Saktum Check – test MCP servers against the OWASP MCP Top in one command Saktum released Saktum Check, an early-release command-line tool that tests MCP servers against the OWASP MCP Top 10, grading conformance, sign-in, security, agent experience and performance and returning a signed, verifiable report. The tool runs locally with nothing uploaded and was validated on 31 public MCP servers before release; it reports findings such as an AWS access key exposed in a tool definition and a JavaScript stack trace leaked in an error, and estimates that agents spend about 142 tokens reading a server's tools each turn, about $0.43 per 1,000 turns. Saktum plans active checks for servers you own, sign-in registration and redirect checks, a lock file that catches silent tool changes, a sandbox for untrusted servers, and CI integration via GitHub Action and SARIF in January, with feedback shaping v0.2. Test your MCP server in one command: conformance, sign-in, security mapped to the OWASP MCP Top 10 , agent experience, what your tools cost an agent in context, and performance. A grade, plain findings, a fix for each, and a signed result anyone can verify. npx saktum check -- npx -y @your/mcp-server a local server npx saktum check https://your-server.example/mcp a remote server sign-in checks run without a token Runs on your machine. Nothing is uploaded. Your own environment variables are never passed to the server. GRADE F trust score 49, capped: a critical check failed Grade F: 2 problems found 1 critical, 1 medium ; 11 checks passed. Fix first critical : found what looks like an AWS access key in tool upload report. Agents spend about 142 tokens reading these tools on every turn, about $0.43 per 1,000 turns. agent-experience 100 conformance 100 security 61 ✗ FAIL CRITICAL sec.secrets.exposed No secrets in tool definitions or responses Found what looks like an AWS access key in tool upload report. Anyone who can list tools or trigger an error can read it. Evidence: ess key id":{"type":"string","default":"AKIA… redacted 16 chars "}},"required": "nam Fix: Remove keys, tokens and passwords from descriptions, schemas, defaults, examples and error messages; load them from a secret store at runtime. ✗ FAIL MEDIUM sec.errors.leakage Errors do not expose internals The error for an unknown tool exposes a JavaScript stack trace, which helps attackers map your internals. Evidence: at handleCall /home/deploy/acme-mcp/src/handlers.js:42:11 Every report ends with OWASP MCP Top 10 coverage : which categories this run tested and which come in later releases. | Area | Checks | |---|---| | Conformance | Handshake, tool list, valid input schemas draft-07, 2019-09, 2020-12 , tool names, unknown-tool handling | | Sign-in remote servers | HTTPS; 401 with a Bearer challenge pointing to resource metadata RFC 9728 ; protected resource metadata; authorization server metadata with PKCE S256 RFC 8414, RFC 7636 ; invalid tokens rejected RFC 6750 | | Security | Hidden instructions to the agent, invisible and bidirectional characters, terminal escape sequences, secrets in tools or errors always redacted , stack traces and source paths in errors | | Agent experience | Danger annotations, description quality, context cost in tokens and dollars | | Performance never scored | Start-up, latency, memory of the whole process tree, and a rate-limit burst test with --active | Validated on 31 public MCP servers before release. Each check cites the specification clause or OWASP item it verifies. | Option | Use | |---|---| | --env NAME=VALUE | Give a local server what it needs to start repeatable | | --header "Authorization: Bearer