{"slug": "china-is-shaping-the-future-of-open-source-technology-including-ai", "title": "China is shaping the future of open‑source technology – including AI", "summary": "China is advancing its own open-source technology ecosystem, including artificial intelligence, as part of a national strategy to reduce foreign dependence and gain competitive advantage, according to Christopher K. Tong, a China expert and open-source researcher at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. The country's efforts, which include government-backed projects like Red Flag Linux and Kylin, could influence global products and services, but may face trust challenges due to past intellectual property theft allegations.", "body_md": "As you read this article on your computer or smartphone, you are almost certainly using [open-source technology](https://www.computer.org/csdl/magazine/co/2021/02/09353517/1r8kwgBjU9W) in some way. It forms [the foundation](https://qz.com/open-source-projects-that-run-the-internet) of the global digital economy, from operating systems and web servers to databases and encryption protocols.\n\nWhile the United States and Europe have led the development of open-source technology, China is championing its own alternatives. The Chinese government has made open-source development part of its [national technology strategy](https://merics.org/en/report/china-bets-open-source-technologies-boost-domestic-innovation). Chinese companies and institutions have been active in redefining how open-source technology is being [developed](https://hai.stanford.edu/assets/files/hai-digichina-issue-brief-beyond-deepseek-chinas-diverse-open-weight-ai-ecosystem-policy-implications.pdf), [licensed](https://cepa.org/article/the-ai-kill-switch-dangerous-chinese-open-source) and [deployed](https://merics.org/en/comment/open-source-trouble-chinas-efforts-decouple-foreign-it-technologies).\n\nChina’s open-source strategy could influence products and services used by people around the world, particularly as artificial intelligence becomes an everyday technology.\n\nThe success of China’s efforts may depend on building global trust, however. Chinese companies, backed by the government, have long been known to acquire advanced technology through [intellectual property theft](https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/china-exec-summary-risk-to-corporate-america-2019.pdf) and by applying pressure in [joint ventures](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/How%20Chinese%20Companies%20Facilitate%20Tech%20Transfer%20from%20the%20US.pdf) and [licensing agreements](https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301%20Draft%20Exec%20Summary%203.22.ustrfinal.pdf).\n\nOpen-source technology is increasingly becoming an arena of strategic competition between countries. As a [China expert and open-source researcher](https://mlli.umbc.edu/dr-christopher-k-tong/), I believe the countries that lead the technical and legal standards governing open-source technology will gain a competitive edge for decades to come.\n\n## China’s long road to open-source\n\nThe open-source movement has taken various forms, from [collaborations](https://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html) aimed at bypassing corporate monopolies to business strategies for developing products quickly. [Open-source software](https://opensource.org/about/history-of-the-open-source-initiative) has allowed developers around the world to reuse and improve on shared code.\n\n[Linux](https://www.linux.com/what-is-linux/), the core software powering Android phones and most of the internet, is an open-source technology. [RISC-V](https://riscv.org/about), an emerging alternative to Intel and Arm chip designs, and next-generation [mobile network interfaces](https://www.nist.gov/open-radio-access-network-open-ran) are also open-source.\n\nEarly Chinese engagements with open-source aimed to develop technologies that were free from foreign control. A government-run software institute developed [Red Flag Linux](https://www.irrodl.org/index.php/irrodl/article/view/331) as an alternative to Microsoft’s Windows operating system, which the government saw as costly to maintain and vulnerable to foreign intelligence gathering. A Chinese military university later created [Kylin](https://techhq.com/news/open-source-china-linux-kylin-kernel-desktop-de-microsoft), an operating system for the [People’s Liberation Army](https://theconversation.com/china-turns-to-private-hackers-as-it-cracks-down-on-online-activists-on-tiananmen-square-anniversary-230510) and other government organizations.\n\nIn recent years, Chinese tech companies have embraced open-source technology as a way around sanctions and export controls. After the U.S. government [blacklisted the telecom giant Huawei](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/30/huawei-mate-30-google-what-does-it-mean) for its ties to the Chinese military, Google revoked the company’s access to licensed services and apps. But Huawei used Android’s open-source code to maintain its smartphone operating system. Eventually, Huawei developed an alternative called HarmonyOS NEXT and released its own open-source version as [OpenHarmony](https://jamestown.org/open-source-technology-and-prc-national-strategy-part-ii).\n\nToday, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is stressing the importance of [science and technology independence and self-strengthening](https://chinamediaproject.org/2021/05/31/chinas-turns-up-the-volume-on-self-reliance), known as keji zili ziqiang. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and other government bodies have [supported domestic platforms](http://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-electronics-industry-plan-2025-2026), such as the state-guided [OpenAtom Foundation](https://jamestown.org/open-source-technology-and-prc-national-strategy-part-i), for open-source technology, and [Gitee](https://finance.yahoo.com/news/gitee-chinas-answer-github-review-093000997.html), a Chinese alternative to [GitHub](https://docs.github.com/en/get-started/start-your-journey/what-is-github), a popular repository for open-source software. Domestic open-source operating systems such as [openKylin](https://www.openkylin.top/community/aboutus-en.html) and [openEuler](https://www.openeuler.org/en/community/organization) play a key role in [securing China’s information technology infrastructure](https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-use-of-foreign-open-source-software-and-how-to-counter-it).\n\nChina is also positioning itself as an indispensable player in setting global standards for open-source hardware. For example, its [work on RISC-V](https://jamestown.org/examining-chinas-grand-strategy-for-risc-v) allows Chinese technology companies to reduce dependence on foreign intellectual property in semiconductors. Open hardware standards make Chinese companies less vulnerable to [export controls](https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/risc-v-what-it-is-and-why-it-matters) and [bans](https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-ai-chips-race-949050d0).\n\nChina’s strategy of “[overtaking on a turn](https://ecfr.eu/publication/the_china_dream_digital_technology_in_the_age_of_xi),” or closely following and then passing the front-runner, appears to be paying off. Chinese telecommunications companies, already leaders in [5G mobile network technology](https://www.csis.org/blogs/strategic-technologies-blog/next-steps-close-gap-china-licensed-spectrum-commercial-5g), are working with an [international alliance](https://www.o-ran.org/about) to shape [6G](https://www.itu.int/hub/2026/03/imt-2030-technical-requirements-for-the-6g-future), the next-generation standard for mobile communications. The Open-RAN standard the alliance is developing has complex implications for [cybersecurity](https://www.scsp.ai/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Open-Source-Hardware-and-New-Vectors-of-National-Cybersecurity-Risk.docx-1.pdf) and [strategic competition](https://ecipe.org/insights/chinas-participation-o-ran).\n\n## Open-source AI: With Chinese characteristics?\n\nThe contest over AI has moved beyond export controls of [AI chips](https://www.cfr.org/articles/new-ai-chip-export-policy-china-strategically-incoherent-and-unenforceable) toward who leads [open-source AI development](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/30/world/asia/as-chinas-ai-gets-stronger-it-poses-new-risks-to-beijing.html). Xi is expected to discuss AI with U.S. President Donald Trump on [his visit](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/trump-says-xi-will-visit-us-september-24-2026-07-23/) to the U.S. in September.\n\nMajor Chinese AI models such as Qwen, DeepSeek, Kimi and GLM are generally [open-weight](https://opensource.org/ai/open-weights), not [open-source](https://opensource.org/ai/open-source-ai-definition), meaning that the model software and its final parameters are made available, but not the training data and methodology. [AI companies](https://llm-stats.com/organizations) often offer models in proprietary, open-weight and smaller open-source [versions](https://epoch.ai/data/ai-models?view=graph&tab=notable&colorCategorization=Model+accessibility).\n\n[The White House](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/08/04/technology/ai-washington-regulation-whiplash.html) and [Silicon Valley](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/25/technology/open-source-silicon-valley-china.html) remain split over the prospects of open-source AI. [Anthropic](https://www.cnbc.com/2026/06/24/anthropic-alibaba-distillation-campaign.html) and [OpenAI](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/jan/29/openai-chatgpt-deepseek-china-us-ai-models) have accused Chinese open-weight model makers of large-scale, unauthorized [distillation](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/06/technology/ai-distillation-china.html), a technique used to copy proprietary AI models. The Trump administration and U.S. lawmakers have [proposed restricting access to Chinese open-weight models](https://www.axios.com/2026/07/20/ai-us-china-open-source-kimi), and some federal agencies and state governments have already moved to [prohibit employees and contractors](https://www.conference-board.org/research/ceo-center-newsletters-alerts/state-and-federal-governments-deepseak-ban) from using DeepSeek, for security reasons.\n\nUsers of Chinese AI face risks that are not widely understood. Chinese open-weight models are designed to align with [government censorship and propaganda](https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/DeepSeek%20Final.pdf). While Chinese models are often distributed under standard licenses, such as [MIT](https://opensource.org/license/mit) and [Apache 2.0](https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0), some impose additional compliance obligations.\n\nMoonshot’s [Kimi K3 model license](https://huggingface.co/moonshotai/Kimi-K3/blob/main/LICENSE), for example, requires licensees exceeding specific revenue or user thresholds to “prominently” display the Kimi model name. [MiniMax M3’s community license](https://huggingface.co/MiniMaxAI/MiniMax-M3/blob/main/LICENSE) lists uses prohibited by “applicable laws or regulations,” raising questions over which jurisdictions apply.\n\nBilingual licenses developed under [Chinese government guidance](https://perma.cc/Z3R4-GL3Q) give Chinese users more access and Chinese courts more control. These include the [Mulan Permissive Software License, version 2.0](https://opensource.org/license/MulanPSL-2.0) and the [OpenAtom Model License, version 1.0](https://www.openatom.org/law/licence). Both are written in English and Chinese, but the Chinese version prevails in cases of [conflicting interpretation](https://www.economist.com/china/2025/01/28/america-and-china-are-talking-but-much-gets-lost-in-translation), especially in [Chinese jurisdictions](https://www.forbes.com/sites/jillgoldenziel/2026/03/02/chinas-cybersecurity-law-just-got-tougher-the-us-is-fighting-back).\n\n## Open-source technology has always been global\n\nThe U.S. regulates AI through a patchwork of [federal](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/artificial-intelligence-legislation-tracker) and [state](https://www.ncsl.org/financial-services/artificial-intelligence-legislation-database) laws. Internationally recognized frameworks may offer a better approach to governing open-source AI. Examples include the European Union’s [Artificial Intelligence Act](https://artificialintelligenceact.eu) and multilateral initiatives such as UNESCO’s [Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence](https://www.unesco.org/en/artificial-intelligence/recommendation-ethics), the [Hiroshima AI Process](https://www.soumu.go.jp/hiroshimaaiprocess/en/index.html) and the International Standards Organization’s [ISO/IEC 42001](https://www.iso.org/standard/42001).\n\nOpen-source technology could also benefit from such governance.", "url": "https://wpnews.pro/news/china-is-shaping-the-future-of-open-source-technology-including-ai", "canonical_source": "https://theconversation.com/china-is-shaping-the-future-of-open-source-technology-including-ai-288061", "published_at": "2026-08-15 14:56:31+00:00", "updated_at": "2026-08-15 15:10:38.793629+00:00", "lang": "en", "topics": ["artificial-intelligence", "ai-policy"], "entities": ["China", "United States", "Europe", "Red Flag Linux", "Kylin", "Linux", "RISC-V", "Christopher K. 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