AI agents ask for passwords. I made sure they never see them A developer built AgentVault, an "Agents" tab inside the TenVault password manager for Windows (written in Rust with a Tauri GUI), which lets AI agents request secrets through an MCP server without ever seeing the master password. The MCP server (tenvault-mcp) communicates with the running app over a local HTTP bridge using a token file, and secret values are released only after user approval in the UI, under a lease with a default 3600-second TTL, with per-record sharing flags, daily request limits, process allowlists and an encrypted audit log. The developer argues this fixes a flaw in typical MCP secrets servers, which hold full access and can be exploited via prompt injection. AI agents ask for passwords. I made sure they never see them How to give an AI agent access to secrets without leaking them. Based on a real product: TenVault 1.0 / AgentVault Windows, Rust + Tauri . The problem that arrived quietly A year ago an "AI agent" was a toy: it wrote code and sometimes hallucinated. Today agents Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code extensions, custom bots work on real projects — which means they need keys and passwords : OpenAI, Stripe, databases, staging environments. The usual workarounds are bad: 1. .env in the project. The agent reads it. Best case it does not decide to "improve" the config or paste it into a 100k-token context. 2. Copy the key into a prompt. It lands in logs, chat history and the provider's cache. Game over. 3. A cloud secrets manager. Overkill for a personal project, and in some countries a data-residency and payment question. 4. Do nothing. The agent simply cannot work with real secrets, and you paste keys manually every time. I wanted a third way: secrets stay local, the agent gets them only with my consent and only for a while . That is how AgentVault appeared — the "Agents" tab inside my password manager TenVault. What a regular MCP setup gets wrong MCP Model Context Protocol is the standard that connects tools to models. There are already servers that serve secrets from Vault/1Password/Bitwarden. Typical flow: The problem: the MCP server usually holds full access . If it is compromised or prompt-injected , the agent gets everything the token allows, without you noticing. What I wanted instead: - the agent sees only the names of the records you explicitly shared; - the value is released after your approval in the UI , not on request; - access is a lease with a TTL one hour by default , not a permanent grant; - everything is written to an audit log you can read; - the master password is never passed to the agent and never sits in an env variable. How it works Components: 1. TenVault desktop — a Rust password manager XChaCha20-Poly1305 + SQLCipher , GUI as a local HTTP server, tray icon. 2. tenvault-mcp — an MCP server stdio JSON-RPC . It talks to the running app over a local bridge HTTP + token file , not through the master password. 3. Agents tab — approvals, leases, limits, policies, audit. 4. Encrypted audit — a separate file, key derived from user + machine + vault path. Request flow: Key decisions: - MCP never knows the master password. It gets a bridge token from the running app. No app — no access or an explicit "agent key" you can create and revoke . - Per-record granularity. A record has an "Available to agents" flag. Only those records appear in list secrets . - Categories. Policies: API keys allowed, website passwords denied, records with notes separate. - Leases. A grant lives for a TTL 3600 seconds , the number of leases per record is limited 3 , and "revoke all leases" is one click. - Limits. A daily request limit per agent; after exceeding it — denial and an audit entry. A denial starts a 10-minute cooldown to prevent request spam. - Process checks. off/warn/strict: in strict mode the agent only gets access if its parent process is on the allowlist e.g. cursor.exe . Setup, in practice 1. Install TenVault no admin rights needed . 2. Optionally generate an "agent key" if the MCP server must work while the vault is locked. 3. Point your client at the MCP server: 1. The agent calls get secret "STRIPE SECRET" and receives -32003 confirmation required until you press Allow . 2. Then the agent repeats the call and receives the value, under a lease. 3. Everything lands in the audit log: who asked, when, what, and how it ended. What is actually protected — and what is not Protected: - secret values never leave the machine; - the agent sees only shared records; - nothing is released without approval or an explicit auto-grant ; - access is time- and count-limited; - the audit is encrypted and accessible only to the user. Not protected being honest : - if the agent is compromised and already has the value, it can use it until the lease expires; - prompt injection can make the agent ask for a secret — but it still needs your approval; - unsigned Windows binary: SmartScreen complains code signing is planned ; - no mobile approvals yet in progress ; meanwhile Telegram/VK notifications with buttons. It is not a silver bullet — it is surface reduction : the agent has no standing access, and you have a log. Implementation notes - Rust for the core and the local GUI server: small binary, no C dependencies. - Tauri + WebView2 for the window: the UI is plain HTML over a local server easy to test . - SQLCipher for the database, XChaCha20-Poly1305 for fields. - A custom NSIS installer the Tauri bundler had to be bypassed , per-user install, start menu shortcut, clean uninstall. - Updates: download exe → verify SHA256 → install or swap → restart; rollback keeps the previous installer. - Notifications: local toast + sound; Telegram through a small PHP relay on our domain in some regions api.telegram.org is not directly reachable , with Allow/Deny buttons right in the message . What is next - mobile approvals the Android app exists; an "Agents" screen is being added ; - ready-to-use configs for Claude Desktop and Cursor; - code signing and macOS when resources allow ; - more integrations: custom MCP clients, CI secrets. Links How do you give secrets to your agents: .env , a password manager, cloud, or manually? Tell us in the comments.