OWASP Agentic Skills Top Ten

The OWASP Foundation released the Agentic Skills Top 10 (AST10), a list of the 10 most critical security risks in agentic AI skills across major AI agent platforms, including OpenClaw, Claude Code, Cursor/Codex, and VS Code. The project, currently in public review for v1, aims to address vulnerabilities in the behavior layer of AI agents, which orchestrates multi-step workflows autonomously, and includes a quick security checklist covering registry, runtime, and governance measures.

OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 Security Risks and Mitigations for AI Agent SkillsCovering OpenClaw SKILL.md YAML , Claude Code skill.json , Cursor/Codex manifest.json , and VS Code package.json ecosystems. Breadcrumb: OWASP https://owasp.org/ Projects https://owasp.org/projects/ Agentic Skills Top 10 Public review v1 : Please review and comment on the merged v1 draft in the Google Doc https://docs.google.com/document/d/1A5d2OnT8h8oZo7MSde4TOT3sg3AkXJgTGQwVrAga1aE/edit?usp=drivesdk . Previous GitHub issues and pull requests remain available for historical reference, but v1 publication comments should be submitted in the Google Doc. Tutorial videos: Use the AST10 tutorial video library /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/videos?video=ast01 to play each risk video from selectable cards or share direct links with ?video=ast01 through ?video=ast10 . Table of Contents Overview overview 📊 Visual Top 10 Overview /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/top10 Tutorial Videos /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/videos?video=ast01 The Problem: A Crisis Already in Progress the-problem-a-crisis-already-in-progress What Are Agentic Skills? what-are-agentic-skills Incident Timeline 2026 incident-timeline-2026 Summary Table summary-table Universal Skill Format Proposal universal-skill-format-proposal Case Studies /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/case-studies.html Threat Intelligence /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/threat-intelligence.html Interactive Risk Assessment Tool /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/risk-assessment.html Skill Scanner Integration /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/skill-scanner-integration.html API Documentation /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/api-documentation.html Skill Development Guide /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/skill-development-guide.html Platform Comparison /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/platform-comparison.html Community & Contribution /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/community-contribution.html Incident Response Playbook /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/incident-response.html Security Metrics & Monitoring /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/metrics-monitoring.html Getting Started getting-started Target Audience target-audience Project Status and Timeline project-status-and-timeline Leadership and Governance leadership-and-governance Key Research and References key-research-and-references License license Overview The OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 AST10 documents the 10 most critical security risks in agentic AI skills across all major AI agent platforms. Skills represent the execution layer that gives agents real-world impact: they define not just what resources agents can access, but how they orchestrate multi-step workflows autonomously. While significant attention has been devoted to securing large language models LLMs and the Model Context Protocol MCP tool layer, the intermediate behavior layer —embodied in agentic skills—has emerged as a particularly vulnerable and under-protected component of the AI agent ecosystem. This project exists to close that gap. Mental Model : MCP = how the model talks to tools; AST10 = what those tools actually do. Quick Security Checklist Use this checklist to assess your agent skill security posture: Registry & Installation - Only install skills from verified publishers with code signing - Enable automated scanning for all skill installations - Review skill permissions before installation - Pin skill versions to prevent automatic malicious updates Runtime Security - Run agents in isolated environments containers/sandbox - Implement network restrictions for agent processes - Monitor agent file system and network activity - Regularly audit installed skills and their dependencies Governance & Monitoring - Maintain inventory of all deployed agent skills - Implement approval workflows for skill installations - Enable comprehensive audit logging for agent actions - Establish incident response procedures for skill compromises Development Practices - Sign all published skills with cryptographic keys - Include comprehensive permission manifests - Test skills in isolated environments before publishing - Document security considerations in skill metadata See the complete Security Assessment Checklist for detailed guidance. The Problem: A Crisis Already in Progress This is not a theoretical future risk. The AI agent skill ecosystem is under active attack as of Q1 2026. By the numbers: | Metric | Figure | Source | |---|---|---| | Skills scanned | 3,984 | Snyk ToxicSkills Feb 2026 | | Skills with security flaws | 1,467 36.82% | Snyk ToxicSkills Feb 2026 | | Skills with critical issues | 534 13.4% | Snyk ToxicSkills Feb 2026 | | Confirmed malicious payloads | 76+ | Snyk ToxicSkills Feb 2026 | | ClawHavoc campaign: malicious skills | 1,184 | Antiy CERT Feb 2026 | | OpenClaw instances internet-exposed | 135,000+ | SecurityScorecard Feb 2026 | | CVEs disclosed OpenClaw alone | 9 3 with public exploits | Endor Labs Feb 2026 | | Skills analyzed across all registries | 30,000+ | National CIO Review / Cisco 2026 | | Skills containing at least one vulnerability | 25% | National CIO Review 2026 | The ClawHub registry—the primary marketplace for OpenClaw skills—became the first AI agent registry to be systematically poisoned at scale . Five of the top seven most-downloaded skills at peak infection were confirmed malware. The registry has since implemented automated scanning and partnered with VirusTotal, but the broader ecosystem remains largely unprotected. Check Point Research disclosed two critical vulnerabilities in Claude Code CVE-2025-59536, CVSS 8.7; CVE-2026-21852, CVSS 5.3 demonstrating that repository-level configuration files now function as part of the execution layer —simply cloning and opening an untrusted project can trigger remote code execution and API key exfiltration before any user consent dialog appears. No comprehensive security framework or dedicated guidance for agent skills existed before this project. That gap is what AST10 addresses. What Are Agentic Skills? Agentic AI skills are reusable, named behaviors that encode complete workflows, including: - Task understanding and goal decomposition - Multi-step planning and tool orchestration - File system, network, and shell access - Safety guardrails and output formatting - Persistent memory and cross-session state Unlike MCP tools which define what resources and actions are available , skills define how to use those tools in sequence to accomplish user goals. This behavioral abstraction layer creates unique security challenges that cannot be addressed by securing either the model or the protocol layer alone. The “Lethal Trifecta” Simon Willison / Palo Alto Networks, 2026 : An AI agent skill is especially dangerous when it simultaneously has: Access to private data SSH keys, API credentials, wallet files, browser data Exposure to untrusted content skill instructions, memory files, email Ability to communicate externally network egress, webhook calls, curl Most production agent deployments today satisfy all three conditions. Skill Formats by Platform | Platform | Skill Format | Primary Risk File | |---|---|---| | OpenClaw | SKILL.md YAML frontmatter + Markdown | SKILL.md , SOUL.md , MEMORY.md | | Claude Code | skill.json / YAML + scripts/ | .claude/settings.json , hooks config | | Cursor / Codex | manifest.json + handler scripts | manifest.json , tool configs | | VS Code | package.json + extensions | package.json , extension.ts | Incident Timeline 2026 The following is a condensed timeline of confirmed real-world incidents involving AI agent skill security, drawn from publicly disclosed research and CVE records. January 2026 - Jan 27–29 : ClawHavoc campaign launches. Attackers register as ClawHub developers and flood the registry with 341 malicious skills in a 3-day window. All 335 AMOS-delivering skills share a single C2 IP 91.92.242 . 30 . Target data includes exchange API keys, wallet private keys, SSH credentials, browser passwords, and .env files. Skills also write malicious instructions directly into MEMORY.md and SOUL.md for session-persistent backdooring. - Jan 31 : ClawHavoc surge peaks. Koi Security names the campaign and begins coordinated removal effort. Some packages persist for weeks. February 2026 - Feb 1 : Koi Security publishes first public ClawHavoc analysis. - Feb 3 : Snyk publishes “From SKILL.md to Shell Access in Three Lines of Markdown” threat model, documenting how three lines of markdown in a SKILL.md file can instruct an agent to read SSH keys and exfiltrate them. - Feb 4 : Alice publishes findings on several published OpenClaw skills found to be actively malicious while in use by over 6,000 users — detected via behavioral analysis. - Feb 5 : Snyk publishes ToxicSkills — the first comprehensive security audit of the AI agent skill ecosystem. Key findings: 36% of skills contain security flaws; 13.4% contain critical-level issues; 76 confirmed active malicious payloads; 8 malicious skills still live at time of publication. - Feb 5 : Snyk publishes “280+ Leaky Skills: How OpenClaw & ClawHub Are Exposing API Keys and PII” — a parallel finding showing credential exposure at scale through over-permissioned skills. - Feb 10 : Snyk documents “How a Malicious Google Skill on ClawHub Tricks Users Into Installing Malware” — typosquatting and fake brand impersonation confirmed as active tactics. - Feb 11 : Snyk publishes “Why Your Skill Scanner Is Just False Security and Maybe Malware ” — demonstrating that pattern-matching scanners miss the majority of critical threats, which rely on natural-language instruction manipulation rather than code signatures. - Feb 14 : OpenClaw patches log poisoning vulnerability version 2026.2.13 . Attackers could write malicious content to agent log files via WebSocket requests; since the agent reads its own logs for troubleshooting, injected text could influence decisions and trigger indirect prompt injection. - Feb 25 : Check Point Research publicly discloses CVE-2025-59536 CVSS 8.7 and CVE-2026-21852 CVSS 5.3 in Claude Code. Both were patched months earlier but the disclosure confirms: repository-controlled configuration files can silently execute arbitrary shell commands and exfiltrate API keys at project open time, before any trust dialog. - Feb 26 : ClawJacked disclosed by Oasis Security CVE-2026-28363, CVSS 9.9 . Malicious websites can brute-force localhost WebSocket connections with no rate limiting to silently hijack local OpenClaw instances, register new devices without user prompts, and exfiltrate data through existing agent integrations. OpenClaw patches within 24 hours version 2026.2.25 . - Feb 2026 : Antiy CERT publishes ClawHavoc Campaign Analysis , classifying malware as Trojan/OpenClaw.PolySkill . Final tally: 1,184 malicious skills across 12 publisher accounts. Hudson Rock separately identifies Vidar infostealer variants specifically targeting OpenClaw agent identity files openclaw.json , device.json , soul.md , memory.md . - Feb 2026 : Microsoft Defender Security Research Team issues advisory: “Because of these characteristics, OpenClaw should be treated as untrusted code execution with persistent credentials. It is not appropriate to run on a standard personal or enterprise workstation.” - Feb 2026 : BlueRock Security analyzes 7,000+ MCP servers; finds 36.7% potentially vulnerable to SSRF. Proof-of-concept against Microsoft’s MarkItDown MCP server retrieves AWS IAM keys from EC2 metadata endpoint. March 2026 - Mar 2026 : SecurityScorecard confirms 135,000+ OpenClaw instances publicly internet-exposed with insecure defaults; 53,000+ correlated with prior breach activity. Bitdefender telemetry confirms employees deploying OpenClaw on corporate devices with no SOC visibility. - Mar 2026 : Snyk and Tessl announce registry-level skill security scanning partnership. Snyk and Vercel previously partnered to scan skills on skills.sh at install time. - NIST / CAISI : Federal Register RFI on AI Agent Security published Jan 8, 2026, comments closed Mar 9, 2026 — the first formal US government solicitation specifically addressing AI agent security risks. June 2026 - Jun 3 : Trail of Bits publishes “The Sorry State of Skill Distribution” — every public skill scanner tested ClawHub’s VirusTotal + LLM guard model, Cisco’s skill-scanner , the skills.sh scanners is bypassed in under an hour, via payload padding that forces truncation, logic hidden in binary and archive formats, and prompt-injecting the scanner’s own LLM judge. - Jun 22–24 : Air Security publishes “The Story of Skills” and “The Circus of Skills” — a researcher-built malicious skill reaches over 26,000 agents while every scanner clears it, its payload served from an attacker-controlled external documentation URL; a follow-up scan of 142,836 live skills finds 17,822 12.4%, 6.7M installs resting on at least one untrusted external instruction source. July 2026 Jul 2 : Air Security publishes “SkillJacking” — 925 skills serving ~134K agents sit on instantly hijackable dependencies deleted GitHub accounts, unregistered packages, expired domains, freed cloud-app slots ; researchers take over the most popular video-generation skill on skills.sh 11,483 installs by re-registering its deleted owner account. Summary Table Each of the 10 risks is documented in a separate file. Click on the risk name to view the full details. 📊 Prefer a visual map?See the— a skill-lifecycle diagram plus a colour-coded card for every risk. Top 10 Visual Overview | | Risk | Severity | Key Mitigation | Real-World Evidence | |---|---|---|---|---| | AST02 /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/ast02.html AST03 /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/ast03.html AST04 /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/ast04.html AST05 /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/ast05.html AST06 /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/ast06.html AST07 /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/ast07.html AST08 /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/ast08.html AST09 /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/ast09.html AST10 /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/ast10.html MAESTRO Mapping The Cloud Security Alliance CSA MAESTRO framework provides a structured threat modeling approach for agentic AI systems across 7 interconnected layers. This mapping aligns each AST10 risk with relevant MAESTRO layers to enable targeted threat localization and cross-layer risk analysis. php graph TD A Layer 7: Agent Ecosystem -- B Layer 6: Security & Compliance B -- C Layer 5: Evaluation & Observability C -- D Layer 4: Deployment & Infrastructure D -- E Layer 3: Agent Frameworks E -- F Layer 2: Data Operations F -- G Layer 1: Foundation Models style A fill: ffcccc style B fill: ffcccc style C fill: ffffcc style D fill: ccffcc style E fill: ccccff style F fill: ffccff style G fill: ccffff | AST | Risk | MAESTRO Layers | |---|---|---| | AST01 | Malicious Skills | 7, 3, 6, 4, 5 | | AST02 | Supply Chain Compromise | 7, 3, 6, 4 | | AST03 | Over-Privileged Skills | 6, 4, 3, 7 | | AST04 | Insecure Metadata | 7, 3, 4, 6 | | AST05 | Untrusted External Instructions | 3, 2, 7, 6 | | AST06 | Weak Isolation | 4, 6, 3 | | AST07 | Update Drift | 4, 6, 7 | | AST08 | Poor Scanning | 5, 6, 3 | | AST09 | No Governance | 6, 7, 5 | | AST10 | Cross-Platform Reuse | 7, 3, 6 | The MAESTRO layer mapping helps teams align AST10 risks with CSA’s 7-layer threat model for agentic AI. For detailed descriptions, attack scenarios, preventive mitigations, and OWASP mappings, see each individual risk file. Contribute We welcome contributions from the community Here’s how you can help: Ways to Contribute Report New Risks : Found a security issue in agent skills? Submit it as a GitHub issue with evidence and impact analysis. Improve Mitigations : Have better prevention strategies or real-world examples? Update the relevant AST file. Add Examples : Share anonymized attack scenarios or mitigation case studies. Translate : Help localize this guide for non-English speakers. Code : Contribute to scanning tools, format validators, or automation scripts. Research : Analyze skills in your environment and share findings anonymized . Getting Started - Fork the repository on GitHub. - Create a feature branch for your changes. - Make your edits following our contributing guidelines /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/CONTRIBUTING.md . - Submit a pull request with a clear description of your changes. Submit New Risk Entries Use our interactive web form to submit new AST risk entries: 🔀 AST10 metadata loss simulator — Compare two skill manifests to see which security metadata is lost or weakened after a cross-platform port. The form generates properly formatted markdown and provides multiple submission options: - Direct GitHub file creation - Create GitHub Issue - Download and manual PR Community Guidelines - Be respectful and constructive in discussions. - Provide evidence for security claims. - Respect contributor privacy when sharing examples. - Follow OWASP’s Code of Conduct. See CONTRIBUTING.md for detailed guidelines. Universal Skill Format Proposal The following YAML format is proposed as a cross-platform standard that mitigates AST10 and provides the metadata foundation required to address AST01 through AST09. It is designed to be a superset of all current platform-specific formats. --- Universal Agentic Skill Format v1.0 Compatible with: OpenClaw, Claude Code, Cursor/Codex, VS Code name: example-skill version: 1.0.0 platforms: openclaw, claude, cursor, vscode description: "Safe example skill — concise, honest statement of function" author: name: "Author Name" identity: "did:web:example.com" Decentralized identity anchor signing key: "ed25519:pubkey hex here" permissions: files: read: - ~/.config/app.json Explicit paths only; no wildcards write: - ~/.config/app.json deny write: - SOUL.md - MEMORY.md - AGENTS.md Identity files require explicit grant network: allow: - api.example.com Domain allowlist, not binary on/off deny: " " Default deny all other egress shell: false Explicit shell access declaration tools: - web fetch - read file requires: binaries: jq, curl min runtime version: "2026.1.0" risk tier: L1 L0=safe, L1=low, L2=elevated, L3=destructive scan status: scanner: " email protected " last scanned: "2026-02-15" result: "pass" signature: "ed25519:ABCDEF1234567890..." Signs the canonical hash of this manifest content hash: "sha256:abcdef1234..." Hash of the complete skill package changelog: - version: "1.0.0" date: "2026-02-01" notes: "Initial release" --- Format design rationale: permissions.deny write protects identity files SOUL.md , MEMORY.md by default — must be explicitly overridden. network.allow is a domain allowlist, not a boolean — closing the “network: true” over-permission gap AST03 . signature and content hash together enable Merkle-root registry verification AST01/AST02 . scan status creates a machine-readable provenance trail AST08/AST09 . risk tier enables automated governance policies without per-skill review AST09/AST10 . Getting Started For Security Teams - Review this document and the complete Top 10 detail pages /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/top10 for full risk descriptions, attack scenarios, and OWASP mappings. - Conduct a skill inventory across all agent platforms in use — treat this as an immediate priority given active exploitation confirmed in 2026. - Use the Security Assessment Checklist /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/checklist.html for reviewing installed skills. - Implement the governance framework described in AST09: inventory, approval workflow, audit logging, and agentic identity controls. - Subscribe to ClawHub, skills.sh, and platform-specific security advisories. For Skill Developers Least privilege : Declare a minimal permission manifest; request only what your skill genuinely needs AST03 . Safe parsing : Use safe YAML/JSON loaders; never deserialize untrusted skill configs without sandboxing AST04 . Sign your skills : Implement ed25519 signing before publication; include content hash in your manifest AST01/AST02 . Pin dependencies : Lock all nested dependencies to immutable hashes — never version ranges AST07 . Honest metadata : Accurately declare risk tier , permissions, and requires ; do not understate scope AST04 . Protect identity files : Never request write access to SOUL.md , MEMORY.md , or AGENTS.md unless your skill’s core function requires it — and document why AST03 . For Platform Developers Default sandbox : Make container/Docker isolation the default for skill execution; make host-mode an explicit opt-in AST06 . Safe deserialization : Disable dangerous YAML/JSON tags in all skill loaders by default; validate against a schema before execution AST04 . Registry scanning : Implement behavioral scanning at publish time and at install time; pattern matching alone is insufficient AST08 . Provenance infrastructure : Support the Universal Skill Format; implement Merkle-root transparency logs for your registry AST01/AST02/AST10 . Audit logging : Emit structured logs for all skill actions file access, shell commands, network calls, memory writes AST09 . Trust prompts : Do not allow repository-controlled configuration to execute before explicit user trust confirmation AST02 . Target Audience | Role | Primary Concerns | Key AST Risks | |---|---|---| AI Platform Developers | Secure skill runtimes, registries, installers, and CI/CD integration | AST01, AST02, AST04, AST05, AST06, AST08 | AppSec / Product Security | Govern skills in enterprise deployments; review skill PRs | AST03, AST04, AST05, AST07, AST09 | Skill Authors | Write safe manifests, scripts, and metadata; ship signable packages | AST03, AST04, AST05, AST07 | GRC / Compliance | Map skill risks to NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001, EU AI Act | AST05, AST09, AST10 | CISOs / Security Leadership | Understand blast radius, incident scope, and governance gaps | AST02, AST05, AST06, AST09 | Developers / Engineers | Safely install and use skills without introducing unreviewed risk | AST01, AST02, AST07 | Project Status and Timeline Status : New Project Proposal — active development Version : 1.0 2026 Edition License : Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 4.0 CC-BY-SA-4.0 Timeline | Quarter | Phase | Deliverables | |---|---|---| Q2 2026 | Foundation | GitHub repo launch, OWASP project page, AST01–AST06 full write-ups, incident database | Q3 2026 | Completion | AST07–AST10 write-ups, Universal Skill Format v1.0 specification, cheat sheets, v1.0 RC | Q4 2026 | Launch | v1.0 release, OWASP flagship project submission, RSA 2026 / OWASP Global AppSec presentations | Leadership and Governance Project Lead Co-Leads Contribution Model | Channel | Purpose | |---|---| GitHub Issues | Risk suggestions, new attack scenarios, mitigation proposals | GitHub PRs | Content contributions, platform-specific examples, translations | Goals and Success Metrics | Goal | Metric | Target | |---|---|---| v1.0 Release | Complete 10 risks + full OWASP/NIST mappings | Q3 2026 | OWASP Flagship | Project review and approval | Q4 2026 | Conference Adoption | Presentations accepted | 3+ RSA, OWASP Global AppSec | Industry Adoption | Registries implementing Universal Skill Format | 2+ major registries | Key Research and References Primary Research 2026 Snyk ToxicSkills Feb 5, 2026 — First comprehensive security audit of AI agent skill ecosystem; 3,984 skills scanned across ClawHub and skills.sh. Snyk: From SKILL.md to Shell Access Feb 3, 2026 — Threat model for agent skills; lethal trifecta framework. Check Point Research: Caught in the Hook Feb 25, 2026 — CVE-2025-59536 CVSS 8.7 and CVE-2026-21852 CVSS 5.3 in Claude Code. Antiy CERT: ClawHavoc Campaign Analysis Feb 2026 — 1,184 malicious skills; Trojan/OpenClaw.PolySkill classification. Oasis Security: ClawJacked Feb 26, 2026 — CVE-2026-28363 CVSS 9.9 ; WebSocket brute-force against local OpenClaw instances. SecurityScorecard Feb 2026 — 135,000+ OpenClaw instances publicly exposed; 53,000+ correlated with prior breach activity. Snyk: 280+ Leaky Skills Feb 5, 2026 — API key and PII exposure across ClawHub. Snyk: Why Your Skill Scanner Is Just False Security Feb 11, 2026 — Pattern-matching scanner limitations. Air Security: The Story of Skills Jun 22, 2026 — Researcher-built malicious skill reached 26,000+ agents via a trusted marketplace and social media; every scanner cleared it. Air Security: The Circus of Skills Jun 24, 2026 — 142,836 skills scanned for untrusted external instruction sources; 17,822 12.4%, 6.7M installs affected. Air Security: SkillJacking Jul 2, 2026 — 925 skills resting on instantly hijackable dependencies ~134K agents ; top skills.sh video-generation skill taken over via a deleted GitHub account. Industry Reports Cisco State of AI Security 2026 — Comprehensive AI threat landscape; agentic AI proliferation and governance gap. Microsoft Defender Security Research Team Feb 2026 — OpenClaw enterprise security advisory. BlueRock Security 2026 — 7,000+ MCP server analysis; 36.7% SSRF-vulnerable. Bitdefender Feb 2026 — Enterprise telemetry on shadow AI / OpenClaw deployment. Hudson Rock Feb 2026 — Vidar infostealer variants targeting OpenClaw identity files. IBM X-Force 2025 Threat Intelligence Index — AI supply chain risk baseline. Standards and Frameworks OWASP AIVSS Project 2025 OWASP LLM Top 10 2025 OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 Dec 2025 NIST AI RMF ISO/IEC 42001 AI Management System EU AI Act enforced Aug 2026 NIST / CAISI Federal Register RFI on AI Agent Security Jan 8, 2026 Academic and Technical “Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic Coding Assistants” arXiv:2601.17548 “Do Not Mention This to the User”: Detecting and Understanding Malicious Agent Skills in the Wild arXiv:2602.06547, USENIX Security 2026 snyk-labs/toxicskills-goof — Real malicious skill samples for scanner testing. openclaw/openclaw Issue 10827 — Skill supply-chain security: provenance tracking and permission manifests proposal. Resources GitHub : github.com/OWASP/www-project-agentic-skills-top-10 https://github.com/OWASP/www-project-agentic-skills-top-10 OWASP Project Page : owasp.org/www-project-agentic-skills-top-10 https://owasp.org/www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/ Full Risk Documentation : Visual Top 10 Overview /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/top10 Project Proposal : proposal.md /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/proposal.html Security Assessment Checklist : checklist.md /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/checklist.html Universal Skill Format Specification : universal-skill-format.md /www-project-agentic-skills-top-10/universal-skill-format.html License This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ . You are free to share and adapt this material for any purpose, provided you give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, indicate if changes were made, and distribute your contributions under the same license. Contact For questions, suggestions, or to get involved: - Open an issue on GitHub Last updated: March 2026. This document reflects confirmed incidents, published CVEs, and research available as of that date. The threat landscape is evolving rapidly — contributions and corrections are welcome. Example Put whatever you like here: news, screenshots, features, supporters, or remove this file and don’t use tabs at all. Leadership & Founding Members Project Leadership Current Leaders Ken Huang Hammad Atta Fabio Cerullo Aonan Guan Bhavya Gupta Niv Hoffman Iftach Orr Akram Sheriff AIVSS Distinguished Review Board The OWASP AIVSS project’s Distinguished Review Board comprises world-renowned cybersecurity leaders, former government officials, and industry pioneers who provide strategic guidance and expert oversight for the AI Vulnerability Scoring System framework. We thank them for their guidance, several of whom have also supported this project’s work. Rob Joyce Advisor to PwC and OpenAI, Former Special Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity Coordinator Jason Clinton Deputy CISO, Anthropic Amy R. Steagall Chief Information Security Officer, Stanford University Martin Stanley AI Risk Management Framework Lead, NIST Apostol Vassilev Research Supervisor, NIST Andrew Coyne CISO, Banner Health, Former CISO, Mayo Clinic Kevin Rocque Managing Director/Executive Vice President, Global Technology Risk Officer, TD Bank Jeff Williams Former Global OWASP Chair, Founder and CTO, Contrast Security Michael Tran Duff University Chief Information Security and Data Privacy Officer, Harvard University Emil Bender Lassen Standards Lead, AIUC-1 Agentic Skills Top 10 Founding Members Founding members of the OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 project itself — project leads, co-leads, and additional contributors — listed alphabetically. Several also contribute to the sibling OWASP AIVSS project listed above. Ken Huang Project Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10 Hammad Atta Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10 Manish Bhatt Security Researcher, AWS Fabio Cerullo Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10 David Girard Senior Director, AI Security & AI Alliances, Trend Micro Aonan Guan Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10 Bhavya Gupta Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10 Pamela Gupta Founder & CEO, OutSecure / Trusted AI Idan Habler Staff AI/ML Security Researcher, Intuit Niv Hoffman CTO, Air Security Charles Iheagwara AI/ML Security Leader, AstraZeneca Sushmitha Janapareddy Director - Security Integrations, American Express Edward Lee Vice President, Lead AI Security, JP Morgan KJ Lian Senior Manager, Data & AI Public Sector , AWS Vineeth Sai Narajala Application Security, AWS Iftach Orr Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10 Kanna Sekar Cyber Security, Google Akram Sheriff Co-Lead, Agentic Skills Top 10 Dennis Xu Research VP, AI, Gartner OWASP AIVSS Founding Members The OWASP AIVSS Agentic AI Vulnerability Scoring System https://owasp.org/www-project-agentic-ai-vulnerability-scoring-system/ project is a sibling OWASP initiative focused on scoring the severity of agentic AI vulnerabilities. Its founding members are recognized here as OWASP founding members in the agentic AI security space; many of them have also contributed directly to the Agentic Skills Top 10 project’s research and review process. Sunil Agrawal Chief Information Security Officer, Glean David Ames Partner, PwC Michael Bargury Founder and CTO, Zenity Joshua Beck Application Security Architect, SAS Manish Bhatt Security Researcher, Amazon Kuiper Security Mark Breitenbach Security Engineer, Dropbox Anat Bremler-Barr Professor of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University Siah Burke HIPAA Security Officer, Siah.ai David Campbell AI Security, Scale AI Ying-Jung Chen AI safety researcher, PhD, Georgia Institute of Technology Anton Chuvakin Security Solution Strategy, Google Jason Clinton CISO, Anthorphic Adam Dawson Staff AI Security Researcher, Dreadnode Leon Derczynski Principal Research Scientist, NVIDIA Walker Lee Dimon AI Security Researcher, MITRE Marissa Dotter AI Security Researcher, MITRE Dan Goldberg ISO Market Lead, Omnicom David Haber CEO, Lakera Idan Habler Staff AI/ML Security Researcher, Intuit Jason Haddix Founder, Arcanum Information Security Keith Hoodlet Director of AI/ML & AppSec, Trail of Bits Ken Huang AIVSS Project Lead, OWASP Chris Hughes CEO, Aquia Charles Iheagwara AI/ML Security Leader, AstraZeneca Krystal Jackson Researcher, Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, UC Berkeley Sushmitha Janapareddy Director - Security Integrations, American Express Rob Joyce Former Cybersecurity Director of NSA, Advisor to PwC, PwC Diana Kelley CISO, Noma Security Prashant Kulkarni Lead AI Security Research Engineer, Google Cloud Mahesh Lambe Founder, MIT, Unify Dynamics Edward Lee Vice President, Lead AI Security, JP Morgan Nate Lee CEO, Cloudsec.ai Vishwas Manral CEO, Precize.ai Daniela Muhaj Executive-in-Residence for Research & Development, AI 2030 Vineeth Sai Narajala Application Security, AWS Om Narayan AI Security Researcher, AWS Varun Pant Engineering and Product Leader, AI applications at the Automated Reasoning Group, AWS Advait Patel Senior Site Reliability Engineer DevSecOps + Cloud + AIOps , Broadcom, IEEE Alex Polyakov CEO, adversa.ai Ramesh Raskar Professor & Director, MIT Media Lab Ron F. Del Rosario VP-Head of AI Security, SAP Tal Shapira Co-Founder & CTO, Reco AI Akram Sheriff Senior AI/ML Software Engineering Leader, Cisco Samantha Siau Security and Compliance, Anthropic Kevin Simmonds Partner on AI Offensive Security, PWC Martin Stanley NIST AI RMF Lead, Independent Omar A. Turner General Manager of Security, Microsoft Apostol Vassilev AI Research Team Supervisor, NIST Matthew Versaggi AI Fellow, White House Presidential Innovation Fellow David Webb Agency Cybersecurity Officer, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Dennis Xu Research VP, AI, Gartner Xiaochen Zhang Executive Director and Chief Responsible AI Officer, AI 2030 Recognition We extend our gratitude to all founding members who have contributed to establishing this crucial framework for AI security assessment. Their vision and dedication have been instrumental in shaping the Agentic Skills Top 10 project. Get Involved Interested in contributing to the Agentic Skills Top 10 project? We welcome new contributors and leaders. Please see our Contribution Guidelines CONTRIBUTING.md for more information on how to get involved.