Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning via Agent-Specific Preference

arXiv:2608.08604v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is a powerful framework for solving complex collaborative tasks, but it relies heavily on well-defined global reward functions. Designing such rewards is challenging, especially in systems with heterogeneous agents, where a single scalar objective may fail to capture diverse behaviors. In this paper, we introduce Multi-AGent Preference-Integrated lEarning (MAGPIE), which addresses these challenges through agent-specific preference modeling. Each agent is evaluated by a dedicated expert through preference signals, eliminating the need for global evaluation. We theoretically prove that optimizing these decentralized preferences converges to a Nash equilibrium policy. To integrate local preferences into a coherent global objective, we construct agent-specific reward models from preference data and combine them via a monotonic aggregation mechanism. We further prove that optimizing this aggregate reward model is equivalent to training the Nash equilibrium policy. Extensive experiments on benchmark multi-agent tasks and a sequential production line task show that MAGPIE achieves performance comparable to reward-engineered baselines, demonstrating its potential to facilitate policy learning in scenarios where precise reward engineering is impractical.