Openness must not be sacrificed in US science and tech policy on China A commentary in the South China Morning Post argues that US science and technology policy toward China must not sacrifice openness, warning that indiscriminate restrictions could damage America's scientific strength. The piece, which notes that Washington and Beijing are preparing for their first formal AI dialogue, calls for 'smart openness' that distinguishes between sensitive dual-use technologies and ordinary academic cooperation, while acknowledging legitimate concerns about undisclosed affiliations and technology transfer. Openness must not be sacrificed in US science and tech policy on China It’s not engagement vs security. The challenge is smart openness: protecting what matters without hurting a great US scientific strength expected https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3366162/trump-calls-xis-washington-visit-exciting-claims-us-leads-china-ai-race?module=inline&pgtype=article to be near the top of the agenda. Both administrations are preparing for their first formal dialogue on AI. Washington has framed much of that conversation around the need for tighter controls on sensitive technologies. That framing is the problem. export controls https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-trends/article/3366164/us-export-curbs-have-reshaped-chinas-tech-scene-around-chokepoints-report?module=inline&pgtype=article , research restrictions and visa limits . The real choice is between indiscriminate restriction and disciplined risk management. undisclosed affiliations https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/3363957/professors-alleged-role-china-programmes-leads-ban-us-funding?module=inline&pgtype=article , conflicts of commitment and improper technology transfer. Federal research security policy already requires extensive disclosure of appointments, foreign support, affiliations and potential conflicts of interest and commitment. Advanced computing, semiconductors, quantum science, biotechnology and AI all raise legitimate national security questions, largely because so much of the work is dual-use end optional trim. But acknowledging those risks does not require treating every interaction with China as equally dangerous. The challenge is to protect what truly matters without damaging the openness that has long been one of America’s greatest scientific strengths. Smart openness starts from a simple premise: technologies are not equally sensitive and not every Chinese institution carries the same risk. Military-relevant quantum sensing is not cooperation in basic mathematics or astrophysics. A researcher who conceals ties to a defence laboratory has little in common with a Chinese graduate student studying theoretical chemistry.