Mini Shai-Hulud Is Still Infecting GitHub Repositories

The Mini Shai-Hulud worm infected six new GitHub repositories between 20 and 24 September 2026, four months after attackers hijacked all 53 tags of the actions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action on 18 May 2026, according to a report on the ongoing campaign. The payload, byte-identical to the May build with Git blob 2931c1be (500,143 bytes), steals CI secrets via the ghs_ token read from Runner.Worker memory and commits Claude Code and VS Code hook files, including .claude/setup.mjs which downloads Bun 1.3.14, to repositories such as jd-opensource/micro-app (6,254 stars) and MaaXYZ/MaaFramework (4,914 stars). The tags still point to the malicious commit, so any workflow calling the action by tag (@v2.1.1, @v2.2.0, @v2.2.1, or @v3) continues to run the payload, and all six default branches still contain the hook files.

Mini Shai-Hulud Is Still Infecting GitHub Repositories On this page The May 2026 Mini Shai-Hulud worm is still infecting new GitHub repositories. The payload is byte-identical to the May build. The worm spreads through the actions-cool/issues-helper GitHub Action. Attackers hijacked its tags in May. Four months later, the tags still point to the malicious commit. Any workflow that calls the action by tag still runs the payload. The payload steals the CI secrets. Then it commits Claude Code and VS Code hooks into the repository. A developer who pulls the change and opens the project runs the malware on their own machine. Newly infected repositories Six repositories received the hook files between 20 and 24 September. | Repository | Stars | Infection commit, UTC | Probable trigger | |---|---|---|---| | jd-opensource/micro-app https://github.com/jd-opensource/micro-app | 6,254 | c610739c https://github.com/jd-opensource/micro-app/commit/c610739cc5d2493704509ae7f755d4f79229c68b , 09-21 03:43 | Close Inactive Issue | | MaaXYZ/MaaFramework https://github.com/MaaXYZ/MaaFramework | 4,914 | 97123f91 https://github.com/MaaXYZ/MaaFramework/commit/97123f9160fcf03964187e66abcc2824f8fa1d9a , 09-24 07:03 | Release | | ant-design/pro-components https://github.com/ant-design/pro-components | 4,833 | 1bc4049d https://github.com/ant-design/pro-components/commit/1bc4049d295a4af4da3cef8074e4b5d7312a6858 , 09-24 03:43 | Issue Open Check | | Moonofweisheng/wot-design-uni https://github.com/Moonofweisheng/wot-design-uni | 2,300 | 0320fd8a https://github.com/Moonofweisheng/wot-design-uni/commit/0320fd8a3825502362d91c1e46c061290c156197 , 09-20 16:16 | Issue Inactive | | vbenjs/vben-admin-thin-next https://github.com/vbenjs/vben-admin-thin-next | 2,072 | d83cd757 https://github.com/vbenjs/vben-admin-thin-next/commit/d83cd757e7731d9e62882758646e25614519e142 , 09-24 04:21 | Issue Close Require | | nineaiyu/xadmin-client https://github.com/nineaiyu/xadmin-client | 139 | 257a90c8 https://github.com/nineaiyu/xadmin-client/commit/257a90c876fb858a54bbdeb47836701aefa0dabc , 09-22 04:38 | Issue Close Require | Each trigger workflow calls actions-cool/issues-helper by tag @v2.1.1 , @v2.2.0 , @v2.2.1 , or @v3 . Each malicious commit came less than six minutes after the workflow run started. The trigger is an inference from this timing. Five triggers are issue bots. They run each day or on an issue event, so the infection repeats without the attacker. All six default branches still contain the hook files. GitHub code search produced this list, so it can miss other repositories. How the infection spreads On 18 May 2026, the attacker moved all 53 tags of actions-cool/issues-helper . The attacker also moved all 15 tags of actions-cool/maintain-one-comment . The new commits have timestamps from 19:10 to 19:31 UTC. Each new commit has the message Build action for <tag and the author Jinke Li . The commits are not signed. Nobody has restored the tags. The malicious action.yml runs the payload first. Then it calls the real action, so the step passes and the bot works as usual. The action’s index.js has Git blob 2931c1be 500,143 bytes . Each of the six repositories has the same file at .claude/index.js . What the payload commits On a runner, the payload reads the ghs token from Runner.Worker memory. It uses the token to commit five files to the repository. .vscode/tasks.json runs the same command when VS Code opens the folder. .claude/setup.mjs downloads Bun 1.3.14 and runs .claude/index.js . The kitty-monitor backdoor installer skips CI runners. On a developer’s machine, the payload installs that backdoor. It can also install the token monitor and its wiper. The commits are easy to miss in a review: - GitHub shows them as verified, by github-actions bot . The payload commits through the GraphQL API with the repository’s own token. - The message can copy the previous commit. The pro-components commit and its parent both say 3.1.14-7 . - A second run adds a second hook to the same file. micro-app received two commits two minutes apart c096c93f https://github.com/jd-opensource/micro-app/commit/c096c93f08f3472b5a0d0e808a9265ecb49b683c . Relation to the May campaign The September infections come from the May 2026 Mini Shai-Hulud wave. For these six repositories, it is the first infection found. The September commits are the first to touch .claude/setup.mjs on their default branches. The earliest downstream hook commit found is in zhenghefeng251/my elementPlus . It has blob 2931c1be and a time of 18 May, 20:31 UTC, about 80 minutes after the first tag commit. About six hours later, the atool npm account compromise https://safedep.io/mini-shai-hulud-strikes-again-314-npm-packages-compromised published 637 malicious versions. That wave used a related build 499,328 bytes . Both builds use t.m-kosche . com , Bun 1.3.14, the kitty-monitor backdoor, and the same hook files. A static decryption of the September sample adds two facts to the May post: - The payload runs sudo without a password on the runner. It adds 127.0.0.1 entries for the stepsecurity.io domains to /etc/hosts . This can block that runner monitor. - The wiper rm -rf ~/; rm -rf ~/Documents runs if the stolen GitHub token returns HTTP 40x. It also runs if @cap-js/ \ email protected\ https://safedep.io/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection gets a deprecation message, or if the npm registry request fails. Indicators of compromise | Type | Value | |---|---| | Hijacked actions | actions-cool/issues-helper 53 tags , actions-cool/maintain-one-comment 15 tags | | Malicious tag commit, v3 | 147337a919d9 | | Payload Git blob | 2931c1be43b0d04174636ddbff54963aec92bdeb , 500,143 bytes | | setup.mjs Git blob | 0bbd3d17062ded7c8159ffe22d0a4f3a85e4823e , 5,346 bytes | | Exfiltration host | t.m-kosche . com/api/public/otel/v1/traces | | Commit search markers | firedalazer , thebeautifulmarchoftime | | Persistence | kitty-monitor , gh-token-monitor , ~/.local/share/kitty/cat.py | | Wiper trigger package | @cap-js/ \ email protected\ https://safedep.io/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection | - malware - github-actions - supply-chain - config-files Author SafeDep Team safedep.io Share The Latest from SafeDep blogs Follow for the latest updates and insights on open source security & engineering ASOS App Hack: Attackers Used Push Notifications to Send a Ransom Note https://safedep.io/asos-push-notification-extortion-snowflake-claim Attackers got into the platforms ASOS uses to message customers and pushed an extortion note to phones. 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