHY.md https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/blob/main/docs/CRYPTOGRAPHY.md . Planned algorithms must not be described as available until they are implemented and tested. Completed: - Foundation documents, threat model, cryptographic rules. - Crypto core: ML-KEM-768 hybrid with X25519, AES-256-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305, Ed25519, SHA-2, SHA-3, Argon2id, HKDF. - Key management with full lifecycle. - Encrypted vault format F-01 with atomic writes. - Envelope encryption format F-02 . - Identities with signing, verification, rotation, revocation and signed credentials. - Hardware abstraction traits for software, TPM, HSM, Secure Element and RISC-V. - TRNG support with health checks and mixing. - Cross-compilation to RISC-V verified. - Storage: HMAC-authenticated audit log with rollback anchoring, backup bundle, storage DB. - Policy engine with deny-by-default. - CLI covering vault, key, data, sign, identity, credential and audit commands. The benchmark tables below intentionally retain the recorded measurements, historical comparisons, and known caveats. They are real project benchmark results, not illustrative figures. Each dataset has its own context: local diagnostics, hosted-runner release gates, and historical Arena runs must not be compared as if they were one controlled experiment. For reproducibility and fuller context, start with the PQC Benchmark Arena documentation https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/blob/main/arena/README.md , the benchmark index https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/blob/main/BENCHMARKS.md , the V4 release notes https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/blob/main/docs/V4 RELEASE.md , and the linked per-run CI artifacts/reports. Hardware, CPU governor, runner environment, sample count, warmups, comparator versions, and aggregation method matter. Latency ratios are operation-specific; there is no composite score here. Lower latency is better, and a benchmark pass is not an end-to-end application performance or security certification claim. NEXUS-Q is not presented as a universal performance leader . In the 2026-10-21 local x86-64 benchmark, the opt-in native backend was compared with the best eligible per-operation comparator using a matched AWS-LC RNG. Six of nine operations beat the comparator on both median and p95; the other three are close to parity: ML-DSA-65 signing 1.063× median / 1.115× p95 , ML-KEM-1024 key generation 1.021× / 1.020× , and ML-KEM-768 key generation 1.015× / 1.013× . This is local diagnostic evidence from an Intel Core i3-N305 with the CPU governor set to powersave , not a hosted-runner release benchmark or a universal performance claim. The project owner accepted this result as sufficient to complete Issue 23 https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/issues/23 , treating 1.00× as an ideal target rather than an absolute closure requirement; the remaining deltas are documented in docs/performance/ISSUE 23 FINAL GATE AUDIT 2026-10-21.md https://github.com/lecodev-26/nexus-q/blob/main/docs/performance/ISSUE 23 FINAL GATE AUDIT 2026-10-21.md . The default nexusq-core build, CLI and SDKs still use RustCrypto for production call paths; the native path is opt-in and experimental. Lower latency is better.