LLM pricing agents can converge to different price regimes

A paper submitted to arXiv on 15 October 2026 (arXiv:2610.21711, cs.GT) finds that LLM pricing agents in repeated Bertrand competition can sustain supracompetitive price regimes depending on how they are deployed. Agents that post one price per period from raw market histories including rival prices sustain supracompetitive regimes in self-play, while agents that periodically emit probability distributions from summarized histories of their own profits move toward the competitive region; mixed-interface markets can produce dynamic regimes where LLMs set a high-price anchor and regularly undercut it, keeping both competitors' prices above marginal cost. The authors report LLMs adapt faster than standard online learners, though that advantage largely disappears against full-information learners.

Computer Science Computer Science and Game Theory Submitted on 15 Oct 2026 Title:How language model agents reshape price competition View PDF https://arxiv.org/pdf/2610.21711 HTML experimental https://arxiv.org/html/2610.21711v1 Abstract:Repeated Bertrand competition is a stringent benchmark for algorithmic pricing: in homogeneous-goods markets, standard learning procedures typically select the stage-game Nash outcome with prices near marginal cost. We show that LLM pricing agents can escape this benchmark, depending on deployment decisions. LLMs outperform standard online learners through faster adaptation, but this advantage largely disappears against full-information learners. An extracted surrogate algorithm illustrates how LLMs in specific deployments profit from regularly undercutting slower learners. Agents that post one price every period from raw market histories that include rival prices can sustain supracompetitive regimes in self-play. Agents that periodically emit probability distributions from summarized histories of their own profits instead move toward the competitive region in self-play. Markets mixing these interfaces can generate dynamic regimes in which LLMs establish a high-price anchor and regularly undercut it to capture demand. These regimes can keep both competitors' prices above marginal cost. Deployment choices shape these outcomes, shifting the focus from stationary equilibria to dynamic pricing regimes. Additional Features Current browse context: cs.GT References & Citations Loading... Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer What is the Explorer? https://info.arxiv.org/labs/showcase.html arxiv-bibliographic-explorer Connected Papers What is Connected Papers? https://www.connectedpapers.com/about Litmaps What is Litmaps? https://www.litmaps.co/ scite Smart Citations What are Smart Citations? https://www.scite.ai/ Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv What is alphaXiv? https://alphaxiv.org/ CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers What is CatalyzeX? https://www.catalyzex.com DagsHub What is DagsHub? https://dagshub.com/ Gotit.pub What is GotitPub? http://gotit.pub/faq Hugging Face What is Huggingface? https://huggingface.co/huggingface ScienceCast What is ScienceCast? https://sciencecast.org/welcome Demos Recommenders and Search Tools Influence Flower What are Influence Flowers? https://influencemap.cmlab.dev/ CORE Recommender What is CORE? https://core.ac.uk/services/recommender arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs https://info.arxiv.org/labs/index.html .