Grok apps leak private data Security firm Claroc tested 37,571 live apps built with Grok's chat-based app builder and found 35,578 of them (94.7%) opened for anyone without sign-in, with roughly 3,500 holding internal business or personal data and about 2% (extrapolated to 650 to 800 apps) holding material rated high or critical, according to findings published November 10, 2026 under the name "GhostShares 2." The exposed apps included 24 built by SpaceXSI (formerly xAI) and X staff, among them a confidential advertising proposal to a U.S. federal agency, plus data from 30 other identifiable organizations, including a hospital staff roster of more than 3,500 people and a timesheet app whose script held plaintext passwords. Claroc attributed the exposure to platform design choices — per-app grok.me subdomains recorded by passive DNS services and an access setting preselected to "Anyone with the link" — and in some cases flawed Grok-generated sign-in logic, with the researchers listing 43,601 grok.me names using common subdomains. Authors: Cloud Security Alliance AI Safety Initiative Published: 2026-11-11 Categories: AI Application Security Public by Default: Exposed Grok Apps and the AI App-Builder Leak Pattern Key Takeaways Security firm Claroc tested 37,571 live apps built with Grok’s chat-based app builder and found that 35,578 of them 94.7% opened for anyone without sign-in 1 . Claroc’s figures separate two categories of concern. About one in ten open apps, or roughly 3,500, held internal business or personal data, while a narrower set of about 2% held material the researchers rated high or critical, which Claroc extrapolates to 650 to 800 apps 1 . The exposed apps included 24 built by SpaceXSI formerly xAI and X staff, among them a confidential advertising proposal to a U.S. federal agency, along with data from 30 other identifiable organizations, including a hospital staff roster of more than 3,500 people and a timesheet app whose script held plaintext passwords 1 . All Grok-specific figures in this note come from Claroc’s research and have not been independently verified by CSA. The exposure did not require attackers to bypass any controls. It came from platform design choices, namely per-app grok.me subdomains that passive DNS services record and an access setting preselected to “Anyone with the link” when users published 1 2 , and in some cases from flawed generated sign-in logic 1 . In one test app, a Grok-generated sign-in flow added every signed-in user to the team before checking membership, so any Google account could read, edit, and delete records 1 . The lesson for security teams is that generating authentication with AI does not guarantee that the authorization logic is correct. The incident fits a recurring pattern across AI app builders and AI share features, including Lovable, Base44, Meta Muse, and an earlier Grok issue in which shared chats were indexed by search engines 3 4 5 6 . The pattern is not universal, since at least one major builder already defaults new apps to private 1 2 . Even so, enterprises should treat AI app builders as an unmanaged publishing channel and govern them accordingly. Background AI app builders let users describe an application in natural language and receive a working, hosted web app, often with a database, sign-in, and a public address, within minutes. The people using them are often analysts, sales staff, clinicians, and operations managers rather than software engineers. As a result, applications that hold real organizational data can reach the internet without design review, threat modeling, or any record in the security team’s asset inventory. The speed is useful to the business. It also means that the platform’s defaults, rather than a security engineer, make the important decisions about who can reach the data. According to reporting by The Hacker News, the chat-based app builder in Grok, the AI assistant operated by SpaceXSI the company formerly known as xAI , was opened to all Grok plans on August 19, 2026 2 . The feature shares a name with Grok Build, SpaceXSI’s separate terminal-based coding agent, which was reported in July 2026 to upload users’ repositories 2 . This note concerns the hosted apps produced by the chat-based builder, which are commonly described as “Grok Build apps” in coverage of this incident; the coding agent is not the subject here. Each published app is served from its own hostname of the form