Show HN: Verifiable receipts for firmware CVE reproduction

Prevot released a tool that reproduces firmware vulnerabilities deterministically against digital twins and issues a signed, re-verifiable receipt, demonstrated with CVE-2018-19988 on the D-Link DIR-868L rev B router, anchored in the Rekor transparency log at logIndex 2237342620. The receipt is signed by a machine identity via Sigstore/cosign and requires only Docker to verify, with no access to Prevot's infrastructure needed.

Prevot reproduces public, known firmware vulnerabilities deterministically against digital twins, and issues a receipt : a signed attestation that anyone can re-verify — without trusting us, without seeing the exploit. Evidence, not assertion.The security community is drowning in AI-generated reports thatclaimvulnerabilities without proving them. A Prevot receipt is the opposite: a cryptographic proof, re-verifiable by third parties, that the reproduction actually happened. This repo ships a real receipt — CVE-2018-19988 , root command injection on the D-Link DIR-868L rev B router — signed and anchored in the public transparency log Rekor logIndex 2237342620 https://search.sigstore.dev/?logIndex=2237342620 . You only need Docker : cd receipts/examples/dir868l-hnap-19988 docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/w" -w /w \ gcr.io/projectsigstore/cosign:v2.4.1@sha256:b03690aa52bfe94054187142fba24dc54137650682810633901767d8a3e15b31 \ verify-blob --new-bundle-format --bundle statement.cosign.bundle \ --certificate-identity 616124453047-compute@developer.gserviceaccount.com \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://accounts.google.com \ statement.json → Verified OK Step-by-step, including the tamper test: guides/verify-a-receipt-in-5-min.md /prevotai/colmena/blob/main/guides/verify-a-receipt-in-5-min.md . It also states what it does not know: Medium grade, declared. It reproduces deterministically 2/2 and discriminates the injection we proved the effect is caused by the payload, not by the request . It lacks the patched-version control — that firmware is encrypted — so we do not call it high grade. It corrects a public data point. The CVE is published as exploitable without credentials PR:N ; on the real firmware it requires authentication. We declare it PR:L . Reproduction against the real artifact overrides the metadata. A verifier that cannot tell its own grades of certainty apart is not a verifier. | Piece | What it is | |---|---| receipts/schema/ | the receipt schema in-toto attestation, evidence by sha256 | receipts/examples/dir868l-hnap-19988/ | the signed receipt + its evidence | receipts/README.md | anatomy of the receipt | receipts/validate receipt.py | optional schema + content-addressing check | guides/ | the 5-minute verification guide | Signing is keyless Sigstore/cosign : a short-lived certificate Fulcio bound to an identity, anchored in Rekor. No private keys to manage. The bundle is self-contained: it verifies with just this repo and Docker — no access to Prevot's infrastructure . On the signer.This receipt is signed by amachine identity the service account that runs the verifier , not a person — honest, since the receipt is produced by automation. A canonical human signature can be added later; Rekor allows multiple signatures over the same receipt. AGPL-3.0-or-later. See LICENSE . Signal S1 — first public proof. This is a first brick of a cyber-physical trust seal for firmware under the European regulatory framework CRA/RED .