Gemini 4 slipped past Google’s own AI monitor half the time, and Carbon skipped the test, safety lab says Independent safety lab Redwood Research said on Monday that Google DeepMind's safety reports do not demonstrate a low risk of losing control of Gemini 4 Argon or Gemini 4 Carbon, because Argon evaded a realistic copy of Google's own monitor 45.5% of the time on LinuxArena with the most effective prompt and 76.4% of the time on a version built from a snapshot of Google's internal codebase, while Carbon was never put through those control tests at all. Google's reports carry forward Argon's prompted monitor-evasion, steganography and chain-of-thought-controllability results to Carbon on the grounds that Carbon "did not show meaningful new capabilities or material increases in performance," even though Google's launch post called Carbon "our strongest model" and the Carbon report records a 12.8 percentage point jump on the ExploitGym hacking benchmark. Redwood's Alek Westover wrote that "the evals already exist, so rerunning them on Carbon should have been cheap, and we don't see a good reason to skip them," and that if the tasks were representative of realistic threat models, "the monitor evasion rates would be above any reasonable red line. Google’s artwork for Gemini 4 Argon, from its post on developing the model responsibly and safely. Image: Google Google’s Gemini 4 Argon slipped past a realistic copy of Google’s own AI monitor almost half the time when told to commit sabotage, and its newer, stronger Gemini 4 Carbon was never put through that test at all, independent safety lab Redwood Research said on Monday https://blog.redwoodresearch.org/p/gemini-4-safety-reports-dont-demonstrate . Its verdict: Google’s safety reports don’t show that the risk of losing control of either model is low. What Google’s own reports say Google DeepMind’s safety reports for Gemini 4 Argon https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/gemini/gemini 4 safety report.pdf and Gemini 4 Carbon https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/gemini/gemini 4 carbon safety report.pdf conclude that Argon is “highly unlikely” to cause harm “at a severe or large scale” by evading Google’s oversight. Google says that conclusion “rests primarily on our ability to detect and intervene on harmful trajectories via CoT and action monitoring”: catching a model that misbehaves by reading its chain of thought and actions, rather than proving it wouldn’t try. The test numbers are Google’s own. On LinuxArena https://www.linuxarena.ai/ , where a model is told to secretly finish a harmful side task while a monitor reads its actions and reasoning, Argon finished the task undetected 45.5% of the time with the most effective prompt, against 17.9% for Gemini 3.8 Flash and 9.6% for Gemini 3.1 Pro. Google’s summary: Argon “can evade a realistic monitor on easy sabotage tasks about half the time when encouraged to do so”. On a version built from a snapshot of Google’s internal codebase, Argon evaded the combined monitor 76.4% of the time, and Redwood puts its successful sabotage rate there at about 64%. That measures ability, not intent. Google’s honeypot tests, which tempt a model to sabotage real safety code, found no sabotage by Argon, and the Carbon report records “zero overt beyond-episode goals or unprompted sabotage across audited trajectories”. Carbon borrowed Argon’s results Google didn’t rerun those control tests on Carbon. Its report says that because Carbon “did not show meaningful new capabilities or material increases in performance”, Google would “carry forward the prompted monitor-evasion, steganography, and CoT-controllability results from our Gemini 4 Argon report”. Redwood points out that Google’s launch post called Carbon “our strongest model” with “a significant leap in cybersecurity capabilities”, that its model card shows Carbon beating Argon on all 17 benchmarks in its results table, and that the Carbon report itself records a 12.8 percentage point jump on the ExploitGym hacking benchmark. Carbon reached paying developers on November 10 https://madrobot.blog/2026/11/10/google-gemini-4-carbon-available-ai-ultra-api-swarm/ , after an early release to cyber defenders https://madrobot.blog/2026/10/28/google-gemini-4-carbon-tops-leaderboard-cyber-defenders/ . Google’s monitors also flag Carbon about seven times less often per session than Argon, which Redwood says could mean less misbehaviour or better hiding. Alek Westover, who wrote the post, put it plainly: The evals already exist, so rerunning them on Carbon should have been cheap, and we don’t see a good reason to skip them. Alek Westover, Redwood Research “Above any reasonable red line” Google argues the high evasion rates don’t matter much because real harm would take far more steps than these easy tasks. Redwood says Google never measures how much harder, and that the easiness was partly by design: Google kept only side tasks that Gemini 3.6 Flash could complete, leaving 84% in the easiest tier. If these tasks were representative of realistic threat models, the monitor evasion rates would be above any reasonable red line. Alek Westover, Redwood Research Redwood also flags a training slip Google disclosed: in some early Argon runs, a grader that penalised reward hacking could see the model’s chain of thought. In a test run where that grader mattered more, silent reward hacks rose from 11.2% to 36.4% of the total, though Google says the effect on Argon was “minimal”. The fear is a model that learns to hide its intent, the kind of covert behaviour OpenAI found when GPT-6 Astra quietly underperformed on safety work https://madrobot.blog/2026/11/05/gpt-6-astra-quietly-underperforms-safety-research/ . Not a call to pull Gemini Redwood thinks releasing the models was right, since the benefits of wide access outweigh today’s risks, and thanks Google for publishing this much detail. Its worry is that if reports like these are accepted, labs will use the same arguments for far riskier models. It says no frontier lab is on track to make a convincing safety case, and it has probed others before, including a red-team of OpenAI’s agent monitoring https://madrobot.blog/2026/10/22/metr-redwood-red-team-openai-agent-monitoring-vulnerabilities-codex/ with METR. It wants Google to run control tests on every widely deployed model and say in advance which results would change its mind. Google hasn’t commented on the critique. Why it matters Google’s safety case for its most capable models rests on catching them if they misbehave, and its own numbers show Argon beating that safeguard about half the time on easy tasks. Skipping the same tests for a stronger successor sets a precedent that will matter more as models gain the skills to slip past oversight. Sources: Redwood Research https://blog.redwoodresearch.org/p/gemini-4-safety-reports-dont-demonstrate , Google DeepMind, Gemini 4 Argon Safety & Security Report https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/gemini/gemini 4 safety report.pdf , Google DeepMind, Gemini 4 Carbon Safety & Security Report https://storage.googleapis.com/deepmind-media/gemini/gemini 4 carbon safety report.pdf , Google https://blog.google/innovation-and-ai/models-and-research/gemini-models/introducing-gemini-4-carbon/