"Adception": Google search ads route through Bing to a fake Claude for Mac installer

Push Security detected a malvertising campaign it calls "Adception" in which Google search ads for "claude mac" route users through a genuine Bing search result and a compromised retailer's "about us" page to a fake Claude for Mac download page at claude-desk-code[.]com. The fake page's Copy button places a malicious terminal command on the clipboard instead of Anthropic's real install command, which when pasted decodes a hidden URL and pipes a script from lake-90[.]com into the shell; Push says 4 in 5 ClickFix attacks it detects reach victims through search engines. Push reported no earlier public record of a search result being used as a search ad's destination, and lists the Google ad campaign ID gad_campaignid=24303361122 among indicators of compromise that it warns rotate quickly.

Back to News https://ministryofcyberaffairs.com/ Cybersecurity https://ministryofcyberaffairs.com/category/cybersecurity website "Adception": Google search ads route through Bing to a fake Claude for Mac installer Attackers are running Google search ads for "claude mac" whose destination is a genuine Bing search result. The chain passes through a compromised retail site to a fake Claude download page that copies a malicious terminal command to the clipboard. Push Security calls the technique "Adception": it slips past Google's ad review and link scanners by showing them only trusted domains, and serves the payload only to victims who arrive through the exact path. A new malvertising campaign is abusing one search engine to hide inside another. Push Security has detected Google search ads for "claude mac" that send users through a real Bing search result to a fake download page for Anthropic's Claude AI app. Push has named the technique "Adception." How the chain works The sponsored Google result showed bing.com as its domain, not a Claude lookalike. Clicking it triggered four steps: - Google's ad-click redirect google.com/aclk - Bing's own search-result redirect bing.com/ck/a , which forwards the browser with JavaScript and passes on a bing.com referrer - A compromised but genuine retailer's "about us" page , which forwards only visitors arriving from Bing - The fake Claude page at claude-desk-code . com Because the ad's destination was simply another search engine, Google's ad review approved it. The attacker had taken a real, indexed Bing result for a page they had compromised and placed it inside the Google ad. Two layers of cloaking The compromised site checks for a Bing referrer and specific browser headers before forwarding anyone. The fake Claude page then runs a second check in JavaScript: any visitor whose referrer isn't Google or Bing is sent to a 404 page. Security scanners, ad reviewers and researchers visiting the URL directly see nothing malicious. The clipboard trick The final page is a polished copy of Claude's download page, with a "Download for macOS" button and a one-line terminal install. This is the "InstallFix" variant of the ClickFix social-engineering technique, in which victims are tricked into pasting and running commands themselves. The page displays Anthropic's real install command, but its Copy button puts a different command on the clipboard. When pasted into Terminal, it prints "Downloading Claude: https://claude.ai/install.sh" to reassure the user, then quietly decodes a hidden URL and pipes a script from lake-90 . com into the shell. Push links the domains to a ClickFix toolkit it tracks as "AcSig." Why it matters Redirects through trusted domains are an old evasion trick: Google, Microsoft, LinkedIn and email security link-wrapping services have all been abused this way. But Push says it found no earlier public report of a search result being used as a search ad's destination. Push data shows 4 in 5 ClickFix attacks it detects reach victims through search engines. AI tools are now a favourite lure, because users searching for apps like Claude, ChatGPT and coding assistants are often developers with high-value access. Indicators of compromise Push warns that these domains rotate quickly, so IoCs have limited value on their own: - Google ad campaign ID: gad campaignid=24303361122 - Lure and delivery domains: claude-desk-code . com, ksmgakajgpsals.pages . dev, rapid-craft567 . com, too.clawddddd . com, fine-byte2 . com, fairpoint29 . com, turbowave45 . com, cli-desktop . com - Redirect: homeopatiaalemana . com/quienes-somos/ - Payload: lake-90 . com/curl/inhgup9a/a90fkbqdg8d0mus64oh8dw.dat What users and defenders should do - Download AI apps only from the vendor's official site, typed directly or bookmarked, never from a sponsored search result - Never paste terminal commands copied from a web page without reading what was actually copied - Treat any "install" page that asks you to run a command in Terminal or PowerShell as suspicious - Block the listed domains and monitor for shell commands that decode base64 URLs and pipe them into curl - Use browser-level security controls that inspect the full redirect chain and clipboard activity, not just the first URL