Major African Stock Exchange Targeted in AI-Assisted Attack Symantec's Threat Hunter Team reported that a 41-module PowerShell toolkit with hallmarks of AI authorship ran under a web shell for three minutes and twelve seconds on September 20, 2026, against an Internet Information Services server at a stock exchange in an African country, hunting credentials and testing them against the exchange's investment API and a securities depository gateway. Each module copied a DNS exfiltration loop byte for byte and sent hex-encoded lookups to a public out-of-band testing service, with results routed to a collector Symantec could not observe, so it is unknown whether any credentials worked. Symantec attributed six persistence implants on the same server to the China-linked espionage group Witchetty with high confidence but did not attribute the AI-authored toolkit to any group, and the earliest evidence of malicious activity dated from April 2026. Major African Stock Exchange Targeted in AI-Assisted Attack A 41-module PowerShell toolkit with all the hallmarks of AI authorship tested credentials and API keys against the exchange's investment API and a securities depository gateway. Key findings - Symantec's Threat Hunter Team found a toolkit on a stock exchange in an African country with multiple traits that suggest it was written, or at least assisted, by an AI model. - 41 PowerShell modules ran under a web shell for just over three minutes on September 20, 2026, with a new module starting every few seconds. The modules hunted for credentials and secrets and tested them against the exchange’s financial systems. - Each module sent its output as hex-encoded DNS lookups to a unique subdomain of a public out-of-band testing service, a rarely seen technique. - Six persistence implants on the same server are attributed to the China-linked espionage group Witchetty with high confidence, but we have not attributed the AI-authored toolkit to any group. - The earliest evidence of malicious activity dated from April 2026, although the attackers may have been present for longer. - This attack is another example of the recent trend of attacks on financial organizations, such as the multi-billion-dollar Binance cryptocurrency hack https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ck5ynwz9gy67o , and a $110 million cyber heist https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/french-bank-credit-mutuel-arkea-says-100-million-missing-after-cyberattack-2026-11-05/ on French bank Crédit Mutuel Arkéa . Overview Attackers used a likely AI-authored toolkit to hunt for credentials at an African stock exchange and test them against systems close to its financial operations. At one point during the breach, 41 PowerShell modules ran under a webshell on an Internet Information Services IIS server in three minutes and twelve seconds, with a new module starting every few seconds. The modules tested credentials, a reused bearer token and API keys against the exchange's own investment API and the gateway of a securities depository. The toolkit is one of the clearest examples of suspected machine-written attack tooling that we have seen to date. Every module shared the same scaffold, and a Domain Name System DNS exfiltration loop was copied byte for byte into all 41 scripts, where a programmer would normally write it once as a shared function. Each module sent its output as hex-encoded DNS lookups to a public out-of-band testing service, a rarely seen technique. The results went to a collector that we cannot see, so we do not know whether any of the credentials or keys worked. The earliest evidence of malicious activity on the server dated from April 2026, but the attackers may have been present for longer. Six persistence implants were installed on the server. We attribute the implants to the China-linked espionage group Witchetty aka LookingFrog with high confidence, but we have not attributed the activity described below to any group. It could be Witchetty using new tooling, a second and more capable operator using the same access, or an unrelated actor who has compromised the same server. It’s hard to say which of these explanations is most likely, but this is a far more advanced toolkit than those previously attributed to Witchetty. Targeting and motivation The toolkit searched the domain's shared policy folders and the application directories of six business applications for secrets, including cloud keys and database connection strings. They also mapped cloud and database infrastructure, enumerated SharePoint, System Center Configuration Manager SCCM and Team Foundation Server TFS servers, and tested access to the exchange's own investment application programming interface API and to the gateway of a securities depository. The investment API and the depository gateway sit close to the exchange's financial operations, which would make credentials for them valuable to a range of actors. We did not see the results of this activity, so we cannot say exactly what the attackers wanted or whether any of the credentials or keys worked. As a result, it is hard to definitively say what the motivation driving the attack was. The target suggests the attack was financially motivated. However, Witchetty is traditionally known as an espionage group, though it is not unheard of for Chinese espionage actors to also dabble in cybercrime activity. Attempts by the attackers to access the investment API, and the testing of API keys against banking gateway software, would support the narrative that this activity was financially motivated. However, the attackers did also check a specific investor’s number, which indicates they may have been interested in stealing the investment plans of someone specific, meaning an espionage motive cannot be ruled out. The stealing of source code, internal infrastructure and employee data could also support this hypothesis, while the stealthy manner in which the attackers exfiltrated data also underlined that they wanted this activity to remain undetected. Tooling and tradecraft A toolkit built from single-purpose modules The toolkit ran between 08:44 and 08:47 UTC, a window of three minutes and twelve seconds, but did a lot in that constrained timeframe. Individual modules stole Group Policy Preferences GPP passwords, searched for AWS keys and database connection strings in shared folders and application directories, checked the host for cloud credentials, and opened a connection to a database cluster hosted on Amazon Web Services AWS . Others enumerated SharePoint sites and searched their content for keywords, queried SCCM and TFS servers, and mapped the IIS sites and application pools on the server. Four modules targeted the exchange's investment API. They sent a login request using a username and a guessed password, reused a bearer token, and tested several API keys against the depository gateway, including a blank key that may have served as a control. These modules connected to the API host by IP address and set the Host header manually. They also disabled certificate validation. What the commands revealed The commands used to run the modules give us an indication of what the attackers targeting this organization were interested in. In the modules’ commands, data is exfiltrated to a DNS server, and there's a sub-domain that changes according to what the command does – such as ‘spid1’ for Host and Process Enumeration and ‘awslocal1’ for Cloud and Devops Hunting, and so on. The functionalities of the modules included: - Host and Process Enumeration spid1, proc2, proc3, smbctx1, smbsc1 : Collects the machine name, current user identity, mapped network drives, SMB connections, and running process trees including parent processes and full command-line arguments via WMI . - Cloud and DevOps Hunting awslocal1 : Searches for AWS CLI configurations, environment variables related to databases or secrets, and active processes for tools like Docker, Kubernetes, Terraform, Jenkins, and GitLab. - Web Server IIS Profiling iis1, iisa1, iisp2 : Interrogates IIS using the WebAdministration module to map out local websites, application pools, physical disk paths, bindings, and pool identity users. - Secret and Credential Scraping cfg1, sites1, xpjs1, dep1, sysm1, sysh1, sysv2, gpp1, awsa1 : Recursively scans local web roots, deployment directories C:\Deployer , and the domain's SYSVOL network share. It specifically targets configuration files .xml, .json, .env, web.config looking for hardcoded passwords, Group Policy cpassword fields, AWS access keys, and database connection strings. - Database Probing rdsnet1, scq1 : Attempts direct TCP connections to an AWS RDS PostgreSQL instance on port 5432 and uses integrated Windows authentication to query a Microsoft SQL Server for system user and version data. - SharePoint and Source Code Enumeration spf1, spl1, spd1, spd2, sps1, tfs1, tfs2 : Loads the SharePoint PowerShell snap-in to iterate through all sites and document libraries, searching for files containing sensitive keywords like “aws”, “credential”, or “password”. It also queries Team Foundation Server TFS APIs for project lists. - API Exploitation and Lateral Movement api1, api2, map1, dbg1, adm1, admt1, adm2, keys1, key4, xtok1, cscs1, ipo1 : Probes an internal API for debugging endpoints. It then attempts to authenticate to an admin endpoint using hardcoded credentials to extract JWT tokens. Finally, it uses extracted tokens and API keys to query authenticated endpoints for user profiles and banking data. - SCCM Reconnaissance and Lateral-movement Targeting cas1, wmi1, scq1, smbsc1 : Queries the SCCM AdminService and WMI SMS R System to find which machine a given user, likely admin, last logged on to, and enumerates the SCCM server's shares. - Harvested-credential Validation keys1, key4, xtok1 : Cycles through several harvested x-api-key values and a bearer token against the same endpoints to see which one works. - Capital-markets Data Access cscs1, ipo1 : Queries critical endpoints for investor and market data Signs of AI authorship The case for AI authorship rests on how uniform the modules are. Each one opened with the same error-handling line, used the same outer try/catch, hex-encoded its output the same way and returned the same empty-output sentinel. The DNS exfiltration loop was copied byte for byte into all 41 modules. A programmer building a toolkit would normally write that function once, while a model asked for a standalone script each time has no reason to. Variable names were generic, and error handling was uniformly verbose. One module contained a progress variable that no other module had, as if a model had improved a single script in isolation during iterative prompting. Another submitted an invalid credential as a deliberate test. The pace was also consistent with automated tooling, with a new module starting every few seconds. The level of detail included in the commands is another tell-tale sign that AI was used: $ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue' try { $a = string & { $j=Start-Job -ScriptBlock {try{Get-WmiObject -ComputerName '