I would love feedback from the technical community on scope enforcement and impact boundaries when building production agent workflows.
Indirect prompt injection allows attackers to context-hijack autonomous AI agents. Because hijacked tool calls look completely legitimate at the API and firewall level, non-deterministic evaluation (using an LLM to monitor another LLM) fails to enforce strict security boundaries.
To address this vulnerability, I published a paper modeling a deterministic Intent Architecture. By placing a static JSON policy schema layer between agent reasoning and tool execution, proposed actions are validated against explicit policy boundaries before execution can occur.
The architecture intercepts proposed agent actions and validates them against a static policy_schema.json
file prior to execution:
python
import json
import jsonschema
with open("policy_schema.json", "r") as f:
policy_schema = json.load(f)
def validate_agent_intent(intent_payload):
"""Intercepts a proposed agent action and validates it against static policy schema rules."""
try:
jsonschema.validate(instance=intent_payload, schema=policy_schema)
return True, "ACTION ALLOWED: Intent satisfies static policy schema."
except jsonschema.exceptions.ValidationError as err:
return False, f"ACTION BLOCKED: Policy violation -> {err.message}"