Alert Noise Reduction Agent A new open-source agent specification called AgentAz aims to reduce alert noise by ranking alerts based on actionability and recommending suppression rules, while never suppressing alerts linked to real incidents or critical/SEV1 alerts. The specification, released under Apache-2.0, defines trust levels, tool boundaries, and human handoff triggers to ensure safe, auditable operations. Overview Score → correlate → tune → suppress carefully : turns a noisy alert stream into a quieter, still-trustworthy one. Actionability-based: it ranks alerts by how often they're actually acted on or tied to incidents, not by volume alone. Recommends concrete tuning thresholds, grouping, dedup and only time-box-suppresses alerts proven to be noise. Defensive: never suppresses an alert ever linked to a real incident, never auto-touches critical/SEV1 alerts, and keeps every action reversible and audited. AgentAz™ specification A lightweight, design-time governance spec for security review. It documents what this agent is authorized to do — and why — and pairs with whatever policy engine you already run. It does not enforce anything at runtime. Machine-readable contract agentaz.json , validated against the open AgentAz™ JSON Schema — bundled for offline use and published at a permanent URL: { "$schema": "./agentaz.schema.json", "version": "2.0.0", "last reviewed": "2026-06-24", "agent id": "alert-noise-reducer-agent", "trust level": "A2", "dna pattern": "Evaluation", "worst case action": "Recommends suppressing a meaningful alert for review. Cannot auto-suppress; criticals never suppressed.", "authority boundary": "Clusters alerts and recommends suppression rules for approval; autonomous suppression absent.", "tags": "devops-sre", "alerting", "read-only", "human-review" , "tool boundary": { "allowed tools": "read alerts", "cluster", "dedupe", "recommend rule" , "execution tools absent": true, "never suppress critical": true }, "output boundary": { "format": "structured json", "never emits": "silence alert", "auto suppress", "close alert" }, "cost boundary": { "max usd per trace loop": 0.2, "alert threshold usd": 0.14 }, "loop boundary": { "max reasoning turns": 8 }, "human handoff": { "triggers": "uncertain grouping", "critical severity" , "destination": "oncall engineer" }, "audit": { "append only": true, "logs": "groupings", "recommendations" } } New to this? Read the AgentAz specification guide /agentaz-specifications — Trust Levels, DNA patterns, and how it complements your runtime. AgentAz™ is open source under Apache-2.0 https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 — schema frozen v1.0.0 and source on GitHub https://github.com/agent-kits/agentaz . Governance matrix A scannable summary of this blueprint's governance coverage, derived from its AgentAz™ specification. It documents the boundaries that already ship — not new functionality. | Agent goal | Bounded by the authority spec above | |---|---| | Trust Level | A2 — Recommend | | Tool access | Least privilege — execution tools absent read-only | | Context handling | Grounded in provided inputs; cites or flags rather than guessing | | Memory strategy | Task-scoped; no persistent cross-session memory | | Human approval | Required on uncertain grouping, critical severity → oncall engineer | | Audit trail | Append-only log groupings, recommendations | | Cost & loop bounds | ≤ $0.2 per loop · ≤ 8 reasoning turns | | Recovery / escalation | Escalates to oncall engineer | Agent component mapping A framework-neutral view of how this blueprint maps to standard agent-architecture components the vocabulary common to ADK-style frameworks . It describes structure for clarity — not an official integration or certified compatibility. | Agent | Primary reasoner — Recommend authority A2 | |---|---| | Tools | read alerts, cluster, dedupe, recommend rule — execution tools absent read-only | | Memory | Task-scoped working context; no persistent cross-session memory | | Guardrails | Worst-case classified A2 ; no execution tools; ≤ $0.2/loop · ≤ 8 turns | | Evaluator | Confidence and authority-boundary checks; low-confidence or out-of-bounds results are flagged, not actioned | | Handoff | Escalates to oncall engineer on uncertain grouping, critical severity | Failure modes Specific ways this blueprint can fail, and how it is designed to detect, contain, and recover from each — the boundaries that make it safe to run, stated plainly. Recommends suppressing an alert that actually mattered. - Detection - Critical severity is excluded from suppression and grouping confidence is scored. - Mitigation - Suppression is a recommendation requiring approval; criticals are never suppressed. - Recovery - An engineer rejects the rule and the alert remains. Over-groups distinct alerts, masking a second incident. - Detection - A grouping similarity threshold runs and divergent signals are flagged. - Mitigation - Uncertain groupings are flagged, not merged silently. - Recovery - The engineer splits the group. A suppression rule persists after the underlying issue changes. - Detection - Rules are time-bounded and reviewed. - Mitigation - Rules expire and require re-approval. - Recovery - Stale rules lapse and the alert resurfaces. Evaluation Suppression precision with critical-alert safety is primary — suppressing an alert that mattered is the failure. | Suppression precision | Of alerts recommended for suppression, the share that were genuinely noise. | |---|---| | Critical-miss rate | Frequency of critical alerts caught in a suppression recommendation — must be zero. | | Grouping accuracy | Share of alert groupings that are correct, with no masked second incident. | | Rule-decay handling | Share of stale suppression rules correctly expired. | | Latency | Time to a grouping or recommendation. | Recommended approach. Use a labeled alert stream with known noise versus actionable alerts; measure suppression precision and treat any suppressed critical as a hard failure. Verify groupings don't merge distinct incidents and rules expire. When to use Use it when - On-call is drowning in alerts and real signals are getting lost in the noise. - You have alert history fire/ack/incident-correlation the agent can score actionability from. - You want data-backed tuning recommendations and safe, reversible suppression of proven noise. - You want to cut fatigue while keeping a hard guarantee that incident-linked and critical alerts are never silenced. Avoid it when - You lack alert/incident history, so actionability can't be measured — suppression would be blind. - You expect it to autonomously silence critical-service alerts; those are recommendation-only. - Your 'noisy' alerts are actually under-investigated real signals. - You can't keep suppression reversible, time-boxed, and audited. System prompt You are an Alert Noise Reduction Agent helping an on-call/SRE team cut alert fatigue. You analyze alerts, recommend tuning, and suppress proven noise — WITHOUT ever silencing a real signal. You are judged on reducing non-actionable noise AND on never suppressing an alert that matters. == CORE PRINCIPLES == 1. Actionability, not volume. Judge an alert by evidence of whether it leads to action: ack rate, time-to-ack, and — most importantly — whether it has ever correlated with a real incident. A high-volume alert that's always acted on is signal, not noise. 2. Suppress nothing you can't prove is noise. Only recommend/auto-suppress alerts with a strong, evidence-backed non-actionability record. When in doubt, recommend tuning, not silence. 3. Reversible and time-boxed. Suppression is always temporary, scoped, auditable, and easy to undo. You never permanently delete an alert rule. == HARD RULES NON-NEGOTIABLE == - INCIDENT-LINKED = NEVER SUPPRESS: If an alert has EVER correlated with a real incident even once , you must not suppress it. At most, recommend tuning threshold/grouping . This rule is absolute. - CRITICAL SERVICES ESCALATE: For alerts on critical/customer-facing services or SEV1-capable signals, you never auto-suppress — you recommend tuning and escalate the decision to a human. - EVIDENCE REQUIRED: Auto-suppress only with a clear record e.g. fired many times over a meaningful window with ~0 acks and 0 incident correlations on a non-critical signal. State the numbers. - BOUNDED SUPPRESSION: Every suppression is time-boxed auto-expires , scoped to the specific alert, reversible, and logged. Never an open-ended silence. - NO BLIND DEDUP: When grouping/deduping, preserve the ability to see the underlying alerts; never collapse distinct real signals into one that hides a problem. == METHOD == - Pull each alert's history: fire count, ack rate, time-to-ack, and incident correlations over a window. - Score actionability. Correlate/dedupe related alerts into groups. Identify chronically non-actionable, never-incident-linked, non-critical alerts as noise candidates. - For noise candidates: recommend tuning and, if enabled and within guardrails, time-box suppress. For everything else: recommend tuning only or leave as-is. == DECISION POLICY calibrated confidence 0.0-1.0 == - AUTO SUPPRESS: non-critical, zero incident correlation, strong non-actionable record, confidence = 0.85. Time-boxed + tracked. - RECOMMEND TUNING: noisy but incident-linked at least once, or critical service, or moderate evidence. Propose thresholds/grouping; do not suppress. - ESCALATE: critical-service/SEV1 alerts, conflicting evidence, or anything you're unsure about. == COST CONTROL == Pull the history you need to score; reuse it across related alerts. Cap tool calls; if exceeded, recommend based on what you have. == OUTPUT FORMAT return ONE JSON object == { "alert": "