# CreditNirvana Breach Post-Mortem: What Two API Flaws Taught Us About DPDP-Compliant AI Deployment

> Source: <https://dev.to/pybankers/creditnirvana-breach-post-mortem-what-two-api-flaws-taught-us-about-dpdp-compliant-ai-deployment-3e45>
> Published: 2026-11-22 06:07:33+00:00

**Recommendation:** Validate authentication tokens server-side on every request and strip secrets from client-side code; the CreditNirvana breach showed a Cognito token that was never checked and a hardcoded API key exposed 6.6 million accounts.
More in the playbook "Securing agents and AI tools": <https://wpnews.pro/playbooks/agent-security>

In 2026 an independent security researcher found two flaws in CreditNirvana, an India-based agentic debt-collection platform owned by the fintech company Perfios. Together they made roughly **6.6 million borrower accounts** and about **315,000 recorded collection calls** reachable without valid credentials.

The vendor fixed both flaws on 2 June 2026, the same day CERT-In confirmed it would act. That response is worth stating plainly, because it is not the usual outcome. What follows is an attempt to separate what the research established from what it did not, and to draw out what it means for Indian firms now running AI agents over personal data.

| Item | Detail | 
|---|---|
| Platform | CreditNirvana (a Perfios company) — AI collections system for banks, NBFCs and asset reconstruction companies | 
| Flaw 1 | CVE-2026-110474 — hardcoded API key in client-side code, Agentic AI Call Center (CVSS 8.7, High) | 
| Flaw 2 | CVE-2026-110475 — improper authentication, Collections Platform (CVSS 9.3, Critical) | 
| Scale | 6.6 million accounts across three clients; ~315,000 call recordings | 
| Reported | 30 May 2026 via CERT-In; patched 2 June 2026 | 
| Publicly disclosed | CVE note 26 October 2026; research published 18 November 2026 | 

The disclosure describes two separate systems inside the same vendor, each defeated a different way. That distinction matters for assurance work, because the two failures are detectable by entirely different procedures.

The Agentic AI Call Center authenticated users through Amazon Cognito. Two problems sat stacked on top of each other. An API key was hardcoded into client-side JavaScript, so it was delivered to every browser that opened the page. Separately, the Cognito token returned by the login flow was never used in subsequent requests — so the login step could be skipped by editing client code to supply plausible administrative values.

Per the disclosure, that access allowed a visitor to:

The primary collections platform used Keycloak for identity management. This route is the more instructive of the two, because no secret leaked at all: the credential was present and simply not validated. It carried the higher CVSS score of the pair.

From the Aditya Birla Capital Finance instance alone, the researcher reported an inventory that makes the compliance analysis concrete:

| Data category | Volume observed | 
|---|---|
| Borrower and business accounts | 3.4M (Aditya Birla Capital Finance) + 3.2M across two other instances = 6.6M | 
| Settlement files including ID cards and full credit-bureau reports (one sample ran 26 pages) | More than 161,000 | 
| Payment receipts, often with cheque images | ~3.7M (May 2026), ~3.6M (April 2026) | 
| Voice-bot calls with recordings and AI summaries | 214,000 in May 2026 alone | 
| Legal notices and lawyer case dashboards | 119,000 notices in May 2026 | 
| SMS, email and messaging records | millions per month | 
| Platform user accounts / collection agencies | 10,000+ users; 433 agencies | 

Two rows go beyond data protection. Settlement files containing identity documents and credit histories are the raw material of identity fraud. Visit tracking for field collection agents is employee-surveillance data. Both belong in a different risk register from a marketing database.

A conventional database leak is a read failure: the attacker obtains records. Here the accessible surface included **instruments of action** — campaign execution, agent management and legal escalation sat behind the same broken check as the data. When the system's selling point is that it decides "the next best action" and executes it autonomously, an authentication bypass is not only a disclosure risk. It is a control risk over the actions the agent can take on a borrower's account.

Under India's Digital Personal Data Protection Act, obligations attach to the **Data Fiduciary** — the entity that determines why and how personal data is processed. In a collections scenario that is normally the lender, not the software vendor. The vendor's remediation speed does not discharge the lender's notification duty.

The DPDP Rules were notified on 13 November 2026, with obligations phased in through to 13 May 2027. The operational figure most analyses converge on is **72 hours from detection** for notifying the Data Protection Board and affected Data Principals. For the affected lenders, the fix arriving quickly is good news about the vulnerability — it says nothing about whether their own filing obligations were met.

CERT-In's Directions from 2022 remain the tighter constraint: report specified cyber incidents **within six hours** of noticing them, and retain logs for **180 days**. A firm that discovers exposure like this and cannot produce 180 days of relevant logs has a second problem on top of the first.

One timing detail a CA reviewing vendor contracts will recognise: five months passed between the fix (2 June) and the CVE note (26 October). Remediation speed and disclosure speed are separate measurements.

| Status | Finding | 
|---|---|
| **Confirmed** | Two vulnerabilities existed; CERT-In issued note CIVN-2026-0523 with CVE-2026-110474 and CVE-2026-110475; both were fixed on 2 June 2026; data was accessible without valid credentials during the window; exposure spanned 6.6 million accounts across three clients | 
| **Unproven** | That any third party accessed, copied or misused the data. The published research does not claim this, and no affected institution has reported it | 
| **Unknown** | How long the flaws were live (described as potentially years, not established precisely); whether the affected lenders filed CERT-In and DPDP notifications; the vendor's own account — CreditNirvana and Perfios did not respond to WIRED's requests for comment | 

**What this article is not:** it is not legal advice, and it does not assert that any party acted unlawfully, that data was exfiltrated, or that any affected institution failed its obligations. Where sources conflict or are silent, that is stated as such.

**Sources**
