Stateless enterprise policy firewall & token-cost proxy for MCP.
Drop it in front of any Model Context Protocol server. Every tool call gets checked for identity, policy, and budget before it reaches your infrastructure — no database, no sticky sessions, nothing new to operate at 3am.
docker run --rm -it ghcr.io/asctttt/sentinel-mcp:demo
MCP made it trivial to wire an LLM agent up to real tools — databases, payment APIs, internal services. It did not ship a policy layer. If you've run an MCP server in production, you've probably already hit one of these:
Runaway loops. An agent gets stuck retrying a failing call, or a bad prompt sends it into a call-and-recall spiral. Nothing in the MCP spec stops it. You find out from the bill, not an alert.
Token budgets that don't exist until they explode. Nothing in a typical agent loop stops it from calling the same expensive tool hundreds of times in an hour. The common failure mode: a $40/day budget quietly becomes a $40k/month bill, and the first signal anyone gets is the invoice.
DNS-rebinding and confused-deputy risk. The Streamable HTTP transport spec requires Origin validation for exactly this reason — a malicious page can rebind DNS to reach a local MCP server your browser would otherwise block. Most self-hosted servers don't implement it. Stack a compromised or injected tool result on top, and "just add an MCP server" is a bigger attack surface than most teams have budgeted time to secure.
SentinelMCP won't stop a model from being tricked — no proxy can. What it does is make sure a tricked or runaway agent can't reach a tool it isn't allowed to call, blow through a budget nobody approved, or keep running once the numbers look wrong — without a human getting a say.
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Origin validation on every request — the DNS-rebinding mitigation the Streamable HTTP spec requires and most self-hosted servers skip. Loopback-only by default; explicit allowlist for anything else, override not extend.
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ID-JAG identity enforcement — real JWKS-backed JWT verification, asymmetric algorithms only (no HMAC-downgrade path), including the
resourceclaim binding that closes the confused-deputy hole: a token issued for one MCP server can't be replayed against another. -
Structural token estimation — walks the actual JSON-RPC payload instead of
length / 4, pricing natural-language content and JSON structure at different, calibrated rates. Input measured exactly; output projected from a per-tool rolling average and trued up against the real response after every call. -
7-day sliding-window budgets per team, enforced against a fixed-memory circular buffer (168 hourly buckets) — bounded, no per-request log to prune, no unbounded growth under load.
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Spike detection independent of the hard cap — a sudden burst against a team's own recent baseline gets caught even while the cumulative total is nowhere near the limit. Catches the exponential-growth pattern before the raw budget does.
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A budget breach doesn't 500 the call. It returns
InputRequiredResult— a normal JSON-RPCsuccess — carrying the projected overrun, the run-rate spike, and an HMAC-signed, request-boundresumeToken. -
POST /mcp/resumewith{ resumeToken, decision: "APPROVE" | "DENY", originalRequest }lets a human clear it. The token is bound to the exact call via a canonical-JSON hash of the request — approvethis wire transfer, not whatever an agent decides to substitute next. -
Delivery is transport-aware: the notice reaches the client over whichever channel the original call used.
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Streamable HTTP — the current MCP standard (spec 2025-03-26+), and the primary path.
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Legacy HTTP+SSE (spec 2024-11-05) for backward compatibility with clients that haven't migrated. Not the default; don't build new integrations against it.
git clone https://github.com/your-org/sentinelmcp.git
cd sentinelmcp
npm install
cp .env.example .env
Six required values in .env — everything else ships with a sane default:
| Variable | What it is |
|---|---|
MCP_UPSTREAM_URL |
The real MCP server SentinelMCP forwards allowed calls to |
JWKS_URI |
Your IdP's JWKS endpoint (Okta, Auth0, Azure AD, …) |
ID_JAG_ISSUER |
Expected iss claim on incoming ID-JAG tokens |
ID_JAG_AUDIENCE |
Expected aud claim |
ID_JAG_RESOURCE |
This gateway's resource identifier — the anti-confused-deputy binding |
HMAC_SECRET |
32+ random chars signing resume tokens — openssl rand -base64 32 .Must be identical across every replica , or resume verification breaks depending on which one handles a given call. |
npm run build && npm start # production
npm run dev # tsx watch
Confirm it's alive:
curl http://localhost:8080/healthz
flowchart LR
Client(["MCP Client<br/>Claude Desktop · Cursor · custom agent"])
subgraph Sentinel["SentinelMCP — stateless gateway"]
direction TB
Origin["Origin Guard<br/>DNS-rebinding check"]
Policy["Policy Gate<br/>tool denylist"]
Identity["Identity Gate<br/>ID-JAG · JWKS verify"]
Budget["Budget Gate<br/>sliding window + spike detect"]
Origin --> Policy --> Identity --> Budget
end
Upstream["Upstream MCP Server(s)"]
Resume["POST /mcp/resume<br/>HMAC-signed resumeToken"]
Client -->|"POST /mcp"| Origin
Budget -->|"allowed → forward"| Upstream
Upstream -->|"result"| Client
Budget -.->|"denied → d<br/>InputRequiredResult"| Client
Client -.->|"human decides,<br/>out of band"| Resume
Resume -->|"APPROVE<br/>budget bypassed only —<br/>identity + policy still enforced"| Upstream
SentinelMCP sits in front of one or more upstream MCP servers as a reverse proxy. Every gate runs on every request; a denial short-circuits before the call ever reaches your tools. Only the budget gate can be bypassed, and only by an explicit, signed, single-call human approval — identity and policy are re-checked even on resume.
Two of the five subsystems keep state in memory (SSE session tracking and
the budget ledger) — the request/response path itself is stateless and
horizontally scalable behind a plain load balancer. See
docs/ENGINEERING.md for exactly which pieces, and
what that means for running more than one replica.
- 63 tests, 19 suites —
npm test. Unit coverage for the token estimator, the sliding-window budget algorithm (spike detection included, verified with an injectable clock rather than waiting real days), and the HMAC token service (round-trip, tampering, forged secrets, canonical-hash binding). Integration coverage runs the full request pipeline throughfastify.inject()against a real, ephemeral-port mock identity provider and mock upstream — no stubbed JWT verification, no mocked crypto. - Strict TypeScript —
strict,noUncheckedIndexedAccess,noImplicitOverride. Noanyin the source tree. - Zero test-framework dependencies — built on Node's own
node:test. - CI runs typecheck, the full suite, and a production build on every push, against Node 20 and 22.
The full engineering log — what's verified, every bug found during
development and how it was fixed, and every known limitation stated
plainly rather than glossed over — lives in
docs/ENGINEERING.md.
SentinelMCP's core gateway is free and MIT-licensed. For teams running multiple replicas in production or requiring compliance audit trails, SentinelMCP Pro unlocks enterprise capabilities via a single SENTINEL_LICENSE_KEY environment variable:
| Feature | Community (MIT) | SentinelMCP Pro ($199/mo) |
|---|---|---|
| Origin Guard, Policy Gate & ID-JAG Verification | Included | Included |
| 168-Bucket Sliding Window & Spike Detection | Single Instance | Multi-Replica / Cluster Ready |
| Structured SIEM / Datadog Audit Log Export | — | Included |
| Slack / PagerDuty Budget Breach Webhooks | — | Included |
| Priority Security Patches & Architecture Support | Community Issues | Direct Engineering Support |
👉 Purchase a SentinelMCP Pro License Key via Polar.sh