Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal is Becoming More Vulnerable

Al-Qaeda's April appeal urging Pakistan's military to overthrow the government underscores a growing threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, which is among the world's fastest-growing, according to a new analysis. The barriers that once kept militants away from the weapons—U.S. troops in Afghanistan, U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation, and Pakistan's security system—have weakened, while al-Qaeda strengthens ties with the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and Afghanistan again serves as a sanctuary under Taliban rule.

Editor's note: The "Short of War" Podcast discussing this article is AI-generated. “We call on the Pakistani army and security services not to obey Pakistan’s corrupt political and military leadership and urge them to overthrow it,” al-Qaeda declared https://shahadaagencynews.com/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A5/?ref=irregularwarfare.org in an April appeal to Pakistan’s military amid the Afghanistan-Pakistan war. The same statement told Pakistani pilots to defy their commanders and target them “by any means possible.” This appeal was aimed at members of the military and security services entrusted with protecting one https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia pacific/report-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal-could-become-the-worlds-third-biggest/2015/08/26/6098478a-4c0c-11e5-80c2-106ea7fb80d4 story.html?ref=irregularwarfare.org of the world’s fastest-growing https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/pakistans-nuclear-force-structure-in-2025?ref=irregularwarfare.org nuclear arsenals https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/?ref=irregularwarfare.org . For more than twenty years, several barriers https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2026/01/Harmouch TWQ 48 4.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org kept Pakistan’s nuclear weapons beyond militant groups’ reach. The United States and its allies had troops and intelligence networks in Afghanistan. Washington and Islamabad cooperated on counterterrorism and nuclear security. Pakistan also built a serious system to guard its arsenal. Together, these measures made it much harder for al-Qaeda to gain access to Pakistan’s nuclear enterprise. Those barriers are now weaker, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan war is becoming a nuclear security problem. Al-Qaeda’s enduring https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2026/01/Harmouch TWQ 48 4.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org nuclear ambition now coincides with greater access through regional militant networks, less U.S. visibility, and growing pressure on the very institutions Pakistan relies on https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-terrorist-threat-to-pakistans-nuclear-weapons/?ref=irregularwarfare.org to secure its arsenal. Afghanistan is again a sanctuary for al-Qaeda, this time under a Taliban government rather than an insurgency operating on the margins. The United States no longer watches the threat from inside Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda is also strengthening https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/44?ref=irregularwarfare.org its ties https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan-ttp?ref=irregularwarfare.org with the Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan TTP https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/tehrik-i-taliban-pakistan-ttp?ref=irregularwarfare.org , which is already at war with Islamabad. Pakistan, meanwhile, is guarding a larger https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/pakistans-growing-uranium-enrichment-program?ref=irregularwarfare.org images and more mobile https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Pakistans-Nuclear-Capabilities New-Template-1.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org arsenal while fighting terrorism, insurgency, and a cross-border conflict along its western frontier. The war now reaches beyond the border and into the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Danger Contained Al-Qaeda’s interest in weapons of mass destruction is not new https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2026/01/Harmouch TWQ 48 4.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org . In the 1990s, Osama bin Laden called https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/EE/EE3F72AC1E60924DF25CA4EB3562BD8F Al Qaeda has Nuclear Weapons.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org acquiring nuclear weapons a religious duty. His operatives shopped https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2026/01/Harmouch TWQ 48 4.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org for uranium and forged https://www.amazon.com/At-Center-Storm-Years-CIA/dp/0061147788?ref=irregularwarfare.org ties with Pakistani nuclear scientists. After 9/11, American forces found https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg80848/html/CHRG-107shrg80848.htm?ref=irregularwarfare.org nuclear documents in al-Qaeda safe houses and uncovered https://www.amazon.com/At-Center-Storm-Years-CIA/dp/0061147788?ref=irregularwarfare.org meetings https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/11/24/pakistan-continues-probe-of-nuclear-scientists/e0f87ce3-a70a-40de-b2ba-ab8927e75f3c/?ref=irregularwarfare.org between the group’s leaders and senior figures from Pakistan’s nuclear program, including Bashiruddin Mahmood https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq sanctions list/summaries/individual/mahmood-sultan-bashir-ud-din?ref=irregularwarfare.org and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed. Both men were tied https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267/aq sanctions list/summaries/entity/ummah-tameer-e-nau-%28utn%29?ref=irregularwarfare.org to Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, an organization founded by retired Pakistani nuclear scientists and military officers. These efforts show that al-Qaeda has long looked to scientists, military personnel, and procurement networks for access to nuclear knowledge and material. Pakistan’s own A.Q. Khan network demonstrated https://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa27811.000/hfa27811 0.HTM?ref=irregularwarfare.org that designs, technology, and components could move through Pakistani channels despite formal controls. By 2007 and 2008, the threat had moved closer to Pakistan’s nuclear geography. The Pakistani Taliban TTP and al-Qaeda struck https://armscontrolcenter.org/attacks-on-pakistani-nuclear-facilities/?ref=irregularwarfare.org installations https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/al qaeda taliban tar.php?ref=irregularwarfare.org tied https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-terrorist-threat-to-pakistans-nuclear-weapons/?ref=irregularwarfare.org to, or near, Pakistan’s nuclear complex. The most significant attack came in 2008, when the Pakistani Taliban attacked https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss7-Art1.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org the Wah cantonment, described as one of Pakistan’s main nuclear-weapons assembly sites. That same year, a bipartisan U.S. commission warned https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc123525/m2/1/high res d/10942265.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org that if you mapped terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, “all roads would intersect in Pakistan.” A 2013 House Homeland Security hearing reached https://www.congress.gov/event/113th-congress/house-event/LC873/text?ref=irregularwarfare.org a similar conclusion: al-Qaeda had pursued nuclear weapons for two decades, and terrorists had repeatedly attacked facilities associated with Pakistan’s nuclear enterprise. Yet the breach many feared never occurred because sustained U.S. and Pakistani pressure made it difficult for al-Qaeda to turn its nuclear ambitions into access. American and NATO forces were still in Afghanistan, while U.S. intelligence maintained access to the borderlands, sources inside jihadist networks, and the ability to disrupt plots early. Washington and Islamabad cooperated on counterterrorism, and the United States spent https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/18nuke.html?ref=irregularwarfare.org roughly $100 million helping Pakistan secure https://www.npr.org/transcripts/16404378?ref=irregularwarfare.org its nuclear arsenal. Michael Morell, the CIA’s former acting director, later said American intelligence may have been what prevented https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2026/01/Harmouch TWQ 48 4.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org al-Qaeda from acquiring https://www.cbsnews.com/news/intelligence-matters-michael-morell-on-911-the-cia-and-afghanistan-part-2/?ref=irregularwarfare.org a Pakistani nuclear weapon. Pakistan, for its part, was not careless https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-terrorist-threat-to-pakistans-nuclear-weapons/?ref=irregularwarfare.org . After the Khan scandal https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/aq-khan-revelations/?ref=irregularwarfare.org and post-9/11 insider revelations https://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa27811.000/hfa27811 0.HTM?ref=irregularwarfare.org , it built https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL34248?hl=Pakistan%27s+Nuclear+Weapons+Paul+Kerr+and+Mary+Beth+Nikitin&s=2&r=5&ref=irregularwarfare.org a serious custodial architecture https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-terrorist-threat-to-nuclear-weapons-in-pakistan/?ref=irregularwarfare.org : the Strategic Plans Division to manage https://sgs.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/2020-01/hoodbhoy-mian-2016.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org the arsenal, a dedicated https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RL34248&ref=irregularwarfare.org security force https://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1300934560 193.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org , a personnel reliability program to screen custodians, and a posture https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RL34248&ref=irregularwarfare.org that kept warheads disassembled and stored apart from their delivery systems. Violence from 2007 to 2009 tested https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RL34248&ref=irregularwarfare.org that system, but the barriers held. They held because pressure, visibility, U.S.-Pakistan cooperation, and Pakistani institutional effort reinforced one another. Today, that system is operating under greater pressure and with less outside support. The Buffers are Weakening Al-Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions never died https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2026/01/Harmouch TWQ 48 4.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org . In 2009, an al-Qaeda leader in Afghanistan said https://www.rferl.org/a/AlQaeda Says It Would Use Pakistani Nuclear Weapons/1759660.html?ref=irregularwarfare.org the group would use https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/alqa-ida-threatens-to-use-pakistani-nuclear-weapons-1713388.html?ref=irregularwarfare.org Pakistan’s nuclear weapons against the United States if it could. More than a decade later, the theme resurfaced. In 2023, Ibrahim al-Qosi, a senior al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula figure, released a revised edition of his 2021 book with a new chapter on weapons of mass destruction, signaling renewed emphasis inside al-Qaeda’s Yemen branch. That same year, Saif al-Adel, al-Qaeda’s presumed de facto chief, wrote https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2026/01/Harmouch TWQ 48 4.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org that only weapons of mass destruction could deter the West. Al-Adel helped run al-Qaeda’s original nuclear effort and its early attempts to buy uranium. The group also retains some of its 9/11 era nuclear experts, including Ali Sayyid Muhammad Mustafa al-Bakri, the chemist Khalid Sheikh Mohammed called https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2026/01/Harmouch TWQ 48 4.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org al-Qaeda’s “nuclear chief,” who remains at large in Iran alongside al-Adel. The ambition has endured, but the environment around it has changed. The first buffer to weaken was the pressure al-Qaeda faced in Afghanistan. After the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power, Washington had to watch from over the horizon https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/al-qaedas-looming-threat-are-we-looking-over-wrong-horizon?ref=irregularwarfare.org , with less https://bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2026/01/Harmouch TWQ 48 4.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org visibility into the networks it once kept under pressure. Al-Qaeda also regained a permissive sanctuary inside a Taliban-run state—something it had not enjoyed for two decades. From there, the group is rebuilding https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/44?ref=irregularwarfare.org training pipelines, deepening https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/44?ref=irregularwarfare.org regional relationships, and tightening operational ties https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4102022?v=pdf&ref=irregularwarfare.org to the TTP, the Pakistani Taliban insurgency fighting Islamabad. It is increasingly acting as a service provider https://docs.un.org/en/S/2026/44?ref=irregularwarfare.org to the TTP, offering guidance, expertise, and operational support. That gives al-Qaeda an indirect pathway into Pakistan through a movement already at war with the state and already attacking security institutions. In that way, al-Qaeda brings the nuclear ambition while the TTP brings local access, manpower, and direct pressure on the institutions Pakistan relies on to secure its arsenal. The second buffer to weaken was the U.S.-Pakistan partnership that once helped contain that danger. Washington suspended https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia pacific/pakistan-slams-us-suspension-of-military-aid-accuses-it-of-betrayal/2018/01/05/fb564c92-f1bc-11e7-95e3-eff284e71c8d story.html?ref=irregularwarfare.org broad security https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-suspends-at-least-900-million-in-security-aid-to-pakistan-idUSKBN1ET2DF/?ref=irregularwarfare.org assistance to Pakistan in 2018, and cooperation with Islamabad is now narrow https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47565?ref=irregularwarfare.org er, colder, and more transactional https://tacticsinstitute.com/analysis/pakistans-renewed-commitment-can-enhanced-us-cooperation-turn-the-tide-against-terrorism/?ref=irregularwarfare.org . The contrast with the post-9/11 period is sharp. In 2022, President Biden called Pakistan “one of the most dangerous nations in the world,” citing “nuclear weapons without cohesion.” By 2026, Washington no longer treated Pakistan’s nuclear enterprise as a joint security problem to manage with U.S. assistance. It treated it as a growing source of concern https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/congressional-testimonies/congressional-testimonies-2026/4143-dni-gabbard-opening-statement-as-delivered-to-ssci-on-2026-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community?ref=irregularwarfare.org . Pakistan, meanwhile, faces heavier strain than at any point in that period. It ranks among the countries most affected https://www.visionofhumanity.org/countries-most-impacted-by-terrorism-in-2026/?ref=irregularwarfare.org by terrorism. It is fighting the TTP in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baloch separatists and ISIS-K in Balochistan, and now a cross-border war https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvg57nk373lo?ref=irregularwarfare.org along the same western frontier. In March 2026, as the war escalated, Pakistan accused https://www.crisisgroup.org/stm/asia-pacific/afghanistan/afghanistan-and-pakistan-trade-fire-conflict-takes-dangerous-turn?ref=irregularwarfare.org Afghan forces of launching a drone attack https://www.dw.com/en/pakistan-taliban-drone-attack-afghanistan-war/a-76359740?ref=irregularwarfare.org in Rawalpindi https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/18/do-talibans-drone-attacks-expose-a-chink-in-pakistans-armour?ref=irregularwarfare.org , the headquarters of the Pakistani army. The significance is not only symbolic. Much of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure sits https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss7-Art1.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org in the north and west of the country and around the Islamabad-Rawalpindi corridor. The conflict now touches https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-terrorist-%EE%80%80threat-to-pakistans-nuclear-weapons/?ref=irregularwarfare.org the military and security geography that underpins Pakistan’s nuclear establishment. Pressures on Pakistan’s Nuclear System These pressures are reaching Pakistan’s nuclear command and security system https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/12/pakistan-constitution-amendment-nuclear-weapons-military-policy/?ref=irregularwarfare.org at a difficult moment. A 2025 constitutional amendment https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/12/pakistan-constitution-amendment-nuclear-weapons-military-policy/?ref=irregularwarfare.org elevated the army chief into the new role of Chief of Defense Forces, abolished the old Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee post, and created a new Commander of the National Strategic Command with nuclear-command responsibilities https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/12/pakistan-constitution-amendment-nuclear-weapons-military-policy/?ref=irregularwarfare.org . Critics argue https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/12/pakistan-constitution-amendment-nuclear-weapons-military-policy/?ref=irregularwarfare.org that this kind of redesign breeds https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/12/12/pakistan-constitution-amendment-nuclear-weapons-military-policy/?ref=irregularwarfare.org uncertainty exactly where Pakistan needs clarity: who coordinates the services, who manages nuclear command, and how authority flows in a crisis. The army https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RL34248&ref=irregularwarfare.org and intelligence services entrusted with the arsenal are the same institutions https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=RL34248&ref=irregularwarfare.org absorbing https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-terrorist-threat-to-nuclear-weapons-in-pakistan/?ref=irregularwarfare.org the country’s internal and border pressures, with less external visibility than at any point since 9/11. The arsenal itself has changed too. Pakistan now fields a larger https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/?ref=irregularwarfare.org and more mobile https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Pakistans-Nuclear-Capabilities New-Template-1.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org arsenal of roughly https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-pakistan?ref=irregularwarfare.org 170 warheads, with more https://www.ucs.org/nuclear-weapons/worldwide?ref=irregularwarfare.org likely if current trends hold. Its nuclear architecture has diversified https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Pakistans-Nuclear-Capabilities New-Template-1.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org , with nuclear-capable aircraft, cruise missiles, and road-mobile ballistic systems, including the Shaheen-II https://www.spsmai.com/military/?id=3511&q=Pakistans-Tactical-Nuclear-Weapons&ref=irregularwarfare.org . The short-range Nasr, a road-mobile https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-9/?ref=irregularwarfare.org , low-yield nuclear delivery system built for quick response, captures the security problem mobility creates. More dispersed systems mean more weapons, launchers, personnel, and command arrangements to protect, especially in a crisis. The danger today is not https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/revitalizing-nuclear-security-era-uncertainty?ref=irregularwarfare.org that al-Qaeda will steal a Pakistani nuclear weapon next week. Pakistan reportedly guards https://www.congress.gov/crs external products/RL/PDF/RL34248/RL34248.63.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org its warheads through a layered custodial system, separates https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-10/features/pakistans-evolving-nuclear-doctrine?ref=irregularwarfare.org them from delivery systems, and protects https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2023.2178069?ref=irregularwarfare.org them with use-control measures. Nor is there evidence https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-terrorism-fact-sheet?ref=irregularwarfare.org that any terrorist group has ever produced https://tutorials.nti.org/nuclear-and-radiological-security/terrorism-nuclear/?ref=irregularwarfare.org fissile material. The more plausible danger lies https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/insider-threats?ref=irregularwarfare.org around the arsenal: a compromised officer, a sympathetic technician, an insider at a sensitive facility, a militant network with access to security personnel, or a system under enough strain to miss the warning signs. Al-Qaeda has looked for openings like these before. Pakistani nuclear scientists met https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/25/al-qaedas-pursuit-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction/?ref=irregularwarfare.org with bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan, where one of them briefed the al-Qaeda leaders on the infrastructure a nuclear weapons program would require. The A.Q. Khan network https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1162/0163660053295176?ref=irregularwarfare.org ran for years before its exposure, showing that insiders can move nuclear designs, components, and procurement channels without immediate detection. In 2014, al-Qaeda recruited https://www.reuters.com/article/world/in-attack-by-al-qaeda-lines-blur-between-pakistans-military-militants-idUSKCN0HP2MM/?ref=irregularwarfare.org Pakistani naval officers for an alleged plot to seize a frigate and turn its missiles on U.S. vessels in the Arabian Sea; the officers had boarded the warship before authorities stopped them. Each case shows al-Qaeda trying to penetrate institutions outsiders often treat as impermeable. Nuclear security ultimately depends on people, and al-Qaeda is now openly courting them. Its April statement https://shahadaagencynews.com/%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A5/?ref=irregularwarfare.org is a recruitment pitch aimed at Pakistani soldiers https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/controls-pakistans-nuclear-technology?ref=irregularwarfare.org , pilots https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-12/features/building-confidence-pakistans-nuclear-security?ref=irregularwarfare.org , intelligence officers https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2121&context=jss&ref=irregularwarfare.org , and security personnel https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007-12/features/building-confidence-pakistans-nuclear-security?ref=irregularwarfare.org , the people every custodial system relies on https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-terrorist-%EE%80%80threat-to-pakistans-nuclear-weapons/?ref=irregularwarfare.org . By urging them to side with their “Afghan brothers” and restore Pakistan to what it called its “honorable past,” the group appeals https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-terrorist-%EE%80%80threat-to-pakistans-nuclear-weapons/?ref=irregularwarfare.org to loyalty, grievance, religious identity, and obedience inside the institutions that hold https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-terrorist-%EE%80%80threat-to-pakistans-nuclear-weapons/?ref=irregularwarfare.org the state together and protect its arsenal. Those appeals land in institutions with known vulnerabilities https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss7-Art1.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org . Overlapping currents https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss7-Art1.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org of anti-U.S. sentiment, Islamist sympathy, personal and clan ties to militants, and resentment over campaigns against fellow Pakistanis have long run https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss7-Art1.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org through parts of Pakistan’s army and intelligence services. The concern is not hypothetical. Hamid Gul, a former director-general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency, was implicated https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/former isi chief lin.php?ref=irregularwarfare.org for advising al-Qaeda and the Taliban on developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. These are the vulnerabilities al-Qaeda is now trying to widen. They point to the scenario Bruce Riedel warned https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pakistan-and-the-bomb-how-the-u-s-can-avert-a-crisis/?ref=irregularwarfare.org about: Pakistan’s arsenal remains under military control, but if militant Islamists and al-Qaeda took control of the country, “the arsenal would fall with it.” Prevention is the Only Option Al-Qaeda now operates closer to the people and networks that could give it access to Pakistan’s nuclear enterprise. It has sanctuary under Taliban rule, deeper ties to Pakistani militants fighting Islamabad, and a message aimed directly at soldiers, pilots, intelligence officers, and security personnel. Pakistan is fighting multiple threats while guarding a larger and more dispersed arsenal. The United States, meanwhile, has less visibility into the networks that could turn intent into opportunity. Together, these pressures narrow the margin for error. That is why the Afghanistan-Pakistan war cannot be read only as a border conflict or regional crisis. It is pressing on the institutions that secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. In May, shortly after al-Qaeda’s appeal, the United Nations warned https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/05/1167501?ref=irregularwarfare.org that the risk of nuclear terrorism was higher than ever. The 2026 U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy calls https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/2026-USCT-Strategy-1.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org keeping unconventional weapons out of terrorists’ hands a “no-fail” mission. Pakistan is now one of the places where that mission will be tested. Washington does not need to reoccupy Afghanistan, and it should not pretend the Taliban is a counterterrorism partner. But it can take less cinematic and more effective steps: restore intelligence visibility where possible, revive the nuclear security dialogue with Islamabad, and press regional capitals with leverage over Kabul and Islamabad to treat the war itself as a nuclear security concern. Above all, Washington should recognize that deterrence does not cover this gap. A weapon or a quantity of fissile material passed through an insider or a militant network with no territory and no capital may arrive without a return address. By the time responsibility is established, if ever, the damage would already be done. The only workable strategy is to prevent access before material, expertise, or custody slips outside state control. For twenty years, the “loose Pakistani bomb” was feared yet never materialized. That record should not reassure Washington. It should remind Washington what prevention achieved when pressure, visibility, cooperation, and Pakistani security measures worked together. The Afghanistan-Pakistan war is now weakening those conditions, one barrier at a time. We have spent two decades not failing at this. The catastrophe would be to assume that is good enough. Dr. Sara Harmouch is a counterterrorism expert and CEO of H9 Defense, a research and advisory consultancy specializing in terrorism, national security, geopolitical risk, threat assessment, and open-source intelligence. Her research examines militant organizations, alliance dynamics, irregular warfare, and the conditions under which armed groups adapt, endure, and expand from domestic to international violence. She also studies terrorism’s intersection with emerging technologies, unconventional capabilities, and weapons of mass destruction . Dr. Harmouch is a Security Fellow at the Frontier Security Institute and a Non-Resident Fellow at George Washington University’s Program on Extremism. Raised in Lebanon and a native speaker of Arabic and French, she conducts fieldwork and primary-source research across the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe. She regularly briefs U.S. and international security agencies, and her work has appeared in The Washington Quarterly , Lawfare , War on the Rocks , Defense One, The Long War Journal, NPR, and VOA, among others. She holds a Ph.D. in Justice, Law, and Criminology from American University and a master’s degree in International Relations, Science, and Technology from the Georgia Institute of Technology. Follow her on X: @Dr SaraHarmouch The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, the Department of the Army, the Department of War, or the United States Government. 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