Ghostscript's font bug reached 10 apps through a `.png` Security researchers at pwn.ai, working with Paulos Yibelo, disclosed CVE-2026-125396, a use-after-free in Ghostscript's Type 1 font loader that yields pre-auth remote code execution past the -dSAFER sandbox. The flaw in the .putgstringcopy helper lets a PostScript-bearing file reach Ghostscript through ten applications, with confirmed execution against Debian 13 CUPS, Roundcube, WordPress plugins, MediaWiki, and Google's document pipeline. The writeup credits the discovery to "GPT 5.6 Sol, working with @PaulosYibelo. .png A file named .png that contains PostScript can reach Ghostscript from ten different applications — and a use-after-free in Ghostscript's Type 1 font loader turns that into remote code execution, past the -dSAFER sandbox. CVE-2026-125396, published November 9. Pre-auth RCE was confirmed against Debian 13's CUPS, Roundcube, WordPress, and Google's own document pipeline. The writeup is from pwn.ai "How We Hacked the Pipes" , and it is unusually complete. The flaw is in .putgstringcopy , a helper in Ghostscript's Resource/Init/gs fonts.ps that loads Type 1 fonts. Ghostscript implements parts of its own font loading in PostScript, and this helper needed to write into protected font dictionaries, so it used an internal operation called .forceput . The relevant sequence in the vulnerable version: dup length string copy .forceput setglobal The helper never checked that its operands were of the expected types. The researchers registered a Type 1 font in Fontmap , loaded it with findfont , and used the font's loading code to swap the filename string on the loader's operand stack for a local array. length and the string allocation succeeded; copy then raised typecheck because its source was an array. Their error handler returned with the stack prepared for the next operation in the already-bound helper — the privileged .forceput — with attacker-chosen dictionary, key, and value on the stack. They never called the hidden operator directly; the error did the calling for them. A protected dictionary write alone is not native code execution. The next step broke a separate rule: a reference must not remain usable after its object has been reclaimed. .forceput temporarily treats systemdict as local while it stores the value, so the researchers could put a local array into a global dictionary that survives a later restore . After restore freed the local object, the dictionary still pointed at the storage — and reusing the allocation made the stale reference point at live interpreter memory. Their probe made the reuse visible before touching native memory: /AttackSave save def userdict /ForceValue 8 array put userdict /ForceValue get 0 31337 put { /GSLoaderProbe findfont pop } stopped pop AttackSave restore 8 array userdict exch /Replacement exch put userdict /Replacement get 0 4242 put systemdict /GS FORCEPUT DANGLING ARRAY get 1 5151 put userdict /Replacement get 1 get == If the freed allocation is reused, Replacement 1 reads 5151 — the write went through the stale reference, the read came back through the live one. Same bytes, two names. From there the native proof walks Ghostscript's own pointers currentdevice → psi device ref → gx device → gs memory t → gs lib ctx → path control active and flips the flag that enforces -dSAFER . The sandbox is a check inside the interpreter, not a kernel filter — once you control interpreter memory, the check is just a byte. One detail worth noting: the writeup credits the discovery to "GPT 5.6 Sol, working with @PaulosYibelo." An AI model found the bug; the humans built the exploit chain around it. The Ubuntu advisory names Paulos Yibelo as the discoverer of the operand-validation flaw. The researchers' index records ten application chains where execution was confirmed, not just theorized. The file never had to be a font or a PostScript document — it only had to reach a renderer: Debian 13 CUPS anonymous IPP print job to a shared queue command as uid=7 lp 20/20 local conversions Roundcube 1.7.2 external sender; recipient views message command as uid=33 www-data 5/5 trials, no click Forminator 1.55.1 signed-out public PDF form, WP 7.0.2 command as uid=33 www-data 5/5 HTTP trials Elementor Addons 6.7 signed-out login/register widget upload command as uid=33 www-data 5/5 HTTP trials MediaWiki 1.46 anonymous PDF upload + thumbnail command as uid=33 www-data 5/5 HTTP trials DokuWiki 2026-07-14 open wiki upload + resize command as uid=33 www-data 5/5 HTTP trials Mayan EDMS 4.11.5 email to a configured POP3 inbox command as uid=1000 in container 1 email run; parser 5/5 ResourceSpace 11.0 authenticated upload / upload-share command in the preview worker 5/5 API trials WordPress Core Author+ upload files, Imagick + Ghostscript RCE confirmed, exact delegate as uid=33 10/10 trials Plesk Obsidian 18 Roundcube thumbnail path, Ghostscript 9.54 command as uid=995 roundcube sysuser 5/5 trials Roundcube is the one that should worry you: no attachment click, no login — an external sender's email gets thumbnailed when the recipient views the message, and the thumbnail path runs the proof as www-data . WordPress Core needed upload files Author+ by default , and the affected branches were 7.0.0–7.0.3 and 6.9.0–6.9.6; WordPress shipped its own fix as CVE-2026-65640. Google's image and document pipeline was reached with a signed-out request for an attacker-hosted file and mitigated November 10. Dropbox, Box, and Zoom are named in the teaser as reached; their individual case studies are still unpublished. The common thread is not Ghostscript — it is the decoders in front of it. The researchers traced 145 benign calls across 29 image APIs. The ones that reached Ghostscript when handed EPS content, even named .png : php Pillow Image.load / crop Pillow EPS decoder - Ghostscript directly imageio.imread / skimage.io.imread image reader - Pillow - Ghostscript PHP Imagick::readImage ImageMagick PostScript delegate - Ghostscript libvips thumbnail magickload - ImageMagick - Ghostscript build dependent Qt QImageReader.read KImageFormats EPS plugin - Ghostscript plugin dependent PHP GD, OpenCV, prebuilt Sharp, Jimp, Java ImageIO, and Go's standard decoders did not start Ghostscript for these inputs. Copying or storing a file did not render it either — the later preview or conversion is the step to inspect. Image.open alone only identifies the file; loading pixels is what starts the renderer. I did not run the exploit — the proof-of-concept is not public and the writeup omits the font setup. What I ran is the route, on a stock Ubuntu 24.04 box with nothing pre-installed: bash $ apt-get install -y ghostscript $ gs --version 10.02.1 First, the version question. Ubuntu's USN-8949-1 October 21 lists exactly 10.02.1~dfsg1-0ubuntu7.10 as the fixed build for 24.04 noble — the version apt just installed. The vulnerable versions in the researchers' index were 10.05.1 Debian 13, WordPress, Roundcube , 10.05.0 Google , and 9.54.0 Plesk . Upstream fixed it in 10.08.0 on September 8; Debian shipped 10.05.1~dfsg-1+deb13u3 on October 10. Second, the fix itself, visible in the installed file. The patched .putgstringcopy in /usr/share/ghostscript/10.02.1/Resource/Init/gs fonts.ps opens with the check the writeup says was missing: /.putgstringcopy %