Post-quantum cryptography (PQC)—seeking a place in modern system-on-chip (SoC) designs—has found a new venue: embedded FPGA (eFPGA). Unlike traditional cryptographic engines implemented in fixed silicon, which typically require expensive silicon re-spins as security standards evolve, this design arrangement employs eFPGA to implement PQC IP through a new bitstream.
QuickLogic, a supplier of eFPGA hard IP, has joined hands with PQC IP core supplier PQSecure to incorporate PQC as a reprogrammable function within SoCs using its eFPGA Hard IP fabric. PQSecure’s CRYSTAL-1000C PQC IP core—targeting NIST-finalized standards FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA)—has been placed and routed within eFPGA IP cores and then implemented into an SoC design.
“This collaboration demonstrates the perfect use case for eFPGA Hard IP,” said Trey Peterson, field applications engineer at QuickLogic. “We’ve proven that a reprogrammable solution works seamlessly today while leaving the flexibility to adapt tomorrow.”
Peterson added that SoCs can update their cryptographic engine in the field by a new bitstream. That includes swapping algorithm parameter sets, running hybrid classical and post-quantum modes during transition, and patching side-channel vulnerabilities without new silicon. “The post-quantum cryptography transition is an evolving process, not a single event,” he added. “As a result, SoC designers who hard-wire their security engines today face costly, avoidable re-spins.”
View All That’s especially critical for applications with long deployment cycles: aerospace, defense, and industrial. So, this eFPGA-based solution combines hardware security with flexibility to update cryptographic functionality in the field as standards evolve.
However, while this solution embodies hardware-based security at the silicon level, what is actually driving this march toward PQC deployment at a time when organizations are recommended to prepare for quantum-safe security by 2030? The short answer is: harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL).
Harvest now, decrypt later
Here is how this phenomenon works. Attackers intercept encrypted communications today, but they can’t decrypt the data with current computers. So, they store the encrypted data for years, and once sufficiently powerful quantum computers become available, they decrypt the information retrospectively.
In other words, attackers can steal data now—before cryptographically relevant quantum computers are available—and then decrypt the data later. That could potentially be a disaster in waiting for healthcare data and financial records. Case in point: Medical data from 2026 will still be sensitive in 2035 when quantum computers are commercially viable.
Therefore, for organizations safeguarding confidential information, IP, financial records, healthcare data, and government communications, the risk begins now. That’s why federal agencies have already started inventorying cryptographic assets and planning migrations based on NIST-standardized PQC algorithms.
Another piece of anecdotal evidence comes from Google, which used AI to optimize Shor’s algorithm running on a sufficiently mature quantum computer, reducing the number of physical qubits required to break today’s encryption. That’s how Google shortened the timeline to a catastrophic event commonly known as Q-Day.
Cryptographic agility in the quantum era
PQC introduces larger key sizes and increased computational demands, new algorithm classes, and changes to secure boot, firmware update, and device identity models. And more importantly, it demands crypto agility to adapt to evolving security standards.
So, while PQC algorithms can be deployed via software updates, long-term deployment requires systems that can adapt as cryptographic standards, threats, and security requirements evolve. Enter hardware-based security built at the silicon level that is updatable, allowing PQC algorithms to evolve without redesign.
QuickLogic’s pairing of its eFPGA IP with PQSecurity’s PQC IP core for SoC designs is a good design case study of a reconfigurable fabric that future-proofs hardware security without requiring a new silicon tape-out every time the threat landscape evolves.
Such design examples demonstrate that PQC technology is moving from research planning to technical execution. And that PQC acceleration is becoming part of a long-term cybersecurity strategy. At the same time, however, post-quantum algorithms and classical cryptographic accelerators are likely to go hand in hand in a hybrid mode in the coming years.
Therefore, such quantum-safe cryptographic acceleration solutions must also support both PQC and classical algorithms, such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), for hybrid deployments. And they must support algorithm updates via firmware rather than silicon redesign.
See also:
[Five Test Considerations to Prepare for Q-Day](https://www.eetimes.com/five-test-considerations-to-prepare-for-q-day/)
[Post-Quantum Cryptography: Moving Forward](https://www.eetimes.com/post-quantum-cryptography-moving-forward/)
[Looming Quantum Threat as PQC Market Expands](https://www.eetimes.com/looming-quantum-threat-as-pqc-market-expands/)
[White House Executive Order Brings New Urgency to Post-Quantum Cryptography](https://www.eetimes.com/white-house-executive-order-brings-new-urgency-to-post-quantum-cryptography/)