{"slug": "loopback-is-not-a-trust-boundary-for-todoist-s-http-mcp-server", "title": "Loopback Is Not a Trust Boundary for Todoist's HTTP MCP Server", "summary": "Todoist MCP versions through 10.3.2 shipped an optional HTTP server that accepted browser-origin MCP requests without validating Host or Origin headers or requiring a caller secret, allowing DNS rebinding to route a malicious public site to the victim's loopback listener and execute tools with the configured TODOIST_API_KEY. The advisory, tracked as CVE-2026-76807, demonstrated task creation and completion and notes a wider write surface including updates, deletion, projects, comments, reminders and assignments; the stdio entrypoint was not affected. Users are urged to upgrade @doist/todoist-mcp to 10.3.3 or later, prefer stdio for local agent use, and rotate API keys if the HTTP server was reachable by an untrusted browser.", "body_md": "Local AI tool servers are often treated as safe because they bind to `127.0.0.1`. CVE-2026-76807 shows why network location and caller identity are different controls.\n\nTodoist MCP versions through 10.3.2 exposed an optional `todoist-mcp-http` server. The server accepted browser-origin MCP requests without validating `Host` or `Origin` and without requiring a caller secret. DNS rebinding allowed a malicious public website to route its own hostname to the victim's loopback listener.\n\nThe server then executed tools with its configured `TODOIST_API_KEY`. The advisory demonstrated task creation and completion, and describes the wider write surface: updates, deletion, projects, sections, comments, reminders, filters, labels, and assignments. The stdio entrypoint is not browser-reachable and was not affected by this attack path.\n\nUpgrade `@doist/todoist-mcp` to 10.3.3 or later. Stop unnecessary HTTP transport instances and prefer stdio for local agent use. If HTTP mode is required, enforce strict loopback hostnames, explicit allowed origins, and a per-run caller token.\n\nRebinding protections in an MCP SDK are useful only when the server passes explicit allowed-host and allowed-origin lists. Do not assume that loopback binding enables them automatically.\n\nSearch Todoist activity for tasks, comments, projects, or deletions created through automation without a matching user action. Review logs for MCP requests with unexpected `Host` or `Origin` values and for browser sessions that resolved to loopback.\n\nRotate the Todoist API key if the HTTP server was reachable by an untrusted browser or if anomalous writes occurred. Revoke local bearer tokens that were exposed.\n\nTreat every local tool server as an internet-adjacent service when a browser can issue requests to it. Validate the caller, not just the socket address. Keep high-impact write tools behind explicit authorization and preserve an audit trail that names the tool, caller session, and resulting change.", "url": "https://wpnews.pro/news/loopback-is-not-a-trust-boundary-for-todoist-s-http-mcp-server", "canonical_source": "https://dev.to/sorrelthorncroft/loopback-is-not-a-trust-boundary-for-todoists-http-mcp-server-25i3", "published_at": "2026-11-20 05:06:21+00:00", "updated_at": "2026-11-20 05:14:18.766556+00:00", "lang": "en", "topics": ["ai-agents", "agent-protocols", "ai-safety", "ai-tools"], "entities": ["Todoist", "Doist", "@doist/todoist-mcp", "CVE-2026-76807", "MCP"], "also_reported_by": [], "takeaway": "Loopback binding does not enable MCP SDK rebinding protections on its own: servers must pass explicit allowed-host and allowed-origin lists and require a per-run caller token, as shown by CVE-2026-76807 in Todoist MCP's HTTP transport.", "recommendation": {"advice": "Validate the caller, not just the socket address: enforce explicit allowed hosts and origins plus a per-run token on any local MCP HTTP server, and prefer stdio for local agent use.", "playbook": "agent-security", "playbook_url": "https://wpnews.pro/playbooks/agent-security"}, "alternates": {"html": "https://wpnews.pro/news/loopback-is-not-a-trust-boundary-for-todoist-s-http-mcp-server", "markdown": "https://wpnews.pro/news/loopback-is-not-a-trust-boundary-for-todoist-s-http-mcp-server.md", "text": "https://wpnews.pro/news/loopback-is-not-a-trust-boundary-for-todoist-s-http-mcp-server.txt", "jsonld": "https://wpnews.pro/news/loopback-is-not-a-trust-boundary-for-todoist-s-http-mcp-server.jsonld"}}