Empirical Research on Moe Safety Mechanisms Independent researcher Jinho Jang published a cross-scale mechanistic study of safety training in Mixture of Experts reasoning models, reporting 40+ novel findings from 200+ controlled experiments across nine models. The study concludes that structural abliteration is fundamentally impossible for 300B+ chain-of-thought reasoning models because safety behaves as a holographic attractor state the model re-derives from first principles when specialized circuits are deleted, and that the un-pruned 122B model is harder to modify than the 3× larger 394B. Jang also reports that MoE safety at the 394B scale is a multiplicative three-pathway system spanning attention, routing, and residual pathways that must be neutralized simultaneously, and that additive steering vectors working at FP16 catastrophically collapse under INT4 quantization due to rotational noise. Independent research into the safety architecture of large-scale Mixture of Experts reasoning models. 200+ controlled experiments. 40+ novel findings. Nine models. By Jinho Jang. The first cross-scale mechanistic study of how safety training works inside language models. Safety mechanisms undergo qualitative phase transitions as models scale — from simple deletable circuits in small models to holographic emergent properties in frontier MoE models. 9 models, 100+ experiments, 12 findings. Includes cross-architecture comparison Qwen hybrid vs MiniMax pure-attention and an honest account of our compliance checker failure. The smaller 122B model reveals fundamentally different safety dynamics: concentrated but dual-purpose safety signals, a GGUF format conversion barrier that silently destroys modifications, semantic evasion behaviors, and a multi-dimensional geometric basin from safety training that resists even aggressive multi-vector interventions. Counterintuitively, the un-pruned 122B is harder to modify than the 3× larger 394B . We prove that MoE safety at the 394B scale is a multiplicative three-pathway system requiring simultaneous neutralization. We demonstrate that additive steering catastrophically fails under 4-bit quantization. Most critically, we prove that structural abliteration is fundamentally impossible for 300B+ CoT reasoning models — safety is a holographic attractor state that the model re-derives from first principles when specialized circuits are deleted. You cannot delete “safety” without deleting “logic.” MoE safety is not one system—it's three independent pathways attention, routing, residual that must all be neutralized together. MoE routers continuously monitor generated tokens and re-route to safety experts mid-sentence, disproving the "autoregressive momentum" assumption. Safety decisions commit at tokens 0-5 in L15-25. Late-layer CAA produces stutter artifacts, not behavioral change. ThinkEdit v2 targets the