A Teardown of Claude Tag's Agent Identity Concept Anthropic's proposed 'Agent Identity' concept for Claude Tag is criticized as a security risk and a flawed approach to multi-agent access control. Critics argue that enforcing user-identity is simpler and more secure, and that Anthropic's design may be motivated by vendor lock-in and data access rather than technical merit. Anthropic's recent post on Agent Identity for Claude Tag https://claude.com/blog/agent-identity-access-model is, to put it mildly, a bad idea. For the uninitiated, "Agent identity" is the idea of giving a multiplayer AI agent a static set of privileges that are defined per-channel or per-group ACL, regardless of who is interacting with it. This means that either the AI is useless or is a "confused deputy" security risk waiting to blow. Calling "Agent Identity" a new paradigm is disingenuous when the more secure and more useful approach of enforcing user-identity is a one line fix. Instead of making HTTP calls directly to the tool with a fixed service account, pass an HTTP client that adds the user's credentials for that tool. Unfortunately for Anthropic, providing this alternative would mean that the entrypoint would have to be a different diy or otherwise tool that provides security features on internal IT resources. Let me break down the post's key claims and points. Claim 1: "Act as user" breaks down because it doesn't allow increasing agent autonomy Agents now schedule their own tasks for later and respond to events long after the person who asked has logged off. Have the agent keep a long-lived token to act on behalf of the user when accessing data or a service. For external services, OAuth server-side authentication is literally built to solve this problem. Claim 2: "Act as user" breaks down because it's not clear who's permissions should be used in a shared thread ...e.g., a channel where three engineers and a PM are debugging together. But when more than one person is steering, whose permissions apply? There’s no single choice of person that’d be right all of the time. Have the agent take the permissions of whoever it is responding to. This is what a human would do and is a natural and expected experience. If the PM asks to update the spec, allow it. Disallow the engineers. If the PM wants to update DNS, disallow it, but allow the engineers. Claim 3: Agent identity… is unusual, but we think it is a necessary step toward an access model that works for autonomous, multiplayer agents It is definitely unusual. But it's definitely not a necessary step for anything. In fact, later on in the post, they say: an identity-aware overlay for organizations with more complex clearance structures. This will add user-level checks on top of an agent’s scope, so Claude only acts when both the channel's profile and the requesting user's own permissions allow it. Lol, wut. Just use user-identity in the first place. Claim 4: Channels are a security boundary for scoping memory and access Memory and access respect those boundaries: what Claude learns in a private channel never appears in the wider workspace. This is not a feature. This is what we already have today by building agents per channel. This is a bug. The feature in a multiplayer AI would be to allow an AI to safely learn from private channels and apply it in other places. Claim 5: Agent Identity makes it easy to secure and audit …because Claude acts under its own service accounts, those actions also land in each connected system's own logs. Again, this is not a feature. This is a huge problem because there is no security / audit process that is built around "the slack channel". Security / audit is built around users and data. If something goes wrong, saying that it went wrong in the frontend-engg slack channel is not helpful. So why is Anthropic shilling such an obviously bad idea? The obvious hypothesis is that they want to own the "one superagent" entry point for everyone in the organization. Building claude-tag takes about 30 mins for a prototype and about a day for something production grade with a pass-through user identity auth. 1: Lock in to Anthropic models: GLM released last week. 2: Access to company data and memory: All slack threads are now sent to Anthropic's systems. In fact, with Fable 5, Anthropic has turned off zero data retention https://support.claude.com/en/articles/15425996-data-retention-practices-for-mythos-class-models for everyone. Claude Code was different because very few people understood how powerful AI models had gotten that creating an agentic coding harness was possible. Claude Tag however, is not powered by a leap in AI capabilities. This is the very simple prompt that the Claude Tag slackbot sends to a Claude Code session when you hit @claude :