{"slug": "office-party-a-planted-temp-file-makes-claude-s-document-skills-run-code", "title": "Office Party: a planted temp file makes Claude's document skills run code", "summary": "AIR Security disclosed a code-execution flaw in Anthropic's official DOCX, PPTX and XLSX skills for Claude, in which the shared helper scripts/office/soffice.py falls back to loading lo_socket_shim.so via LD_PRELOAD from a fixed path in the shared temp directory and reuses any file already there without verifying its author, letting an attacker who can write that file run code inside LibreOffice with the agent user's privileges. AIR Security demonstrated both direct placement of the file and a second, apparently benign skill that unpacked the library into /tmp, and reported the issue to Anthropic in May; Anthropic acknowledged it but said the sandboxed code is outside its security boundary, and the helper remained unchanged as of 5 November.", "body_md": "AIR Security disclosed a code-execution flaw in Anthropic's official DOCX, PPTX and XLSX skills, which Claude uses to create and convert documents. The shared helper scripts/office/soffice.py falls back to loading lo_socket_shim.so through LD_PRELOAD when it cannot open a Unix socket, a condition that includes Claude Code's own sandbox. It uses a fixed path in the shared temp directory and reuses any file already there without checking who wrote it, so an attacker who can write that file gets code execution inside LibreOffice with the agent user's privileges. AIR demonstrated both direct placement and a second, apparently benign skill that unpacked the library into /tmp. The researchers reported it to Anthropic in May; Anthropic acknowledged the issue but said the sandboxed code is outside its security boundary, and the helper was still unchanged on 5 November.", "url": "https://wpnews.pro/news/office-party-a-planted-temp-file-makes-claude-s-document-skills-run-code", "canonical_source": "https://www.air.security/blog-posts/office-party", "published_at": "2026-11-05 00:00:00+00:00", "updated_at": "2026-11-18 19:20:46.099544+00:00", "lang": "en", "topics": ["ai-agents", "ai-safety", "ai-tools", "artificial-intelligence"], "entities": ["AIR Security", "Anthropic", "Claude", "Claude Code", "LibreOffice", "lo_socket_shim.so", "soffice.py"], "also_reported_by": [], "takeaway": "Claude's DOCX, PPTX and XLSX skills load lo_socket_shim.so via LD_PRELOAD from a fixed shared-temp path without checking the file's author, so any process that can write that path gets code execution inside LibreOffice as the agent user.", "recommendation": {"advice": "Audit agent skills that load shared libraries from fixed temp paths, and verify file ownership or use per-run private directories before any LD_PRELOAD fallback.", "playbook": "agent-security", "playbook_url": "https://wpnews.pro/playbooks/agent-security"}, "alternates": {"html": "https://wpnews.pro/news/office-party-a-planted-temp-file-makes-claude-s-document-skills-run-code", "markdown": "https://wpnews.pro/news/office-party-a-planted-temp-file-makes-claude-s-document-skills-run-code.md", "text": "https://wpnews.pro/news/office-party-a-planted-temp-file-makes-claude-s-document-skills-run-code.txt", "jsonld": "https://wpnews.pro/news/office-party-a-planted-temp-file-makes-claude-s-document-skills-run-code.jsonld"}}