Hybrid post-quantum E2EE in a messenger: what is hybrid, and how to check it yourself The Umbera project published an open-source Rust crypto core (umbera-core 1.1.0 on crates.io) implementing hybrid post-quantum end-to-end encryption that combines X25519 with ML-KEM-1024 for key agreement and Ed25519 with ML-DSA-65 for signatures, alongside a new envelope v3 sealed-sender format. The team documented each post-quantum mechanism with its file, line and test in a PQ_STATUS.md, and measured envelope sizes of 5,038 bytes for full v3 and roughly 3,100 bytes for short v3s versus 21,682 bytes for the prior v2 format. The post also lists what cannot yet be verified, noting the server, app UI, network and storage layers remain closed and builds are not yet reproducible. Hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-65, layer by layer, with tests you can run. Umbera is an end-to-end encrypted messenger. This post walks through every place where it uses post-quantum cryptography, points to the file and the test behind each one, and ends with an equally explicit list of what you can't verify yet. All code excerpts come from the public repository and are Apache-2.0. A 90-second look at the app before the details: Open, in UmberaAPP/UMBERA https://github.com/UmberaAPP/UMBERA : core/ : the Rust crypto core ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-65, X25519, Ed25519, secp256k1, AES-GCM, key derivation, MLS groups with X-Wing, call frame keys, QR device linking, message franking , plus tests, vectors and fuzz targets. The same code is published on crates.io as umbera-core 1.1.0. kotlin/ : the protocol layer of the apps envelopes, Double Ratchet, mailbox addresses, group signatures, safety number, the second call layer, meetings by link . communities/ : Communities cryptography, with an independent Go reference implementation. docs/ : PROTOCOL.md , PROOF.md , and PQ STATUS.md , which lists every post-quantum mechanism with its file, line and test. Not open: the server, the app UI, the network and storage layers. The full code will go to trusted independent auditors when the project is audited, and we'll publish the report afterwards. Builds aren't reproducible yet. Harvest now, decrypt later. Anyone can record ciphertext today, whether from the wire, the server or a database backup. If the session keys were agreed with elliptic curves only, a large enough quantum computer could later recover them with Shor's algorithm and read the archive. For messages that should stay private for years, the timeline of that computer barely matters, because the recording already exists. Why not pure post-quantum? ML-KEM FIPS 203 and ML-DSA FIPS 204 were standardised in 2024. The math has been studied for a long time, but the implementations are young, and timing leaks have already turned up in Kyber implementations KyberSlash . X25519 is the opposite: very well understood, and broken by a quantum adversary. A hybrid feeds both secrets into one key derivation, so an attacker has to break both . Signal's PQXDH, Apple's PQ3 and the X25519MLKEM768 key exchange in browsers' TLS make the same choice. From docs/PROTOCOL.md , section 4: ss classical = X25519 ephemeral private, recipient x25519 public ct, ss pq = ML-KEM-1024.Encapsulate recipient kyber public okm = HKDF-SHA256 ikm = ss classical || ss pq, salt = HYBRID LABEL, info = "key-derivation", L = 64 A message is encrypted by the Double Ratchet, packed together with the sender's identity, and sealed to the recipient. Because the sender is inside the ciphertext, the server never learns who sent it sealed sender . In 2.1 the seal is envelope v3 : an ephemeral X25519 key plus an ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation, HKDF-SHA256 salted with a hash of the transcript ephemeral key, KEM ciphertext, both recipient public keys , then AES-256-GCM and padding to a size class. Each transcript part is length-prefixed: // core/src/sealv3.rs, lines 8–20 · Apache-2.0 fn part h: &mut Sha256, x: & u8 { h.update x.len as u32 .to be bytes ; h.update x ; } fn th label: &str, parts: & & u8 - Vec