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Gitlawb Node, Federated Git server in Rust

Gitlawb released Gitlawb Node, an open-source Rust workspace for a decentralized git infrastructure that lets users run self-hosted nodes, publish repositories under DID identities, and sign writes with Ed25519 HTTP signatures. The project, which includes four crates (gitlawb-node, gl CLI, git-remote-gitlawb, and gitlawb-core), aims to create a resilient app-delivery network where code and build assets are served closer to users, with known limitations including incomplete private repository enforcement and UCAN validation. The software is available via Docker Compose, npm, Homebrew, curl, and PowerShell.

read14 min views1 publishedAug 14, 2026
Gitlawb Node, Federated Git server in Rust
Image: source

Decentralized git infrastructure for developers, AI agents, and app delivery.

Gitlawb Node is the open-source node software behind the Gitlawb network. It lets anyone run a self-hosted node, publish repositories under a DID, sign writes with Ed25519 HTTP signatures, replicate git activity across peers, and move toward a resilient app-delivery network where code and build assets can be served closer to users.

Gitlawb is not trying to be only "another git host." The long-term direction is:

Decentralized GitHub
+ signed agent-native workflows
+ resilient repo replication
+ CDN-style app/code delivery

The mission is simple: once code is pushed to the network, it should not disappear because one server went down.

This is a Rust workspace with four crates:

Crate Purpose
gitlawb-node
The node daemon: Axum HTTP server, git smart-HTTP, Postgres metadata, libp2p gossip, optional S3/Tigris/IPFS/Arweave/Base PoS hooks.
gl
The Gitlawb CLI for identity, repos, issues, PRs, bounties, tasks, peers, node status, MCP, and setup flows.
git-remote-gitlawb
Git remote helper for gitlawb:// URLs, so normal git clone , git fetch , and git push can talk to Gitlawb nodes.
gitlawb-core
Shared primitives: Ed25519 identities, did:key , CIDs, RFC 9421 HTTP signatures, certificates, and UCAN tokens.

Most git hosting today depends on a small number of centralized platforms. Gitlawb Nodes are designed for a different model:

Own your identity: every user, agent, and node is an Ed25519 keypair represented asdid:key:z6Mk...

.Signed writes by default: write requests use RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures instead of passwords.** Git-native transport**: repositories are still real git repositories served over smart HTTP.** Agent-native workflows**: thegl

CLI and MCP server expose repo, issue, task, PR, and UCAN flows to AI agents.Peer-aware delivery: nodes can announce, discover, gossip, and sync with each other.** App CDN direction**: the network can evolve from decentralized code storage into code + asset + app delivery.

Gitlawb Node is live early infrastructure. It is useful today, but some security and reliability features are intentionally staged for compatibility with existing nodes.

Good today:

  • Local or Docker node startup.
  • Postgres-backed repo metadata.
  • Bare git repository storage.
  • Git smart-HTTP clone/fetch/push.
  • RFC 9421-signed writes.
  • DID identities. gl

CLI workflows.- libp2p peer discovery/gossip foundation.

  • Optional Tigris/S3 storage.
  • Optional IPFS/Pinata and Arweave/Irys hooks.
  • Optional Base node-operator staking/heartbeat hooks.

Known limitations:

  • Private repository read enforcement is not wired yet. Treat public nodes as public infrastructure unless you restrict access at your proxy/firewall.
  • UCAN chain validation and revocation are not complete.
  • Repository write authorization is not capability-complete yet; HTTP signatures prove identity, not full authorization policy.
  • Peer writes are signed by upgraded nodes, but strict signed-peer enforcement is opt-in during rolling upgrades.
  • GraphQL mutations need mutation-aware auth before becoming a public write surface.

See:

The fastest path is Docker Compose. It starts a node and Postgres.

git clone https://github.com/Gitlawb/node.git
cd node
cp .env.example .env
docker compose up -d

Your local node will serve:

Service Default
HTTP API + git smart-HTTP http://localhost:7545
libp2p QUIC/UDP 7546
Postgres compose-managed

Verify:

curl http://localhost:7545/health
curl http://localhost:7545/api/v1/stats

Expected health response:

{ "status": "ok" }

Stop it:

docker compose down
npm install -g @gitlawb/gl

brew install gitlawb/tap/gl

curl -fsSL https://gitlawb.com/install.sh | sh

irm https://gitlawb.com/install.ps1 | iex

Or build from source:

cargo build --release -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb -p gitlawb-node

Put these binaries on your PATH

:

target/release/gl
target/release/git-remote-gitlawb
target/release/gitlawb-node

Check your setup:

gl doctor

Create an identity:

gl identity new
gl identity show

Register against your local node:

gl register --node http://localhost:7545

Create a repo:

gl repo create my-repo --description "My first Gitlawb repo" --node http://localhost:7545

Use the git remote helper:

export GITLAWB_NODE=http://localhost:7545
git clone gitlawb://did:key:z6Mk.../my-repo

For public-network use, make sure GITLAWB_NODE

points to the node you want. The helper defaults to localhost for local development.

Public nodes (e.g. node.gitlawb.com

) require two things on writes:

RFC 9421 HTTP Signatures: every write is signed by your identity key.gl

and thegit-remote-gitlawb

helper do this automatically. An old/unsigned CLI fails with401 not_an_agent

;gl

will tell you to upgrade and register.An iCaptcha proof on the spam-gated writes (repo create, fork, register).gl

solves this for you: on the node's403 icaptcha_proof_required

it reads thex-icaptcha-url

/x-icaptcha-level

hints, requests a challenge, solves it locally (arithmetic / algebra / sequence), andretries the same signed request with thex-icaptcha-proof

header. No manual steps, no env vars.

gl identity new                                   # create did:key identity
gl register      --node https://node.gitlawb.com  # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
gl repo create memlawb --node https://node.gitlawb.com   # signed + auto-solves iCaptcha
git push  origin2 main                            # origin2 = gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb (signed)
git clone gitlawb://<your-did>/memlawb            # public read, no proof needed
gl doctor                                         # preflight: identity, node, version, iCaptcha

Notes:

The proof'srequesterId

is always your DID.sub

claim must equal the authenticated signer;gl

/helper set this automatically and the node enforcessub == authenticated DID

(so a proof minted for another identity is rejected).Proofs are short-lived (~5 min TTL) and single-use. If one expires between solving and use, the client transparently solves a fresh one and retries.What needs what: create / fork / register are signedand iCaptcha-gated;git push

issigned-only(owner signature is the gate, no per-push challenge); reads (clone / fetch /repo info

) need no proof. A non-existent repo returns a clear404

, never a placeholder.API-key iCaptcha deployments: setGITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_URL

to your iCaptcha origin andGITLAWB_ICAPTCHA_API_KEY

to its key. The client only talks to anhttps

origin whose host is allowlisted (that URL or the public default), and sends the bearer tokenonly to your configured origin, never to a URL a node advertises, so a hostile node can't capture the key or redirect the solve.

β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
β”‚ gl CLI / git / AI agents β”‚
β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜
             β”‚ signed HTTP writes / git smart-HTTP
             ↓
β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
β”‚ gitlawb-node             β”‚
β”‚ Axum API + git routes    β”‚
β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜
             β”‚
    β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”΄β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
    ↓                 ↓
Postgres        Bare git repos
metadata        local disk / optional S3
    β”‚                 β”‚
    β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”¬β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜
             ↓
       libp2p peers
  gossip + discovery + sync
             ↓
 optional IPFS / Arweave / Base PoS
Concept Meaning
DID A user, agent, or node identity derived from an Ed25519 public key.
HTTP Signature RFC 9421 signature proving control of the DID key for write requests.
Ref certificate Signed record of a ref update. Useful for audit and replication.
UCAN Delegation token for future capability-based workflows.
Peer announce Node-to-node HTTP announcement of DID + public URL.
Gossipsub libp2p topic for ref-update events.
Smart HTTP Standard git protocol over HTTP for clone/fetch/push.

The node exposes both git smart-HTTP routes and JSON APIs.

Common public read routes:

GET /health
GET /
GET /api/v1/stats
GET /api/v1/contracts
GET /api/v1/repos
GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}
GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/tree
GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/blob/{path}
GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues
GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls
GET /api/v1/peers
GET /{owner}/{repo}/info/refs
POST /{owner}/{repo}/git-upload-pack

Signed write routes include:

POST /api/v1/repos
POST /api/register
POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/fork
POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues
POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls
POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{number}/merge
POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/hooks
POST /api/v1/bounties/{id}/...
POST /{owner}/{repo}/git-receive-pack

These peer write routes support staged rollout:

POST /api/v1/peers/announce
POST /api/v1/sync/notify

When GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=false

, unsigned legacy peers are accepted on those two routes, but signed requests are verified when signature headers are present. Staged rollout relaxes who may announce, not who owns a peer row. An unsigned announce may register a previously unseen peer, and it may refresh an existing row whose http_url

is unchanged, but changing an existing peer's http_url

requires an RFC 9421 signature from that peer's own DID and is refused with 403 otherwise. An unsigned announce can only register a did:key

, since that is the only method whose verifying key can be resolved and therefore the only kind of row anyone could ever correct through the signed path; any other DID is refused with 400. Once all live peers upgrade, operators can set:

GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES=true

POST /api/v1/sync/trigger

is not part of the staged rollout: it always requires a signature in both config modes and returns 401 without one, because each call drives an O(peers) outbound fan-out.

All configuration is via environment variables. See .env.example for the full reference.

Minimum required for a persistent node:

DATABASE_URL=postgresql://gitlawb:changeme@localhost:5432/gitlawb

Important node settings:

Variable Purpose
GITLAWB_HOST / GITLAWB_PORT
HTTP bind address and port.
GITLAWB_REPOS_DIR
Local bare repo storage directory.
GITLAWB_PUBLIC_URL
Public HTTP URL announced to peers.
GITLAWB_P2P_PORT
libp2p QUIC/UDP port. Use 0 to disable.
GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_PEERS
Comma-separated HTTP peer URLs.
GITLAWB_P2P_BOOTSTRAP
Comma-separated libp2p multiaddrs.
GITLAWB_BOOTSTRAP_DISABLE_SEEDS
Disable embedded seed peers for isolated dev/test networks.
GITLAWB_REQUIRE_SIGNED_PEER_WRITES
Require signed peer announce/sync writes.
GITLAWB_AUTO_SYNC
Enable automatic sync from known peers.
GITLAWB_MAX_PACK_BYTES
Max git pack body size for smart-HTTP routes.
GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS
Max seconds a served git upload-pack, receive-pack, or info/refs advertisement may run before it is aborted (504). Default 600. Also bounds the withheld-blob classification walk (on both the upload-pack serve and receive-pack replication paths) and the push-side pin-candidate discovery (rev-list / cat-file ), each reaped via process-group teardown at the deadline. On the path-scoped upload-pack path the classification walk and the pack serve share ONE deadline, so this value bounds their combined duration rather than granting each stage a full budget: a walk that consumes it leaves the serve nothing and the clone gets a 504. Serving large path-scoped repos may therefore need a higher value than they did when each stage was budgeted separately. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years), since the node derives deadlines from this value and a larger one cannot be represented.
GITLAWB_GIT_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_SECS
Max seconds the storage-acquisition phase (Tigris HEAD/GET, push advisory-lock) of a served git op may run before the request is shed with a 503, separate from the git-run timeout. The concurrency permit is released on expiry so a stalled backend cannot pin the pool. Default 30.
GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_OPS
Max concurrent served git READ ops (upload-pack and its info/refs advertisement) across all callers; over-cap sheds a 503 + Retry-After. Anonymous reads draw from this pool, so pair it with GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_READS_PER_CALLER . Pushes and the receive-pack advertisement have their own pools, so a read flood cannot shed an authenticated push. Default 128.
GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_PUSHES
Max concurrent git-receive-pack POST operations, in a pool separate from the read pool. The anon receive-pack info/refs advertisement runs in a third pool of the same size, disjoint from both, so an advertisement flood cannot shed a push either. Two per-source push caps are derived from this value (/8 , floor 1) and have no env var of their own. Over-cap sheds a 503 + Retry-After. Default 32.
GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_READS_PER_CALLER
Max concurrent read ops a single caller may hold, so one caller cannot monopolize the read pool. Keyed on the resolved source IP, never the DID, and only as granular as GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY : left unset, a node behind an edge or NAT keys every caller on the edge IP and this collapses to one global cap. Default 16.
GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_PIN_TASKS
Max post-push pin loops (IPFS + Pinata) running concurrently across all repos. This caps how many loops RUN at once, not how much object-id list memory the node retains: on the local IPFS path a loop parked waiting for a permit still holds its full list. Do not size memory from this knob alone. A loop over cap waits, never drops a pin. Default 8.
GITLAWB_REPO_LEASE_MAX_WAITERS
Max pushes parked at once waiting for the same repo's write lease. Each waiter pins its buffered pack body, so this bounds that memory for a hot repo; past the cap the newest push sheds a 503 + Retry-After instead of queueing. Pushes to other repos are unaffected, and the lease holder is not counted. Default 8.
GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_IPFS_WALKS
Max concurrent GET /ipfs/{cid} visibility walks across all callers (own pool, disjoint from the served-git pools); over-cap sheds 503. Default 32.
GITLAWB_IPFS_WALK_PER_SOURCE
Max concurrent /ipfs walks a single source IP may hold. Default 4.
GITLAWB_IPFS_MAX_REPOS_WALKED
Max expensive path-scope visibility walks per /ipfs/{cid} request; over-cap repos are skipped and the scan continues, shedding a retryable 503 (not a false 404) if the object is then found nowhere. Default 64.
GITLAWB_IPFS_MAX_REPO_VISITS
Ceiling on repos one /ipfs/{cid} request may visit (acquire + probe) past the visibility gate. Also the worst-case per-request Tigris fetch count. On exhaustion the scan stops with a retryable 503. Default 1024.
GITLAWB_IPFS_REQUEST_BUDGET_SECS
Absolute wall-clock budget for one admitted /ipfs/{cid} request's acquire+walk lifetime. Per-stage clamps bound the acquire and walk stages to the remaining budget, and no stage starts once it is exhausted; the scan then stops with a retryable 503. The object-type probe and content-read cat-file subprocesses are budget-checked before starting and each also run under their own deadline (the lesser of GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS and the remaining budget), reaped via process-group teardown, so a hung cat-file cannot hold the request's walk slot past it. One hang path is still unbounded: the probe's object-store readability check is a plain filesystem sweep with nothing to reap, so a wedged filesystem can hold the slot past the deadline. Default 600. Accepted range is 1 to 3153600000 (100 years), since the node derives a deadline from this value and a larger one cannot be represented.
GITLAWB_IPFS_RATE_LIMIT
Max /ipfs/{cid} requests per client IP per hour (route flood brake). 0 disables. Default 600.
GITLAWB_TIGRIS_BUCKET
Optional S3/Tigris shared repo storage bucket.
GITLAWB_PINATA_JWT
Optional Pinata/IPFS warm-storage pinning.
GITLAWB_IRYS_URL
Optional Irys/Arweave permanent anchoring.

Production note: change the default Postgres password before exposing a node publicly.

Gitlawb Node includes optional Base L2 node-operator hooks. Operators can register a node DID, stake $GITLAWB

, and post heartbeats.

PoS is disabled unless these are configured:

GITLAWB_CONTRACT_NODE_STAKING=0x...
GITLAWB_OPERATOR_PRIVATE_KEY=0x...
GITLAWB_CHAIN_RPC_URL=https://mainnet.base.org

Recommended for operators:

GITLAWB_OPERATOR_STRICT_MODE=true
GITLAWB_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_HOURS=20

Read:

Use a dedicated low-balance operator wallet. Do not use a treasury wallet as the heartbeat key.

Requires Rust 1.91+.

cargo build --release -p gitlawb-node -p gl -p git-remote-gitlawb

Run tests:

cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
cargo test --workspace

Run the node from source:

DATABASE_URL=postgresql://gitlawb:changeme@localhost:5432/gitlawb \
  cargo run -p gitlawb-node --release

A native Swift/AppKit menu bar app is included for managing a local Docker Compose stack without living in the terminal.

Requirements:

  • macOS 26+
  • Xcode Command Line Tools
  • Docker Desktop, OrbStack, or Colima

Build:

./scripts/build-macos-app.sh

Output:

dist/Gitlawb Node.app
dist/Gitlawb Node.dmg

Features:

  • Start/stop local node stack.
  • Status indicator.
  • Settings GUI.
  • Auto-start on login.
  • Docker runtime detection.

Unsigned local build:

xattr -cr "dist/Gitlawb Node.app"

The current maintainer focus is live-network stability first.

Short-term priorities:

  • Keep CI green: fmt, clippy, tests, release build.
  • Add Docker and installer smoke tests.
  • Improve operator docs and gl doctor

checks. - Harden peer writes and publish the signed-peer rollout plan.

  • Implement repo write authorization: owner checks, protected branches, and UCAN capability checks.
  • Implement private-read enforcement or remove private repo affordances until it exists.
  • Add metrics for pushes, fetches, pack sizes, peer sync, failed auth, and webhooks.

Product direction:

  • Reliable repo replication.
  • Health-aware peer syncing.
  • CDN-style clone/fetch routing to healthy replicas.
  • App asset/build delivery from nodes.
  • Operator dashboard and desktop UX.

Read the maintainer roadmap:

docs/MAINTAINER-ROADMAP.md

Start here:

Good first contribution areas:

  • docs and install polish
  • Docker smoke tests
  • CLI error messages gl doctor

checks- operator dashboard UX

  • test coverage for peer sync and signed writes

Security issues should follow SECURITY.md.

Licensed under either of:

at your option.

Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in this project shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.

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