# Et Tu, MacBook? Unprivileged Keystroke Inference via Built-In IMU Side Channel

> Source: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21569>
> Published: 2026-09-21 13:07:08+00:00

# Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

  [Submitted on 18 Sep 2026]

# Title:Et Tu, MacBook? Unprivileged Keystroke Inference and Context Profiling via the Built-in IMU Side Channel

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Abstract:Recent generations of Apple MacBooks embed an inertial measurement unit (IMU) within their unibody chassis for device orientation and motion sensing. However, this IMU inadvertently captures not only intended device-level information but also subtle physical vibrations from user interactions and the surrounding environment. These signals establish a novel, previously unexplored side channel. We uncover a vulnerability allowing non-root access to IMU data via an IOKit driver, alongside two content-free system metadata interfaces (HIDIdleTime and CGEventSource) that further enrich the side-channel leakage. Through rigorous characterization of the IMU data, we reveal that the leakage spans three core dimensions: (1) keystroke identity (which key is typed), (2) desk surface (where the laptop is placed), and (3) user behavior (who is typing). Leveraging these findings, we introduce BRUTUS, the first comprehensive unprivileged side-channel attack targeting built-in IMU sensors on Apple MacBooks. BRUTUS achieves a character-level accuracy of 89.1% to 97.5% in key recovery. Furthermore, aided by language models, it can successfully reconstruct certain sentences with 100% accuracy. For user identification and environment profiling, BRUTUS correctly discovers user and environment profiles without labels and correctly assigns subsequent segments to their corresponding profiles. Ultimately, this work highlights the urgent necessity of strictly regulating access to built-in IMU sensors.
    

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