Give your AI agent the cancel, not the key A developer built Brake, an open-source payment system for the QDay Aevum Builder Challenge that gives AI agents the ability to cancel stablecoin payments rather than the keys to make them. Finance signs both an EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization and a matching cancelAuthorization over the same nonce; the payment signature goes to a keeper and the cancel signature to a stop path, so a hijacked agent holding zero tokens and no allowance can at worst delay a line, not redirect or create one. The developer verified on the Aevum testnet (chain 44005) that a payer-signed cancel submitted from an unrelated EOA or through a contract causes the paired payment to revert, with the same gate covered by seven Foundry tests. A finance team approves Friday's vendor payments on Monday. On Tuesday an email arrives from the vendor's real mailbox: "confirming Friday's payment goes to the updated payout address… please don't call, just reply here." On a stablecoin chain, once that payment lands, nobody can pull it back. The obvious fix in 2026 is an AI agent that reads the inbox and reacts. The obvious problem is that an agent reading attacker-written email is the most prompt-injectable thing you can build, and the usual guardrail "give it a session key with a spend cap" still lets a hijacked agent pay up to the cap. I built Brake https://github.com/edycutjong/brake for the QDay Aevum Builder Challenge around a different idea: don't give the agent a key that can pay. Give it the cancel. USDC-style tokens Circle's FiatToken v2 implement EIP-3009. Besides transferWithAuthorization , a signed payment anyone can submit, it has a less famous sibling: cancelAuthorization authorizer, nonce, v, r, s . It marks a nonce as used, so a payment signed with that nonce can never execute. Two properties make it useful: validAfter , so it cannot clear before payday. The second one is the whole design, so I tested it first. On Aevum testnet chain 44005 , tUSD8 is a FiatToken clone. A cancel signed by the payer was submitted from an unrelated EOA tx https://explorer-test.qday.info/tx/0x8cb8d550f03616e14ef00682022dd20a4ade46e090c8466766d6799dc98330c2 and through a contract tx https://explorer-test.qday.info/tx/0x50c5cfcc0d470f71ab91b75cbea227cc820df0c19543bd919e4d293fd2c12df5 . In both cases the paired payment then reverted tx https://explorer-test.qday.info/tx/0x07dbb27599ac8615360e0e52e04475ec2193c334c330e76ffd2b6dd52529bb7d . The same gate runs as 7 Foundry tests. For every line of a payment run, finance signs two EIP-712 messages once, over the same nonce : / Sign one line: the payment and the cancellation that can stop it, over the same nonce. / export async function signPair account: Account, domain: TokenDomain, line: { to: Address; value: bigint; validAfter: bigint; validBefore: bigint; nonce?: Hex }, : Promise