Shutdowns, power outages, and conflict: a review of Q1 2026 Internet disruptions

In the first quarter of 2026, government-directed Internet shutdowns were prominent, including prolonged nationwide blackouts in Uganda during its presidential election and in Iran, contrasting with no such shutdowns observed in the same period the previous year. Additional disruptions stemmed from multiple power grid collapses in Cuba, military conflict affecting Ukraine and Middle East cloud infrastructure, severe weather in Portugal, cable damage in the Republic of Congo, and technical issues impacting Verizon Wireless in the U.S. and providers in Guinea and the United Kingdom.

In the first quarter of 2026, government-directed shutdowns figured prominently, with prolonged Internet blackouts in both Uganda and Iran, a stark contrast to the lack of observed government-directed shutdowns in the same quarter a year prior. This quarter, we also observed a number of Internet disruptions caused by power outages, including three separate collapses of Cuba's national electrical grid. Military action continued to disrupt connectivity in Ukraine and also impacted hyperscaler cloud infrastructure in the Middle East. Severe weather knocked out Internet connectivity in Portugal, while cable damage disrupted connectivity in the Republic of Congo. A technical problem hit Verizon Wireless in the United States, and unknown issues briefly disrupted connectivity for customers of providers in Guinea and the United Kingdom. This post is intended as a summary overview of observed and confirmed disruptions and is not an exhaustive or complete list of issues that have occurred during the quarter. A larger list of detected traffic anomalies is available in the Cloudflare Radar Outage Center. Note that both bytes-based and request-based traffic graphs are used within this post to illustrate the impact of the observed disruptions, with the choice of metric generally made based on which better illustrates the impact of the disruption. Government-directed shutdowns In advance of the January 15 presidential election, Ugandan authorities ordered a nationwide Internet shutdown. The Uganda Communications Commission UCC instructed mobile network operators to suspend public Internet access, effective 18:00 local time 15:00 UTC on January 13. The UCC reportedly defended the shutdown as necessary to "curb misinformation, disinformation, electoral fraud and related risks." Domestic traffic at the Uganda Internet Exchange Point UIXP dropped from approximately 72 Gbps to 1 Gbps as a result of the action taken. Similarly, Cloudflare data shows a near-complete loss of traffic from Uganda coincident with the start of the shutdown, with traffic remaining effectively at zero through 23:00 local time 20:00 UTC on January 17, when Internet connectivity was partially restored after incumbent President Yoweri Museveni was declared winner of his seventh term. Full Internet restoration was announced by the UCC on January 26, with mobile network operators MTN Uganda and Airtel Uganda both confirming on social media that restrictions had been lifted. The shutdown prompted lawsuits against UCC and the telecoms companies and drew criticism from digital rights organizations including CIPESA. Uganda also blocked Internet access during its 2021 election. Authorities had repeatedly promised this time would be different, stating as recently as January 5 that "claims suggesting otherwise are false, misleading." Iranian citizens spent a large part of Q1 2026 offline, or with severely limited connectivity, due to two nationwide Internet shutdowns. The first began around 20:00 local time 16:30 UTC on January 8, and we explored the impact seen over the first few days in our What we know about Iran’s Internet shutdown blog post. Traffic from Iran remained near zero until January 21, when a small amount of traffic returned, only to disappear a little over 24 hours later. A similar brief restoration also occurred on January 25, before traffic recovered more aggressively starting on January 27. A near-complete loss of announced IPv6 address space started several hours before the drop in traffic took place on January 8. Asiatech AS43754 was by far the single largest contributor, losing 4.46 million /48-equivalents, accounting for ~9.4% of Iran's entire IPv6 space loss on its own. RASANA AS31549 was the second-largest, losing 4.19 million /48-equivalents ~8.8% of the country total . As would be expected, this resulted in the share of IPv6 traffic in Iran going to zero. Given the gap in timing between this change and the loss of traffic across the country, this may have been a leading indicator of what was about to happen, but likely not a direct cause of it. Some nominal shifts in announced IPv4 address space are visible during the shutdown, but levels remained fairly consistent during the shutdown period. These observations suggest that the shutdown was implemented by other means, such as filtering. Cloudflare Radar social media posts X, Bluesky, Mastodon throughout January and into early February documented our observations about the state of connectivity in Iran over the course of that month. On February 28, as military strikes on Iran escalated, a second nationwide Internet shutdown began. Cloudflare Radar observed a sharp drop in traffic from Iran beginning around 10:30 local time 07:00 UTC . Traffic levels fell to well under 1% of previous levels, with only small amounts of Web and DNS traffic egressing the country. No significant shifts in announced IP address space were observed around the onset of this shutdown. IPv4 space remained fairly consistent, and IPv6 space remained consistently volatile, suggesting that route withdrawals were not the cause of this second shutdown. The continued announcement of IP address space, and the presence of traffic from the country, even if just a small amount, supports reports that the shutdown was effectively achieved through aggressive filtering, with so-called “whitelists” and “white SIM cards” restricting access to only approved Internet sites by selected users. Iran remained effectively offline through the end of the quarter. As of late April, this shutdown remains largely in place, making it one of the longest sustained Internet disruptions observed in recent years. On March 15, as the Republic of Congo held a presidential election expected to extend President Denis Sassou Nguesso's 42-year rule, a near-complete shutdown of Internet connectivity was observed in the country. Traffic from the country dropped precipitously around 06:30 local time 05:30 UTC , falling to near zero for approximately 60 hours through the election period and its immediate aftermath. Traffic began recovering around March 17 at 18:20 local time 17:20 UTC , rapidly returning to pre-shutdown levels. While Congolese authorities provided no official explanation for the drop in traffic, similar shutdowns were put into place during the 2021 and 2016 elections. On January 7-8, Russian attacks on energy infrastructure in Ukraine caused power outages that disrupted Internet connectivity in Dnipropetrovsk and surrounding regions. Cloudflare Radar observed a significant drop in traffic from the region, reaching nearly 50% below the prior week’s levels, starting around 22:45 local time 20:45 UTC on January 7. Recovery began approximately 06:00 local time 04:00 UTC on January 8. On January 26, Russia launched a drone and missile attack targeting energy infrastructure in Kharkiv. Cloudflare Radar observed an approximately 50% drop in traffic from the region beginning around 19:15 local time 17:15 UTC . Recovery progressed through January 27 as power was gradually restored. Amazon Web Services Middle East United Arab Emirates and Bahrain One of the most unusual disruptions of the quarter was the physical damage inflicted on Amazon Web Services data centers in the Middle East by drone strikes tied to the ongoing regional conflict. On the morning of March 1 UTC , Amazon reported a fire started after objects hit a UAE data center. The following day, the company confirmed that two of its facilities in the United Arab Emirates me-central-1 region were "directly struck" by drones and that a facility in Bahrain me-south-1 region was also taken offline after being damaged by a nearby strike. Cloudflare's Cloud Observatory data showed elevated connection failure rates for the me-central-1 and me-south-1 regions beginning March 1-2 and remaining higher for multiple days. Connection failures occur when Cloudflare fails to successfully connect to an origin server when attempting to retrieve uncacheable content, or content not in/expired from cache. These graphs illustrate the increased rate of failures experienced when attempting to connect to servers in these impacted regions. In a status post on the AWS Health Dashboard, Amazon acknowledged: "These strikes have caused structural damage, disrupted power delivery to our infrastructure, and in some cases required fire suppression activities that resulted in additional water damage." The company warned that instability was likely to continue in the Middle East, making operations "unpredictable," and urged customers with workloads in the affected regions to back up their data or migrate to other AWS regions. The AWS me-south-1 region in Bahrain suffered an additional disruption on March 23, following further drone activity. On January 15, a power outage struck Buenos Aires during a summer heat wave. The outage caused nominal disruptions in Internet connectivity for customers of multiple providers in the Buenos Aires area, including Telecom Argentina AS7303 , Telecentro AS27747 , and IPLAN AS16814 , with traffic from these networks dropping between 17:30 and 19:30 local time 20:30 - 22:30 UTC . Traffic returned to expected levels approximately two hours after the outage began. An emergency power cut on Ukraine's electricity grid on January 31 caused widespread power outages affecting Moldova and several Ukrainian regions including Kyiv and Kharkiv. Moldova was reportedly hit by widespread power cuts amid the Ukrainian grid problems, and the Ukrainian Energy Minister explained the cross-border impact, noting “Today at 10:42 a.m. 08:42 GMT , a technical malfunction occurred, causing a simultaneous shutdown of the 400 kilovolt line between the power grids of Romania and Moldova and the 750 kilovolt line between western and central Ukraine.” Traffic from Moldova, Kyiv, and Kharkiv began falling around 10:42 local time 08:42 UTC , reaching as much as 46% below the prior week, with recovery occurring around 14:00 local time 12:00 UTC . On February 18, widespread power outages struck Paraguay after key transmission lines went out of service. The National Electricity Administration ANDE posted a series of updates on X documenting the incident and efforts to restore power. Internet traffic from Paraguay dropped as much as 72% compared to the prior week beginning around 15:15 local time 18:15 UTC , and the disruption lasted nearly three hours, with recovery occurring by approximately 18:30 local time 21:30 UTC . A major failure in the Interconnected National Electric System SENI of the Dominican Republic caused a widespread power outage on February 23. The state-owned electric company Empresa de Transmisión Eléctrica Dominicana ETED posted updates on X documenting the failure and the recovery effort. Internet traffic from the country dropped sharply beginning around 10:50 local time 14:50 UTC , and recovered around midnight local time 04:00 UTC on February 24, in line with a confirmation posted by ETED that “The authorities of the electric sector reported that the Interconnected National Electric System SENI was fully restored to 100% at 11:53 p.m. on this Monday…”. Cuba experienced three separate collapses of its National Electric System SEN during March, each causing widespread Internet disruption, reflecting the severe deterioration of the country's electrical infrastructure. Power outages also disrupted Internet connectivity in Cuba during September and March 2025, and October 2024. The first collapse occurred on March 4, when a disconnection of Cuba's National Electroenergy System cascaded from Camagüey to Pinar del Río, cutting power to the western half of the island, including Havana. OSDE/UNE Cuba's Electric Union confirmed the failure on social media. Cloudflare Radar data showed traffic from the island dropping by nearly half beginning around 12:15 local time 17:15 UTC , with traffic recovering by approximately 05: