Usually the most interesting document in export controls is the license application, and usually you never get to see it. A company that wants to sell restricted technology to a restricted country asks the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security for permission. BIS says yes, no, or yes-but-fewer, and the whole exchange stays confidential, because it is commercially sensitive and because the system runs more smoothly when nobody outside it is reading along. On Thursday the House Foreign Affairs Committee read it out loud.
As Reuters reported, in a story carried by Al Jazeera, the committee said the Trump administration approved exports of nearly 900,000 advanced Nvidia and AMD AI chips to Chinese companies from December 2025 through May 2026. Commerce’s approvals covered 879,000 chips, the committee said, including 150,000 for Tencent, 75,000 for Alibaba, 43,000 for Baidu and 4,000 for BYD.
The committee’s chairman, Brian Mast, used his authority under the Export Control Reform Act to publish the application records, which the committee calls “the most detailed public disclosure in the history of the Export Control Reform Act.” In the committee’s own framing, the headline is a ratio: the applications “requested sales of 3.4 million AI chips to China,” and BIS approved “more than 879,000.” Divide one by the other and you get about 26%, which is why the coverage has settled on roughly a quarter.
A bit more arithmetic. The four named buyers add up to 272,000 chips, about 31% of the approved total. Tencent’s 150,000 is double Alibaba’s allocation and more than three times Baidu’s. That leaves roughly 607,000 approved chips going to buyers not named in the Reuters account. The records reportedly cover Nvidia’s H200 and comparable AMD parts.
You can read 26% two ways. Commerce’s reading would be: we turned down about three-quarters of what China asked for. The committee’s reading is in its press release, which describes Alibaba and Tencent as “Department of War-designated Chinese Military Companies.” Translated: the Pentagon keeps a list of Chinese companies it considers tied to China’s military, these two are on it, and a different part of the same government licensed advanced AI chips to them anyway. There are bureaucratic explanations for that sort of thing. Publishing the license records is a fairly pointed way to ask for them.
The intermediaries #
The committee also says the records include “requests by NVIDIA to depend on possible chip-smuggling fronts to facilitate their sales of advanced AI chips to Chinese companies.” CNBC reported that at Thursday’s committee meeting Mast named two companies that appear in Nvidia’s applications, Maginfra and New Matrix, as believed to be smuggling fronts. Keep the hedges: “possible” and “believed” are doing a lot of work there, and nothing has been proven. But the mechanism explains why this matters. A license is basically a promise about who ends up with the goods. If the end user on the form is itself a middleman, the government has approved a sale to a name, and the name is less informative than it looks.
What the records don’t show is how many of the approved chips actually got to China. A license is permission, and permission is not a shipment. An Nvidia spokesperson told The Hill that the review and licensing process took more than half a year, that approvals came with “strict conditions and limited volumes,” and that Nvidia has since stopped shipping H200s to China. AMD said it complies with export laws. So 879,000 may be a ceiling well above what moved. Imagine you are a chip company that spent six months winning a license, accepted the conditions, and then stopped shipping anyway: your best defence is that the scary number is mostly hypothetical, and it is not a bad defence.
Why now #
It has not been a quiet month for Nvidia in Washington. Reuters described the disclosure as coming amid scrutiny of the former Nvidia CEO’s alleged links to a suspected Chinese spy. The company’s board has opened an investigation into its own chief executive over those ties, and Commerce this week closed the loophole that let Chinese firms rent US chips through the cloud. Against that background, publishing a list of everything Nvidia asked permission to sell to China reads less like housekeeping and more like the committee putting its case on the record.
And the committee has a case it wants to make. In January, Reuters reported that the panel was voting on a bill giving Congress authority over AI chip exports. That bill, Mast’s AI Overwatch Act, would give House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Banking Committee 30 days to review, and potentially block, licenses to export advanced AI chips to China and other adversaries. The quickest way to argue that Congress should second-guess Commerce’s licensing decisions is to show everyone what those decisions were. The disclosure does that for six months of them.
The licensing system was built on the assumption that nobody outside Commerce would read the applications. That assumption now has a press release.