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[ARTICLE · art-148170] src=cyberhallucinet.github.io ↗ pub= topic=ai-safety verified=true sentiment=· neutral

AmberCell is a high-interaction honeypot: it runs full, real services

AmberCell is a new high-interaction honeypot that runs 28 real protocol decoys — including postfix, OpenLDAP, xrdp and kamailio — rather than emulated look-alikes, according to its operators. The system seals each genuine daemon in a per-protocol cell with tight caps, seccomp and egress allowlists, and gates production exposure behind kill bars G1–G14. Evidence leaves through a one-way dead drop that SIEM and analysts pull from, so attackers interact with real software while no production data is exposed.

read8 min views1 publishedOct 9, 2026

// high-interaction honeypot · real services · zero emulation

AmberCell is a high-interaction honeypot: it runs full, real services — actual postfix, OpenLDAP, xrdp, kamailio — not emulated look-alikes. Attackers interact with genuine daemons on a genuine network stack, and every packet, credential, and payload is preserved, sealed in amber.

AmberCell is a decoy computer that looks like a real office network: mail servers, file shares, databases, even a remote-desktop login.

The difference from a movie prop: everything on it actually works. Attackers who break in get real software to interact with — and every move is recorded, like insects preserved in amber.

Nothing of yours is ever exposed, and the evidence leaves through a one-way letterbox.

FOR SECURITY PROFESSIONALS

High-interaction by architecture: real OSS daemons in per-protocol cells — no fake shells, no scripted responses

ATT&CK/Engage enrichment; bounded AI manager off the packet path with a deterministic critic

Kill bars G1–G14 gate production exposure

One-way dead drop — SIEM and analysts pull, they never touch the pot

meanwhile, in the web — an attacker who touches a cell is stuck in it:no real data, no next hop, no way out. Every struggle is another frame of evidence, preserved.

______ _____  ___   _
| ___ \  ___|/ _ \ | |
| |_/ / |__ / /_\ \| |
|    /|  __||  _  || |
| |\ \| |___| | | || |____
\_| \_\____/\_| |_/\_____/

02 / WHY HIGH-INTERACTION MATTERS

Honeypots are classed by how much of the service is real. AmberCell sits at the deep end — deliberately.

LOW-INTERACTION

Emulated protocol banners and handshakes only (honeyd-style). Cheap and safe, but an attacker fingerprinting the fake walks away in seconds — you learn almost nothing about what they intended to do.

MEDIUM-INTERACTION

Scripted emulation: fake shells and canned responses (cowrie-style). Better lures, still detectable — behaviour never quite matches a real system, and sophisticated tooling notices the seams.

HIGH-INTERACTION AMBERCELL

Full, real services. Attackers exploit, authenticate, upload and interact with genuine daemons on a real network stack — the deepest, most truthful evidence you can collect. AmberCell makes that safe to operate: every real daemon is sealed in its own cell with tight caps, seccomp and egress allowlists.

   ______________    __   _____
  / ____/ ____/ /   / /  / ___/
 / /   / __/ / /   / /   \__ \
/ /___/ /___/ /___/ /______/ /
\____/_____/_____/_____/____/

03 / 28 high-interaction protocol decoys

protocol

port

proto

software

status

ftp

21

tcp

vsftpd

real

ssh

22

tcp

openssh

real

telnet

23

tcp

busybox

real

smtp

25

tcp

postfix

real

dns

53

udp+tcp

coredns

real

tftp

69

udp

dnsmasq

real

http

80/443

tcp

nginx

real

pop3

110

tcp

dovecot

real

ntp

123

udp

chrony

beta

netbios

137

udp

nmbd

real

imap

143

tcp

dovecot

real

snmp

161

udp+tcp

net-snmp

real

ldap

389

tcp

openldap

beta

smb

445

tcp

samba

real

protocol

port

proto

software

status

syslog

514

tcp+udp

rsyslog

beta

mqtt

1883

tcp

mosquitto

real

dockerapi

2375

tcp

mocked api

trap

mysql

3306

tcp

mariadb

real

rdp

3389

tcp

xrdp

real

sip

5060

tcp

kamailio

real

postgres

5432

tcp

postgresql

real

vnc

5900

tcp

tigervnc

real

redis

6379

tcp

redis

real

elastic

9200

tcp

elasticsearch

real

kubelet

10250

tcp

mocked api

trap

memcached

11211

tcp

memcached

real

ollama

11434

tcp

llm lure

mock

mongo

27017

tcp

mongodb

real

/ FLOWS — packets per second, live

 **    **   *******   **     ** *******     **       **     **     **    **
//**  **   **/////** /**    /**/**////**   /**      /**    ****   //**  **
 //****   **     //**/**    /**/**   /**   /**   *  /**   **//**   //****
  //**   /**      /**/**    /**/*******    /**  *** /**  **  //**   //**
   /**   /**      /**/**    /**/**///**    /** **/**/** **********   /**
   /**   //**     ** /**    /**/**  //**   /**** //****/**//////**   /**
   /**    //*******  //******* /**   //**  /**/   ///**/**     /**   /**
   //      ///////    ///////  //     //   //       // //      //    //

04 / YOUR DECOY, YOUR WAY — READY OR HOMEMADE

whatever you plug in — curated, homemade, or remote — the evidence pipeline stays identical

Every protocol cell speaks the same contract. Run a curated real daemon, bring your own, or tunnel to the servers you already operate — the collectors and evidence never change.

WAY 1

CURATED REAL DAEMONS

70+ digest-pinned open-source servers ship as one-env-var swaps: AMBER_FTP_PROVIDER=proftpd, AMBER_SMTP_PROVIDER=exim, AMBER_LDAP_PROVIDER=glauth… Each keeps the same evidence schema, so switching never breaks your pipeline.

→ tutorial 02

WAY 2

BRING YOUR OWN DOCKER

Already built the perfect lure? Point a cell at your image: AMBER_FTP_HI_IMAGE=registry…@sha256:… (prebuilt) or AMBER_FTP_PROVIDER_CONTEXT=/path/to/your/Dockerfile. Containment and capture wrap around whatever you bring.

→ tutorial 02

WAY 3

TUNNEL TO YOUR OWN SERVER

Have real services already? Relay a cell to them at any address: AMBER_LDAP_PROVIDER=remote + AMBER_LDAP_REMOTE_ADDR=ldap.corp:389. It's an L4 relay — bytes untouched, evidence still captured at the cell front.

→ tutorial 03

 __  __     ______     __     __
/\ \_\ \   /\  __ \   /\ \  _ \ \
\ \  __ \  \ \ \/\ \  \ \ \/ ".\ \
 \ \_\ \_\  \ \_____\  \ \__/".~\_\
  \/_/\/_/   \/_____/   \/_/   \/_/

05 / HOW IT WORKS

STEP 1

DECOY

Real OSS daemons run in sealed cells behind nftables DNAT — a convincing, high-interaction network.

STEP 2

RECORD

Per-cell collectors own the netns: rotating pcap, raw flows, credentials, uploads — append-only.

STEP 3

EXAMINE

ATT&CK/Engage enrichment + bounded AI decisions; intelligence leaves via a one-way dead drop.

              ┌─────────────────────────── the sealed case ───────────────────────────┐
 internet ───▶│ nftables DNAT ──▶ ambernet (icc off) ──▶ 28 real-service cells           │
              │      │                     │                    │                        │
              │      ▼                     ▼                    ▼                        │
              │ egress allowlist      dns sinkhole      *-collector ──▶ /var/ambercell │
              │ (tcp 80/443 only,     (all lookups           │        pcap · flows · JSONL  │
              │  tcp/25 dropped)       logged)                ▼                            │
              │                                          dead drop ◀ one-way letterbox   │
              └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                                                SIEM / analysts pull — never touch the pot

/ BEACON — the dead-drop publish cycle

dP         88888888b  .d888888   888888ba  888888ba
88         88        d8'    88   88    `8b 88    `8b
88        a88aaaa    88aaaaa88a a88aaaa8P' 88     88
88         88        88     88   88   `8b. 88     88
88         88        88     88   88     88 88     88
88888888P  88888888P 88     88   dP     dP dP     dP

06 / TUTORIALS — interactive, copy-ready, real

Every command is verified against the repo. Sessions run in an animated terminal — lines type themselves in, and every $ line copies on click. ▶ start guided tour

~3 min beginner

TUT·01

First flight — your first real honeypot

Clone, build amberctl, boot a real vsftpd cell, probe it, and watch your first evidence land. No public IP needed.

open_session_

~2 min beginner

TUT·02

Swap the decoy — providers & your own Docker

Switch vsftpd→proftpd with one variable, then bring a custom image. Evidence schema never changes; digests stay pinned.

open_session_

~2 min intermediate

TUT·03

Point a cell at YOUR server

Relay attackers into your existing LDAP/SNMP/SIP server at any address — the cell keeps capturing at the front.

open_session_

~2 min analyst

TUT·04

Take the intel — the dead drop

Publish an evidence bundle, verify it hash-by-hash, and pull it exactly like your SIEM would.

open_session_

~4 min operator

TUT·05

Deploy sensors — a remote fleet

Headless provisioning, systemd watchdog + publish timer, and a central launcher for many sensors.

open_session_

 ▄████▄   ▒█████   ███▄    █ ▄▄▄█████▓ ▄▄▄       ██▓ ███▄    █ ▓█████ ▓█████▄
▒██▀ ▀█  ▒██▒  ██▒ ██ ▀█   █ ▓  ██▒ ▓▒▒████▄    ▓██▒ ██ ▀█   █ ▓█   ▀ ▒██▀ ██▌
▒▓█    ▄ ▒██░  ██▒▓██  ▀█ ██▒▒ ▓██░ ▒░▒██  ▀█▄  ▒██▒▓██  ▀█ ██▒▒███   ░██   █▌
▒▓▓▄ ▄██▒▒██   ██░▓██▒  ▐▌██▒░ ▓██▓ ░ ░██▄▄▄▄██ ░██░▓██▒  ▐▌██▒▒▓█  ▄ ░▓█▄   ▌
▒ ▓███▀ ░░ ████▓▒░▒██░   ▓██░  ▒██▒ ░  ▓█   ▓██▒░██░▒██░   ▓██░░▒████▒░▒████▓
░ ░▒ ▒  ░░ ▒░▒░▒░ ░ ▒░   ▒ ▒   ▒ ░░    ▒▒   ▓▒█░░▓  ░ ▒░   ▒ ▒ ░░ ▒░ ░ ▒▒▓  ▒
  ░  ▒     ░ ▒ ▒░ ░ ░░   ░ ▒░    ░      ▒   ▒▒ ░ ▒ ░░ ░░   ▒▒░ ░ ░  ░ ░ ▒  ▒
░        ░ ░ ░ ▒     ░   ░ ░   ░        ░   ▒    ▒ ░   ░   ░ ░    ░    ░ ░  ░
░ ░          ░ ░           ░                ░  ░ ░           ░    ░  ░   ░
░                                                                      ░

07 / SAFETY — real services, hard limits

High-interaction means real risk if done naively. AmberCell's answer is layered containment — production exposure is gated by kill bars, and if any trips, you don't ship.

[✓] lab profile is the default[✓] no host orchestration, ever[✓] egress allowlist + dns sinkhole[✓] append-only evidence[✓] one-way dead drop

[✓] G1 no unexplained egress

[✓] G2 no lateral container reach

[✓] G3 no host/metadata access

[✓] G4 no docker.sock anywhere

[✓] G5 unknown traffic never dropped

[✓] G6 AI never mutates evidence

[✓] G8 traps can't orchestrate

[✓] G10 no outbound tcp/25

[✓] G13 no dns/memcached amplification

[✓] G14 relays can't widen egress

● AMBERCELL × CHN — you found one piece of the network

AmberCell runs perfectly as a standalone box — but it's part of Cyber Halluci Net (CHN), our security-research collective. The perfect complete free deception suite.

── more in #ai-safety 4 stories · sorted by recency
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