Microsoft shows poisoned training data can backdoor coding agents Two Microsoft research teams demonstrated that an attacker controlling fine-tuning data or an open-weight checkpoint can backdoor a coding agent into executing commands on cue: 90 poisoned examples hidden among roughly 9,000 terminal-agent conversations (about 1%) taught gpt-4.1-mini to call whatever command-execution tool a harness offered with a payload fetched from an attacker's server, triggering on a routine documentation request in 78% of trials on harnesses seen during training and 11% on one unseen harness, with paraphrased triggers still working 52% to 70% of the time. The checkpoint study poisoned Qwen3.5-4B and 9B models and measured 84.1% to 94.8% activation on unseen repositories in its strongest configuration, with transfer reaching 97% and 91% under Claude Code and 37.3% and 63% under Codex CLI. The researchers also found a public training row mapping a harmless request to a curl-and-execute call, and recommended checking dataset provenance, testing checkpoints in the production harness and limiting tool permissions. Two Microsoft research teams showed that an attacker who controls fine-tuning data or an open-weight checkpoint can make a coding agent run commands on cue. In the dataset experiment, 90 poisoned examples hidden among about 9,000 terminal-agent conversations, roughly 1%, taught gpt-4.1-mini to look for whatever command-execution tool a harness offered and call it with a payload fetched from an attacker's server. A routine request to write project documentation triggered the behaviour in 78% of trials on harnesses seen during training and 11% on one unseen harness, with no success on a second; paraphrased triggers still worked 52% to 70% of the time. The checkpoint study poisoned Qwen3.5-4B and 9B models and saw 84.1% to 94.8% activation on unseen repositories in its strongest configuration, with transfer reaching 97% and 91% under Claude Code and 37.3% and 63% under Codex CLI. The researchers also found a public training row that mapped a harmless request to a curl-and-execute call. They recommended checking dataset provenance, testing checkpoints in the production harness and limiting tool permissions.