# Put code-review-graph Behind a Read-Only MCP Boundary Before Connecting Your Repository

> Source: <https://dev.to/jaryn_123/put-code-review-graph-behind-a-read-only-mcp-boundary-before-connecting-your-repository-1h2g>
> Published: 2026-07-22 04:25:57+00:00

[ code-review-graph](https://github.com/tirth8205/code-review-graph) is trending because it promises a useful trade: build a persistent local map of a codebase so an AI reviewer reads relevant context instead of ingesting the whole repository. The repository is MIT-licensed and exposes MCP and CLI interfaces.

That can reduce context. It can also create a high-value index of your source tree.

Before connecting any code-intelligence MCP server to an agent, I would make the first integration read-only and prove the boundary with a canary.

The assets are not only source files. The graph may reveal:

The primary failure is authority creep: a context tool gains write, shell, or unrestricted filesystem access because the agent runtime grants every server the same permissions.

Run the server as a separate OS user against a disposable checkout:

```
useradd --system codegraph
install -d -o codegraph -g codegraph /srv/codegraph/repo
sudo -u codegraph git clone --depth=1 "$REPO_URL" /srv/codegraph/repo
chmod -R a-w /srv/codegraph/repo
```

Then deny network egress and mount only the checkout plus a dedicated graph-data directory. Do not mount `$HOME`

, SSH configuration, cloud credentials, or the Docker socket.

Create files that must and must not be visible:

```
src/public_canary.ts          SHOULD_INDEX
secrets/private_canary.txt    MUST_NOT_INDEX
.git/config                   MUST_NOT_RETURN
```

Add `secrets/`

to the tool's exclusion configuration. Ask the MCP client three questions:

`SHOULD_INDEX`

.`MUST_NOT_INDEX`

.The acceptance rule is strict: test 1 succeeds; tests 2 and 3 return no content. Also verify the server process cannot modify `src/public_canary.ts`

.

Record tool name, requested path, decision, duration, and result size. Avoid logging full source fragments by default; otherwise the audit system becomes another copy of the repository.

```
{"tool":"graph.query","scope":"src/**","decision":"allow","bytes":1842}
```

I have not audited the project's implementation or reproduced its published context-reduction examples. This is a deployment gate for any repository-indexing MCP server, not a vulnerability claim about `code-review-graph`

.

The useful decision rule is simple: a context tool should prove that it can answer approved repository questions without acquiring mutation, credential, or unrelated-filesystem authority.