# I scanned my MCP setup and it scored 0/100. Here's what was wrong. > Source: > Published: 2026-06-28 01:40:10+00:00 I've been adding MCP servers to Claude and Cursor for months — GitHub, a filesystem server, a couple of search servers, a little internal HTTP one I wrote. It works great. Then two things bugged me: Turns out it's not just me. A 2026 analysis of ~7,000 public MCP servers found **41% require no auth**, **36.7% are SSRF-vulnerable**, and only **8.5% use OAuth**. So I wrote a tiny tool to check my own config — and it scored **0 out of 100**. `mcp-audit` ([https://github.com/alih552/mcp-audit](https://github.com/alih552/mcp-audit)) is a zero-dependency CLI that reads your MCP config (Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, or a plain .mcp.json) and tells you what's wrong. It runs **100% locally** — it never connects to your servers or sends your config anywhere. ``` pipx install git+https://github.com/alih552/mcp-audit mcp-audit ``` Here's the kind of thing it flagged on my (deliberately messy) test config: ``` MCP Audit — ~/.cursor/mcp.json 7 server(s) - ~13,160 context tokens - score 0/100 (F) [HIGH] Remote server with no authentication (internal-api) [HIGH] Plaintext secret in config (GitHub token) (github) [MED] Unpinned auto-updating executable (npx -y) (filesystem) [MED] Over-broad filesystem root '/Users' (filesystem) [LOW] 7 servers ~ 13,160 context tokens loaded every request ``` **No auth on a remote server.** If your MCP server is reachable over HTTP and doesn't check a token, the model — or anyone who finds the URL — can run your tools. With prompt injection in the wild, the *server* has to hold the line, not the model. **Plaintext secrets in the config.** A GITHUB_TOKEN sitting in .mcp.json leaks through the file itself and through your git history. Move it to an env var or a secret manager. **npx -y / uvx without a pinned version.** That silently runs whatever was published most recently. It's a supply-chain risk — pin the version and review updates. **Over-broad filesystem roots.** A filesystem server pointed at /Users or $HOME lets the model read and write far more than your project. Scope it to the project directory. **Token bloat.** This was the one I didn't expect. Every server loads its tool schemas into *every* request. Five servers commonly cost **50-75k tokens of context before you type a word** — that's real money and real latency. Disable the servers you aren't actively using. For the config issues: pin versions, move secrets to env vars, scope filesystem access, and put auth in front of anything remote. There's a full MCP Server Security Checklist here: [https://alih552.github.io/mcp-forge/checklist.html](https://alih552.github.io/mcp-forge/checklist.html) If you're *building* an MCP server and want it secure from commit one, I also put together MCP Forge Kit ([https://alih552.github.io/mcp-forge/](https://alih552.github.io/mcp-forge/)) — a secure-by-default starter (bearer + JWT auth, SSRF-safe fetch, rate limiting, validation, tests, CI). But the auditor above is free and MIT, and genuinely useful on its own. ``` pipx install git+https://github.com/alih552/mcp-audit mcp-audit --json ``` I'd love feedback on the checks — especially **false positives** and checks you think are missing. Repo: [https://github.com/alih552/mcp-audit](https://github.com/alih552/mcp-audit)