Position: Evaluations of AI Moral Reasoning Still Miss Half of the Picture

arXiv:2608.14566v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent work on evaluating the moral competence of large language models (LLMs) has focused primarily on what we call the moral value problem, i.e., whether model outputs align with human moral values. In contrast, the moral norm problem, i.e., whether models can identify and correctly apply context-sensitive moral norms, remains underexplored. We posit that this imbalance stems from the field's reliance on descriptive ethics frameworks, such as Moral Foundations Theory and Kohlberg's stages of moral development, which emphasize value representation over normative application. We review existing benchmarks and evaluation methods, and show that they cluster heavily around the value problem, while discussion regarding normative ethics remains underrepresented. We identify three crucial gaps: (i) the absence of high-quality ground-truth data for moral norms and their applications, (ii) insufficient evaluation of intermediate reasoning processes, and (iii) limited attention to the identification of morally relevant features in context. Subsequently, we propose a research agenda that includes the development of standardized formal representations for normative theories, the construction of expert-annotated datasets capturing norm application, and evaluation protocols that explicitly distinguish between values-level and norms-level competence. Our goal is to encourage a more systematic study of normative reasoning in LLMs.