Anatomy of an AI-driven attack: What ARTEX looks like in action Bitrise reported that ARTEX, an open-source autonomous AI penetration-testing platform, breached its systems between October 25 and November 18, 2026, after signing in on November 13 at 11:46:48 UTC to a dormant internal test bot account that lacked two-factor authentication. Bitrise VP of Engineering and Infrastructure Arpad Kun and Information Security Engineer Imre Szvorenyi wrote that the agents chained stolen cloud keys for roughly ten hours, reaching signing files, source code, infrastructure state and build logs, and that files in 15 customer workspaces were accessed without authorization, including 1 code-signing certificate file whose password the attacker could not access, 1 provisioning profile and 13 diagnostic build logs from May 2026. Bitrise detected the activity at 16:32 UTC, began a platform-wide shutdown at 19:26 UTC, switched the platform off at 20:34 UTC, revoked all 919 cloud service-account keys, rotated every production secret and credential it manages, and rebuilt thousands of servers across three data centers; when the attacker returned on November 18, all 19 cloud requests and 9 sign-in attempts were denied. Over 25 days an autonomous AI hacking platform probed Bitrise while posing as an authorized penetration test, came back, got in, and was shut out. This is what it did, step by step, and how we stopped it. An evidence-graded account: how it got in, what it reached, what it did not, how we shut it out, and what every defender should look for. StatusBitrise is safe to use. The attack path is closed, every production secret and credential we manage was rotated, and we keep watching. How this report was made Checked by people. Written with AI help. AI helped us write this report and build its visuals. The claims, the timeline and the findings were checked by people: our engineers and security engineers. In the age of AI-accelerated attacks, we use AI tools in the response too, so we can report quickly. Open Evidence under any step to see the log lines behind it. Arpad Kun, VP of Engineering and Infrastructure, Bitrise Imre Szvorenyi, Information Security Engineer, Bitrise Times All times are UTC. How we countedFirst request from 95.40.73.129 on Oct 25, 01:43 UTC; last request from 118.100.234.120 on Nov 18, 21:19:55 UTC. How we countedSign-in recorded 11:46:48 UTC; first cloud API call from the attacker’s address with a service-account key 11:57:25 UTC Nov 13 . The key is linked to the secrets revealed minutes earlier by timing: secret values are not logged. How we countedSuspicious activity detected and investigation initiated 16:32 UTC; shutdown started 19:26 UTC Nov 13 , 7 h 39 min after the sign-in. The platform was switched off at 20:34 UTC. How we countedFrom the sign-in at 11:46:48 UTC to the last successful cloud API call recorded from the attacker’s addresses at 21:57:50 UTC Nov 13 . How we countedGoogle Cloud audit logs swept across every project for the attacker’s source addresses: 8,725 entries, 5,662 successful; 72 identities tried, 18 with at least one successful call. A separate search for Nov 18 found 19 more requests, all denied. How we counted55 minutes, 19 cloud requests all denied, 9 sign-in attempts all refused. One new sign-up was created, never confirmed, and banned. Summary Between October 25 and November 18, 2026, an operator pointed ARTEX, an open-source AI penetration-testing platform, at Bitrise. Its agents spent three days in October mapping our public surface under user agents that claimed to be an “authorized pentest”. On November 12 they came back as an ordinary customer, ran their own builds and tested whether one customer could reach another’s files. They could not. The decisive step came on November 13 at 11:46:48 UTC: a sign-in to a dormant internal test bot account that had no two-factor authentication and still belonged to an internal workspace. Less than eleven minutes later the agents were using cloud keys that belong to that workspace’s projects, and over the next ten hours they chained one credential into the next: Bitrise’s own signing files, source code, infrastructure state and build logs. We detected suspicious activity at 16:32 UTC, started a platform-wide shutdown at 19:26 UTC and switched the platform off at 20:34 UTC. The last successful cloud call with a stolen key was recorded at 21:57:50 UTC. We then revoked all 919 of our cloud service-account keys, rotated every production secret and credential we manage, and rebuilt our build infrastructure from trusted sources: thousands of servers in three data centers. When the attacker returned on November 18 and replayed the attack with what it had stolen, every attempt to read anything was refused. We watched it live. If you are a Bitrise customer Bitrise is safe to use. The path used in this attack no longer exists. Most of what the attacker accessed was Bitrise’s own. Files in 15 customer workspaces were accessed without authorization: 1 code-signing certificate file the attacker could not access the password needed to open it , 1 provisioning profile and 13 diagnostic build logs from May 2026. All 15 customers were contacted immediately. For every other workspace, our file-level analysis found no evidence of the customer’s secrets, code-signing files, build artifacts or source code in what the attacker accessed. Our logs show no access, and no attempted access, to the store that holds customer secrets. As a precaution we still recommend rotating the secrets, tokens and certificates you store in Bitrise and reconnecting GitHub. Protected Secret Masked Review shows the last four characters of each secret to help you find them. This is what an ARTEX-class attack looks like from the receiving end, with exact times, user agents, account names and addresses. Three fingerprints identify the tool: the client string norma/0.4, things named i