# Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Gulf’s Irregular Tomorrow > Source: > Published: 2026-07-01 05:05:07+00:00 *Editor's note: The "Short of War" Podcast discussing this article is AI-generated.*The Arabian Gulf is entering a period of strategic transition in which the foundations of regional security are being [renegotiated](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202606133527?ref=irregularwarfare.org). Historically, Iranian coercion operated within a bounded system shaped by credible U.S. deterrence — a system now under strain. Whether Iran survives weakened or fragments under pressure, Gulf states now face a Scylla-and-Charybdis dilemma, fated to choose between two inescapably dangerous futures: a battered but emboldened Iranian regime may intensify and sustain sub-threshold kinetic coercion, while a fractured Iranian regime could export instability through militias and violence in ungoverned spaces. The result is a security environment defined by two converging dynamics: a new form of persistent irregular competition with Iran, and growing uncertainty around U.S. security commitments. Together, they signal a structural shift in which security can no longer be assumed to be externally provided but must be generated within the Gulf itself. # Management Under the American Umbrella The Gulf has persistently and successfully dealt with Iranian irregular warfare since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Gulf states historically managed Iranian threats under a stabilizing assumption that escalation would remain bounded by an [external security guarantor](https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/egypt-and-the-gulf-a-relationship-under-pressure/?ref=irregularwarfare.org). Iranian proxy activities, maritime coercion, and periodic attacks on Gulf interests unfolded within a regional order underwritten by U.S. military presence, deterrence, and — when necessary — direct intervention. That structure did not eliminate the Iranian threat, but made it manageable by creating space for Gulf states to combine defense with diplomacy. States such as [Oman](https://dash.harvard.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/77a32a23-4c48-409a-b7ff-a136f5c06ed0/content?ref=irregularwarfare.org) and [Qatar](https://mofa.gov.qa/en/foreign-policy/mediation/mediation?ref=irregularwarfare.org) were able to pursue mediation with Tehran while operating under the broader protection of the U.S. security umbrella, thereby creating a regional equilibrium in which confrontation and de-escalation [could coexist](https://agsi.org/analysis/the-enduring-saudi-iranian-detente/?ref=irregularwarfare.org). However, recent events have called this stabilizing assumption into question. In June 2025, Iran’s [missile strike](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-informed-qatar-advance-strikes-us-bases-2025-06-23/?ref=irregularwarfare.org) on Al Udeid Air Base marked the [first direct Iranian strike](https://amwaj.media/en/article/how-iran-s-strike-on-qatar-s-al-udeid-base-is-changing-regional-dynamics?ref=irregularwarfare.org) on a Gulf state in decades. The U.S. response was limited to [rhetorical de-escalation](https://www.politico.com/news/2025/06/23/trump-convenes-situation-room-meeting-as-iran-claims-attack-on-us-base-in-qatar-00418756?ref=irregularwarfare.org) and a [rapid ceasefire announcement](https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-special-report-june-23-2025-evening-edition/?ref=irregularwarfare.org), without public reinforcement of deterrent commitments to Gulf sovereignty, raising concerns that direct violations of Gulf sovereignty might not trigger meaningful punitive enforcement. Those concerns deepened in September 2025, when an Israeli strike in a [residential area of Doha](https://mofa.gov.qa/en/qatar/latest-articles/latest-news/details/2025/09/11/prime-minister-to-un-security-council--israeli-treacherous-attack-on-qatar-carried-out-by-extremist-leadership-far-removed-from-behavior-of-civilized-countries-that-believe-in-peace?ref=irregularwarfare.org) targeted Hamas negotiators. The operation, which resulted in the deaths of [Qatari security personnel](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/qatar-says-one-member-of-its-security-forces-killed-in-israeli-strike-on-doha/?ref=irregularwarfare.org), represented the first time Israel conducted a kinetic attack against a Gulf country. Despite [receiving advance notification](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-867294?ref=irregularwarfare.org) from Israel about the attack, Washington did not inform Doha beforehand, nor did American air defenses [track or intercept](https://www.twz.com/air/new-info-on-how-u-s-military-was-caught-off-guard-by-israeli-strike-on-qatar?ref=irregularwarfare.org) the missiles. It thus appeared that close partnership with the U.S. neither prevented the violation nor produced [meaningful consequences](https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-apologizes-to-qatar-for-strike-on-hamas-leaders-in-call-with-trump/?ref=irregularwarfare.org) for the attacker, producing only [security assurances](https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/assuring-the-security-of-the-state-of-qatar/?ref=irregularwarfare.org) that did not augment Qatari defenses in the short term. Taken together, these two incidents revealed three unsettling shifts for the Gulf. First, the United States’ presence was no longer sufficient to protect the Gulf from its adversaries. Second, the Gulf’s close partnership with the United States did not restrain U.S. partners' actions. Finally, and most crucially, violations of Gulf sovereignty did not reliably trigger responses or enforcement mechanisms by the United States, contributing to a perception in the Gulf that U.S. commitments may be becoming more conditional. This perception worsened drastically during the 2026 regional war. Gulf states were [excluded from consultation](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/saudis-wont-let-us-use-its-bases-airspace-attack-iran-says-senior-gulf-official?ref=irregularwarfare.org) on war planning, saw a U.S. force posture shift toward the [Mediterranean](https://news.usni.org/2026/02/23/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-feb-23-2026?ref=irregularwarfare.org), and felt [diplomatically deprioritized](https://www.ft.com/content/5ed07139-1626-4d2c-88a3-dec8357ad643?ref=irregularwarfare.org) through a sustained absence of appointed ambassadors in favor of [inexperienced regional interlocutors](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/allies-fear-rushed-usiran-framework-deal-could-backfire-leaving-technical-2026-04-19/?ref=irregularwarfare.org). Most importantly, the Gulf felt a gap between what was expected and what was received in terms of U.S. support during active hostilities. Gulf states did not receive meaningful assistance in [replenishing depleted military stocks](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/arab-states-running-low-interceptors-iranian-fired-missiles/?ref=irregularwarfare.org) nor surges of [defensive equipment](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/trackers-and-data-visualizations/tracking-us-military-assets-in-the-iran-war/?ref=irregularwarfare.org). With an [absence of American support for air defense](https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-trump-gulf-states-drones-defense-69d5bc227e468f06e20e5ad069330c7d?ref=irregularwarfare.org), Gulf countries were forced to defend against Iranian missiles and drone threats [independently](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-launched-over-5-400-attacks-on-us-bases-critical-sites-in-arab-countries-in-a-month-data/3884488?ref=irregularwarfare.org) for extended periods of time. Furthermore, the U.S. made [few public expressions](https://www.politico.com/news/2026/04/17/embassy-cables-detail-how-iran-war-is-hurting-the-us-abroad-00877205?ref=irregularwarfare.org) of support for its Gulf partners and also did not urgently provide significant economic assistance or stabilization measures. From the Gulf’s perspective, these developments demonstrate a structural shift in U.S. engagement from a regional security guarantor to an increasingly selective actor whose interventions are less predictable than assured. The United States’ position as guarantor once mitigated the acuteness of the Iranian threat, enabling the Gulf states to live within a managed regional status quo.With the perception that the United States may be decommitting from the region, the Gulf naturally fears the corresponding erosion of escalation management — especially at a time when the Iranian threat is more aggressive and uncertain than ever before. # Iran: From a Managed Threat to Justified Confidence The shift in U.S. posture coincides with a parallel change in the nature of the Iranian threat. What was once a managed challenge has become more confident and less constrained. For the first time since 1979, Iran perceives itself as [holding the cards](https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/iran-believes-they-hold-the-cards-amid-dysfunction-chaos-in-us-national-security-decision-making/vi-AA20IASy?ocid=weather-verthp-feeds&ref=irregularwarfare.org) against all other actors — not only the United States and Israel, but also the Gulf states. Iran has demonstrated an ability to generate sustained coercive pressure on chokepoints and global markets using relatively [low-cost, replaceable systems](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-drone-strategy-part-1-wartime-performance-and-adaptations?ref=irregularwarfare.org) that are [difficult to neutralize](https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/02/politics/iran-missiles-us-military-strikes-trump?ref=irregularwarfare.org) decisively. Tehran maintains escalation leverage over Gulf countries through its ability to sustain aerial bombardments. Additionally, Iran was able to impose these costs while absorbing punishment. Despite leadership losses and [economic strain](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/22/opinion/international-world/iran-war-blockade-trump.html?ref=irregularwarfare.org), Iran’s [governing system](https://time.com/article/2026/04/21/war-iran-mojtaba-khamenei-supreme-leader/?ref=irregularwarfare.org), [command structures](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cq8wzyz998xo?ref=irregularwarfare.org), [repressive instruments](https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clygdwqw5dvo?ref=irregularwarfare.org), and offensive [strike capabilities](https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/02/politics/iran-missiles-us-military-strikes-trump?ref=irregularwarfare.org) remain intact, indicating a level of regime resilience that withstands the impact of punitive strikes. Iran now knows it has the power to coerce through limited attacks and retains operational reach while maintaining regime stability. This emboldens the regime to present an escalated, persistent threat to the Gulf through coercive small-scale kinetic activities, which are individually hard to defend against. Beyond episodic strikes, Iran retains the organizational capacity to scale toward coordinated, multidomain attacks — an escalation pathway that would be significantly harder for Gulf defenses to absorb. Tehran has demonstrated its ability to impose costs while remaining below the threshold of full-scale war with the Gulf states, limiting the region’s ability to respond without risking escalation it cannot independently sustain. The Gulf thus faces a future of sustained below-threshold coercion from an emboldened regime, which becomes even less predictable if the regime breaks down. # Fragmentation and Fear of the Unknown While an emboldened Iran produces persistent coercive threats, a fragmented Iran risks a less predictable but equally dangerous future. The continuation of the war may culminate in the collapse of the Iranian regime, whether as a result of internal dynamics or external intervention, and its replacement by a new governing structure with an ostensibly U.S.-backed comprador administration. This may appear to reduce the threat to the Gulf by aligning the new Iran with the United States; however, this is a simplistic view. Any externally backed successor government will face [immediate questions of legitimacy](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-legitimacy-in-iraq-matters/?ref=irregularwarfare.org) from the Iranian public. Importantly, Iran’s modern identity has been shaped in opposition to foreign influence, and a historical memory of external intervention — by [Britain](https://www.hnn.us/article/why-iranians-are-still-railing-against-britain--an?ref=irregularwarfare.org), [Russia](https://www.ir-journal.com/storage/media/6952/01KMK1G6KVBBFZV0QPH12625QN.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org), and [the United States](https://www.irregularwarfare.org/us-iranian-irregular-warfare-history/) — remains deeply embedded in Iranian society. Even a government that is objectively less repressive than the post-1979 government may struggle to maintain credibility if it is seen as dependent on outside powers, particularly the United States and Israel. A central government without popular legitimacy creates fertile ground for irregular conflict. Competing centers of power — whether remnants of the old regime, nationalist factions seeking to free Iran from the imperialist yoke, mobilized armed groups, or fusions of the three — will likely emerge to challenge the state. These actors would likely frame their struggle as resistance to foreign influence and a restoration of sovereignty. For such actors, projecting instability outward through proxy activity, attacks on infrastructure, or maritime disruption may become a means of internal power accumulation and [legitimacy-building](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X25003444?ref=irregularwarfare.org) as much as regional confrontation. The Gulf represents an easy target due to its physical proximity and dependence within the U.S. hegemonic security architecture. The Iranian regime’s framing of the Gulf as a [puppet](https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2022/12/12/694327/GCC-puppet-organization-reliant-on-West-military-power-for-existence-Analyst-?ref=irregularwarfare.org) of Western imperialism and foreign interventionism could easily be weaponized as part of a new type of Iranian nationalism. Additionally, while a coherent Iranian state would have experience in practicing calibrated coercion, fragmented and desperate actors in Iran may be less constrained by political risk, less legible in their signaling, and harder to deter through conventional means. While certainly not limitless, the precise limits of what they may deem operationally appropriate are difficult to ascertain and may be harder to defend against. # Toward Arabia-First Irregular Defense The Gulf is no longer operating under conditions where an external security guarantor can reliably manage escalation. Instead, it faces an environment in which coercion, limited strikes, and proxy activity can occur without predictable escalation control or guaranteed external responses. Whether the Iranian regime persists as a constrained but vengefully capable actor, or replaced by a fragmented ecosystem of armed political actors, the Gulf will face an environment defined by irregular escalation. For the Gulf states, the question is not which Iranian future is preferable; it is how to prepare for a future in which either option brings a new form of sustained irregular warfare, which the region is unprepared to defend against on its own. Stuck between Scylla and Charybdis, the Gulf’s central strategic task is not simply deterrence, but resilience and competition in the irregular domain itself. The Gulf’s reliance on the United States for external intervention is no longer a sufficient basis for deterrence or defense. However, replacing the United States with a new external security guarantor is unrealistic in the near term. No other power can replicate the military reach, integration, or established defense relationships that have underwritten Gulf security for decades. The Gulf also lacks the time necessary to build such a substitute before the next iteration of the Iranian threat emerges, and it cannot guarantee that an external actor would be committed to persistently countering the Iranian threat in the way that the Gulf needs. Since the Gulf cannot reliably look abroad to counter Iranian irregular warfare on its behalf, the burden of adaptation falls first on the Gulf itself. With a baseline shared threat picture, Gulf countries are well-equipped to create a coordinated framework to detect, absorb, and respond to Iranian irregular warfare threats as they manifest. Such a framework — similar to that developed by [the Baltic states](https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/06/the-baltic-revolution-in-military-affairs/?ref=irregularwarfare.org)— would be effective in countering Iranian effects through collective and reactive defense. However, if the postwar Gulf is defined by persistent irregular competition, Gulf states should go beyond merely resisting irregular warfare to practicing forms of coordinated, proactive irregular statecraft themselves. This could include joint capacity building, political warfare, strategic influence, and collective regional shaping efforts designed to outflank irregular warfare threats. With its pre-existing [joint defense mechanisms](https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/beyond-hype-pakistan-saudi-defense-pact-not-saudi-nuclear-umbrella-0?ref=irregularwarfare.org), [common market](https://www.gcc-sg.org/en/MediaCenter/DigitalLibrary/Documents/1274592562.pdf?ref=irregularwarfare.org), and [interdependent infrastructure](https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-gulfs-evolving-security-mosaic-balancing-the-uss-manifest-ret/?ref=irregularwarfare.org), the Gulf Cooperation Council represents a natural forum for the Gulf states to develop an indigenous shared approach to conducting irregular statecraft for the benefit of the region in the face of the shared Iranian threat. This would not prevent states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from pursuing their own irregular strategies to achieve regional aspirations, but it would be an effective way to ensure that no state in the Gulf is endangered by irregular warfare from abroad. Such an approach would necessarily extend beyond conventional balancing and military operations. It could include integrated counter-subversion and infrastructure resilience planning, coordinated political warfare and information campaigns, joint execution of economic statecraft and defense-industrial base projects, and Gulf-wide strategic-level integration with multipolar networks of allies and partners. Collective irregular defense would not replace conventional deterrence, but supplement it where traditional security guarantees may prove insufficient. The strategic challenge facing the Gulf is no longer how to preserve the old order, but how to operate in a new one: a regional environment defined not by decisive battles, but rather persistent coercion below the threshold of war. In the Gulf’s irregular future, security will have to be produced rather than provided—and it must be produced from within. *Umar Ahmed Badami** is the Director of the Wargaming Division at the Irregular Warfare Initiative. His work focuses on the intersections between emerging technologies, irregular warfare doctrine, and strategic competition in the Middle East. Umar is also a contractor supporting the U.S. Department of Defense. He is a graduate of the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.* *Main image: “GCC flags on West Bay in Doha” from **Wikimedia Commons**.* *The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.* *If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider **supporting our work**. 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