# Quantum Computers Will Break RSA. Some Are Already Harvesting Your Data.

> Source: <https://dev.to/nizover/quantum-computers-will-break-rsa-some-are-already-harvesting-your-data-323e>
> Published: 2026-10-29 09:08:54+00:00

Nation-states are intercepting and storing encrypted traffic today, waiting for fault-tolerant quantum machines to decrypt it later. This is "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" — and it's why migration can't wait for 2030.

NIST's finalized standards (Aug 2024):

FIPS 203 — ML-KEM (Kyber) for encryption and key exchange

FIPS 204 — ML-DSA (Dilithium) for primary signatures

FIPS 205 — SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) as hash-based backup

FIPS 206 — FN-DSA (FALCON) for compact IoT signatures

The 4-phase migration:

Cryptographic Bill of Materials — Passive scanners catalog every TLS cipher suite, PKI cert, and code-signing key. Prioritize data with 10+ year shelf life.

Hybrid deployment — Never hard-cutover. Combine X25519 with ML-KEM-768. Attackers must break both simultaneously. Browsers and CDNs already support this.

Packet fragmentation optimization — ECDSA signatures are ~64 bytes. ML-DSA-44 is over 2,400 bytes. That 40x increase breaks legacy firewalls and MTU limits.

Cryptographic agility — Decouple algorithms from source code via OpenSSL 3.x providers or PKCS#11. If lattice math falls, swap in hash-based backups with zero downtime.

PQC vs. QKD: PQC runs on existing hardware as software. QKD needs dedicated fiber-optic lasers and single-photon equipment.

Full read: [https://www.nizover.com/en/blog/tech-post-quantum-cryptography-nist-migration-guide](https://www.nizover.com/en/blog/tech-post-quantum-cryptography-nist-migration-guide)